| 1. |
- A Herrera, I, et al.
(författare)
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Comparing a multi-linear (STEP) and systemic (FRAM) method for accident analysis
- 2010
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Ingår i: RELIABILITY ENGINEERING and SYSTEM SAFETY. - London, UK : Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.. - 0951-8320. ; 95:12, s. 1269-1275, s. 19-26
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Accident models and analysis methods affect what accident investigators look for, which contributory factors are found, and which recommendations are issued. This paper contrasts the Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (STEP) method and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) for accident analysis and modelling. The main issue addressed in this paper is the comparison of the established multi-linear method STEP with the new systemic method FRAM and which new insights the latter provides for accident analysis in comparison to the former established multi-linear method. Since STEP and FRAM are based on a different understandings of the nature of accidents, the comparison of the methods focuses on what we can learn from both methods, how, when, and why to apply them. The main finding is that STEP helps to illustrate what happened, involving which actors at what time, whereas FRAM illustrates the dynamic interactions within socio-technical systems and lets the analyst understand the how and why by describing non-linear dependencies, performance conditions, variability, and their resonance across functions.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Eriksson, Kerstin, et al.
(författare)
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Effective learning from emergency responses
- 2008
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Ingår i: Safety, reliability and risk analysis : theory, methods and applications. - 9780415485135 ; 1, s. 83-88
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Flammini, Francesco, Senior Lecturer, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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DETECT : A novel framework for the detection of attacks to critical infrastructures
- 2009
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Ingår i: Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis. - : Taylor & Francis. - 9780415485135 ; , s. 105-112
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) against potential threats has become a major issue in modern society. CIP involves a set of multidisciplinary activities and requires the adoption of proper protection mechanisms, usually supervised by centralized monitoring systems. This paper presents the motivation, the working principles and the software architecture of DETECT (DEcision Triggering Event Composer & Tracker), a new framework aimed at the automatic and early detection of threats against critical infrastructures. The framework is based on the fact that non trivial attack scenarios are made up by a set of basic steps which have to be executed in a predictable sequence (with possible variants). Such scenarios are identified during Vulnerability Assessment which is a fundamental phase of the Risk Analysis for critical infrastructures. DETECT operates by performing a model-based logical, spatial and temporal correlation of basic events detected by the sensorial subsystem (possibly including intelligent video-surveillance, wireless sensor networks, etc.). In order to achieve this aim, DETECT is based on a detection engine which is able to reason about heterogeneous data, implementing a centralized application of "data fusion". The framework can be interfaced with or integrated in existing monitoring systems as a decision support tool or even to automatically trigger adequate countermeasures.
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| 6. |
- Johansson, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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A Model for Vulnerability Analysis of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks
- 2009
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Ingår i: Safety, reliability and risk analysis : theory, methods and applications. - 9780415485135 ; , s. 2491-2499
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The technical infrastructures of the society are becoming more and more interconnected and in-terdependent, i.e. the function of an infrastructure influences the function of other infrastructures. Distur-bances in one infrastructure therefore often traverse to other dependent infrastructures and possibly even back to the infrastructure where the failure originated. It is becoming increasingly important to take these interde-pendencies into account when assessing the vulnerability of technical infrastructures. In the present paper, an approach for modeling interdependent technical infrastructures is proposed. The modeling approach is based on aspects of network theory, but with additional functional models for each modeled system. By modeling an electrified railway network, which consists of five system and dependencies between the systems, it is shown how the model can be employed in a vulnerability analysis. The model aims to capture both functional and geographic interdependencies. It is concluded that the model is suitable for vulnerability analyses of interde-pendent systems and the next step is to utilize the model in a full-scale vulnerability analysis.
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| 7. |
- Norberg, Tommy, 1950, et al.
(författare)
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Added value in fault tree analyses
- 2009
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Ingår i: Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications. Joint ESREL (European Safety and Reliability) and SRA-Europe (Society for Risk Analysis Europe) Conference; Valencia; Spain; 22-25 September 2008. - : CRC Press. - 9780415485135
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is recognized that the usual output of a fault tree analysis in some studies is not sufficiently informative. For added value in a widely used instrument for doing risk analyses, a Markovian approach is suggested. It is shown how to extend the calculations of the standard fault tree gates, so that information is available not only on the failure probability at the top level, but also on estimates of its rate of failure and mean down time. In applying this to an integrated fault tree analysis of a municipal drinking water system, we further identified the need for gates that are variations of those currently in use.
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