| 1. |
- Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955
(författare)
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Cognition as Embodied Morphological Computation
- 2018
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Ingår i: PT-AI: 3rd Conference on "Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 9783319964485 ; , s. 19-23
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cognitive science is considered to be the study of mind (consciousness and thought) and intelligence in humans. Under such definition variety of unsolved/unsolvable problems appear. This article argues for a broad understanding of cognition based on empirical results from i.a. natural sciences, self-organization, artificial intelligence and artificial life, network science and neuroscience, that apart from the high level mental activities in humans, includes sub-symbolic and sub-conscious processes, such as emotions, recognizes cognition in other living beings as well as extended and distributed/social cognition. The new idea of cognition as complex multiscale phenomenon evolved in living organisms based on bodily structures that process information, linking cognitivists and EEEE (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognition approaches with the idea of morphological computation (info-computational self-organisation) in cognizing agents, emerging in evolution through interactions of a (living/cognizing) agent with the environment.
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| 2. |
- Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955
(författare)
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Cognitive Architectures Based on Natural Info-Computation
- 2022
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. ; , s. 3-13, s. 3-13
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- At the time when the first models of cognitive architectures have been proposed, some forty years ago, understanding of cognition, embodiment and evolution was substantially different from today’s. So was the state of the art of information physics, information chemistry, bioinformatics, neuroinformatics, computational neuroscience, complexity theory, self-organization, theory of evolution, as well as the basic concepts of information and computation. Novel developments support a constructive interdisciplinary framework for cognitive architectures based on natural morphological computing, where interactions between constituents at different levels of organization of matter-energy and their corresponding time-dependent dynamics, lead to complexification of agency and increased cognitive capacities of living organisms that unfold through evolution. Proposed info-computational framework for naturalizing cognition considers present updates (generalizations) of the concepts of information, computation, cognition, and evolution in order to attain an alignment with the current state of the art in corresponding research fields. Some important open questions are suggested for future research with implications for further development of cognitive and intelligent technologies.
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| 3. |
- Dodig Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955, et al.
(författare)
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Reality construction in cognitive agents through processes of info-computation
- 2017
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. ; 28, s. 211-232
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- What is reality for an agent? What is minimal cognition? How does the morphology of a cognitive agent affect cognition? These are still open questions among scientists and philosophers. In this chapter we propose the idea of info-computational nature as a framework for answering those questions. Within the info-computational framework, information is defined as a structure (for an agent), and computation as the dynamics of information (information processing). To an agent, nature therefore appears as an informational structure with computational dynamics. Both information and computation in this context have broader meaning than in everyday use, and both are necessarily grounded in physical implementation. Evolution of increasingly complex living agents is understood as a process of morphological (physical, embodied) computation driven by agents’ interactions with the environment. It is a process much more complex than random variation; instead the mechanisms of change are morphological computational processes of self-organisation (and re-organisation). Reality for an agent emerges as a result of interactions with the environment together with internal information processing. Following Maturana and Varela, we take cognition to be the process of living of an organism, and thus it appears on different levels of complexity, from cellular via organismic to social. The simpler the agent, the simpler its “reality” defined by the network of networks of info-computational processes, which constitute its cognition. The debated topic of consciousness takes its natural place in this framework, as a process of information integration that we suggest naturally evolved in organisms with a nervous system. Computing nature/pancomputationalism is sometimes confused with panpsychism or claimed to necessarily imply panpsychism, which we show is not the case. Even though we focus on natural systems in this chapter, the info-computational approach is general and can be used to model both biological and artifactual cognitive agents.
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| 4. |
- Häggström, Olle, 1967
(författare)
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Artificial General Intelligence and the Common Sense Argument
- 2022
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. ; 63, s. 155-160
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It has sometimes been suggested that lack of common sense in present-day AI systems demonstrates that there is no need to be concerned about future scenarios where a powerful unaligned AI seizes control of the world from us humans. This argument is criticized, and the confusion is shown to stem partly from an overly one-sided focus on artificial general intelligence (AGI), along with the implicit and unwarranted assumption that AGI must be attained before any such drastic scenarios can be realized.
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| 5. |
- Sonesson, Göran, et al.
(författare)
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Thirdness as the observer observed : From habit to law by way of Habitus
- 2016
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. - 9783319459189 - 9783319459202 ; 31, s. 283-295
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In order to study the notion of habit as an instance of Thirdness in Peirce’s work, it is necessary to go back to the intuitions at the basis of Peirce’s categories, trying to spell out concretely, as I think this has not been done before, the meaning of the three categories. This involves entangling the notions of fallibilism and of the collaborative work of the community of scholars, which may not have been taken seriously by most scholars pursuing the Peircean tradition. It is suggested that Peirce’s phenomenology is a version of Husserl’s phenomenology imposing a lot of constraints on the variation in imagination. In order to make sense of habit as Thirdness, we have to extend Peircean phenomenology into Husserlean phenomenology, abandoning the language of degeneracy, which is not very enlightening. Important contributions to the study of habit has also been made by several sociologists and psychologists.
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| 6. |
- Thorén, Henrik, et al.
(författare)
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History and philosophy of science as an interdisciplinary field of problem transfers
- 2015
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. - 9783319185996 - 9783319186009 ; 21, s. 147-159
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The extensive discussions of the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science in the mid-20th century provide a long history of grappling with the relevance of empirical research on the practices of science to the philosophical analysis of science. Further, those discussions also touched upon the issue of importing empirical methods into the philosophy of science through the creation of an interdisciplinary field, namely, the history and philosophy of science. In this paper we return to Giere (1973) and his claim that history of science as a discipline cannot contribute to philosophy of science by providing, partial or whole, solutions to philosophical problems. Does this imply that there can be no genuine interdisciplinarity between the two disciplines? In answering this question it is first suggested that connections between disciplines can be formed around the transfer and sharing of problems (as well as solutions); and that this is a viable alternative for how to understand the relationship between history and philosophy of science. Next we argue that this alternative is sufficient for establishing a genuine form of interdisciplinarity between them. An example is presented—Darden’s (1991) book on theory change—that shows how philosophy of science can rely on history of science in this way.
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