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| 2. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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An Argument Against Disjunctivism
- 2012
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Ingår i: Two talks on Perception – a mini-workshop.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 3. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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An Argument Against Disjunctivism
- 2013
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Ingår i: Johanssonian Investigations Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. - Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag. - 9783868381900 ; , s. 15-41
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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Embryots själ
- 2006
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Ingår i: Signum. - 0347-0423. ; 2006:2, s. 39-46
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 7. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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Ett analogislut utan slutledningar
- 2007
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Ingår i: Föreläsning vid filosofidagarna i Umeå, den 9:e juni 2007.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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Intentionality and Intersubjectivity
- 2007
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This is a dissertation about the problem of other minds. Its point of departure is the modern philosophical and cognitive-scientific discussion of our attribution of mental states to others, in particular as it is conceived of within the so-called theory theory. The theory theory, and the broader framework of which it is a part, are presented in part 1. In the second part of the dissertation, it is argued that the conception of intentionality normally used in the modern discussions of intersubjectivity cannot adequately explain all facets of human actions. This is because some aspects of actions can only be explained by recourse to intentional states which are not necessarily cognitively accessible. Based upon the Merleau-Pontyian notion of body schema, I develop an alternative account of intentionality, viz. primordial intentionality. The third part of the dissertation argues that the theory theory, and indeed all theories of intersubjectivity that conceive of our ascription of mental states to others as being essentially cognitive, fail to appreciate the nature of the intentionality involved in our habitual capacity for mentalising. The kind of intentionality which is primarily involved in intersubjectivity is not cognitive intentionality, but primordial intentionality. In a Merleau-Pontyian spirit, this mentalising is explicated as a body-schematic transfer. I argue that my Merleau-Pontyian theory can explain how we can habitually attribute mental states to others, and that it furthermore presents a novel solution to the problem of how it is at all possible for us to conceive of the mental states of others.
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| 9. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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McDowell's Naturalism
- 2006
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Ingår i: Kvantifikator för en Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his Sixtieth Birthday. - 1652-0459. ; , s. 37-52
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This is an essay on McDowell’s naturalism. It is, pace some commentators, argued that McDowell’s naturalism does not end up in any strange metaphysical positions in the philosophy of mind, because second nature non-reductively supervenes on first nature and have causal powers. Pace certain other commentators, it is also argued that McDowell can be read as drawing a clear line between ethical platonism, and his own naturalized platonism, but only at the cost of landing in standard naturalism.
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| 10. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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Perceiving Exploding Tropes
- 2016
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : Brill. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 93:1, s. 42-62
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is perceived as identical over time, even though the sense of the qualitative nature ( the redness, the crimson redness) of the property is changing. The distinction between the sense of identity and the sense of quality is explicated in terms of perceiving a particular property, a trope, and perceiving it as an instance of a universal. It is subsequently argued that the perceived tropes cannot constitute the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience.
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