| 1. |
- Kävrestad, Joakim, 1989-, et al.
(författare)
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How the Civilian Sector in Sweden Perceive Threats from Offensive Cyberspace Operations
- 2021
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security. - Reading : ACI Academic Conferences International. - 9781912764433 - 9781912764990 ; , s. 499-506
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The presence of state-sponsored actors executing offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) has been made evident in recent years. The term offensive cyberspace operations encompass a range of different actions, including cyberespionage, disinformation campaigns, spread of malware and more. Based on an analysis of past events, it is evident that state-sponsored actors are causing harm to the civilian sector using OCO. However, the degree to which civilian organizations understand the threat from state-sponsored actors is currently unknown. This research seeks to provide new a better understanding of OCO and their impact on civilian organizations. To highlight this domain, the case of the threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1) is presented, and its impact on three civilian organizations discussed. Semi-structured interviews were used to research how the threats from OCO and state-sponsored actors are perceived by civilian organizations. First, a computational literature review was used to get an overview of related work and establish question themes. Next, the question themes were used to develop questions for the interview guide, followed by separate interviews with five security professionals working in civilian organizations. The interviews were analysed using thematic coding and the identified themes summarized as the result of this research. The results show that all respondents are aware of the threat from OCO, but they perceive it in different ways. While all respondents acknowledge state-sponsored actors at a threat agent executing OCO, some respondent’s argue that state-sponsored actors are actively seeking footholds in systems for future use while others state that the main goal of state-sponsored actors is to steal information. This suggests that the understanding of the threat imposed by OCO is limited, or at least inconsistent, among civilian security experts. As an interview study, the generalisability of this research is limited. However, it does demonstrate that the civilian society does not share a common view of the threat from state-sponsored actors and OCO. As such, it demonstrates a need for future research in this domain and can serve as a starting point for such projects.
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| 2. |
- Wairimu, Samuel, 1988-
(författare)
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e-Health as a Target in Cyberwar : Expecting the Worst
- 2021
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Ingår i: Proceeding of the 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ECCWS 2021. - Reading, UK : ACI Academic Conferences International. - 9781912764433 - 9781912764990 ; , s. 549-557
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Healthcare organisations have become a key target for attackers as evidenced by the global increase in cyberattacks. These cyberattacks are attributed to various attackers who differ in motivations and skills, with the common motivation being financial gain due to the rich personal data contained in patients' health records. But what would happen if the motivation changed? What would happen if the motivation is driven by targeting key people, mass exploitation or taking lives? What would happen if a strategic cyberattack knocks out a society’s critical infrastructure? This article investigates the possibility of targeting e-Health in the context of cyberwar. It assesses the privacy in healthcare and compares the consequences and impact of conventional cyber-attacks within the healthcare sector, against the consequences and impact of cyberwar on the same. The outcome indicates that e-Health in the context cyberwar could result to active reconnaissance of patient records, which could lead to the targeting of key and influential people through Personally Identifiable Information (PII), mass exploitation, and personal attacks derived from Personal Health Information (PHI), which could result to irreversible damage or death.
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| 3. |
- Bengtsson, Johnny, et al.
(författare)
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The Manifestation of Chinese Strategies Into Offensive Cyberspace Operations Targeting Sweden
- 2021
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security. - Reading, UK : Academic Conferences International Limited. - 9781912764990 ; , s. 35-43
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People’s Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).
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