| 1. |
- Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982-, et al.
(författare)
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The Welfare-Enhancing Role of Parental Leave Mandates
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. - : Oxford University Press. - 8756-6222 .- 1465-7341. ; 35:1, s. 77-126
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A major factor that contributes to persistent gender variation in labor market outcomes is womens traditional role in the household. Child-related absences from work imply that women accumulate less job experience, are more prone to career discontinuities and, hence, suffer a motherhood penalty. We highlight how the gender-driven career/family segmentation of the labor market may create a normative justification for parental leave rules as a means to enhance efficiency in the labor market and alleviate the gender wage gap. (JEL D82, H21, J31, J83).
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| 2. |
- Decarolis, Francesco, et al.
(författare)
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Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. - : Oxford Univ Press. - 1465-7341 .- 8756-6222. ; 36:3, s. 537-597
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.
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| 3. |
- Harstad, Bård, et al.
(författare)
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Contracts and Induced Institutional Change
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 8756-6222 .- 1465-7341.
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We study agents’ incentives to form horizontal coalitions before a principal offers vertical contracts. When a vertical contract generates negative externalities on other agents, the agents may collude in order to obtain better deals; when one contract benefits other agents, the agents may decentralize, instead. Contractually induced institutional changes always harm the principal and the negative effect can outweigh the direct effects of the contracts, making the contracts counterproductive. The model is tractable and sufficiently flexible to be relevant for applications such as regulation of pollution, payments for forest conservation, and mergers between firms in a supplier–franchisee relationship. (JEL D86, H23, H87, Q58).
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| 4. |
- Zenou, Yves, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 8756-6222 .- 1465-7341. ; 28:1, s. 1-31
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article studies whether conformism behavior affects individual outcomes in crime. We present a social network model of peer effects with ex ante heterogeneous agents and show how conformism and deterrence affect criminal activities. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed data set of adolescent friendship networks. A novel social network-based empirical strategy allows us to identify peer effects for different types of crimes. We find that conformity plays an important role for all crimes, especially for petty crimes. This suggests that, for juvenile crime, an effective policy should be measured not only by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it engenders.
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