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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Are they watching you and does it matter? Evidence from a natural field experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In a natural field experiment, we tested whether being alone or in a group had an effect on prosocial behavior as expressed in donations to a recreational park. We also explored whether the presence of people exogenous to the group at the time of the donation had any behavioral effect. Our first treatment aimed at identifying peer effects, whereas our second treatment was similar to being in the public eye. We found that being in a group significantly increases the share of people acting prosocially. Moreover, we found that only individuals who are part of a group are positively affected by the presence of a third party.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives: Losses from Excluded Individuals Can Counter Gains from Those Selected
- 2013
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Incentives conditioned on socially desired acts such as donating blood, departing conflict or mitigating climate change have increased in popularity. Many incentives are targeted, excluding some of the potential participants based upon characteristics or prior actions. We hypothesize that pro-sociality is reduced by exclusion, in of itself (i.e., fixing prices and income), and that the rationale for exclusion influences such 'behavioral spillovers'. To test this, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of a subsidy to donations when participants are fully informed about why they are selected, or not, for the subsidy. We study the effects of introducing different selection rules upon changes in donations. Selecting for the subsidy those who initially acted less pro-social (i.e., gave little to start) increased donations, while random subsidies and rewarding greater pro-sociality did not. Yet a selection rule which targets lower prior pro-sociality also intentionally excludes the people who donated more initially, and only that rule reduced donations by the excluded. This shows a tradeoff between losses from excluded participants and gains from selected.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Do Entrance Fees Crowd Out Donations for Public Goods? Evidence from a Protected Area in Costa Rica
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we investigate how different levels of entrance fees affect donations for a public good, a natural park. To explore this issue, we conducted a s tated preference study focusing on visitors’ preferences for donating money to raise funds for a protected area in Costa Rica given different entrance fee levels. The results reveal that there is incomplete crowding - out of donations when establishing an en trance fee.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Do entrance fees crowd out donations for public goods? Evidence from a protected area in Costa Rica
- 2015
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Ingår i: Environment and Development Economics. - : Cambridge University Press. - 1355-770X .- 1469-4395. ; 20:3, s. 311-326
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we investigate how different levels of entrance fees affect donations for a public good, a natural park. To explore this issue, we conducted a stated preference study focusing on visitors' preferences for donating money to raise funds for a protected area in Costa Rica given different entrance fee levels. The results reveal that there is incomplete crowding out of donations when establishing an entrance fee.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Does context matter more for hypothetical than for actual contributions? Evidence from a natural field experiment
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We investigate the importance of the social context for people’s voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica, using a natural field experiment. Some subjects make actual contributions while others state their hypothetical contribution. Both the degree of anonymity and provided information about the contributions of others influence subject contributions in the hypothesized direction. We do find a substantial hypothetical bias with regard to the amount contributed. However, the influence of the social contexts is about the same when the subjects make actual monetary contributions as when they state their hypothetical contributions. Our results have important implications for validity testing of stated preference methods: a comparison between hypothetical and actual behavior should be done for a given social context.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Does It Matter if You Are Observed by Others? Evidence from Donations in the Field
- 2013
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - 0347-0520. ; 115:1, s. 74-83
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate whether people’s donations in the field are affected by the presence of others. In the analysis, we distinguish between individuals who arrived at a national park alone and those who arrived as members of a group. We also investigated the effect of donations being made in the presence of a third party made in the presence of a third party. We find that donations are significantly more frequent for individuals who are members of a group. When a third party is present, we find that the total donations by individuals who are a part of a group are significantly higher than those of lone travelers, mainly because of the increased probability of donating.
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- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Effects of Exclusion from a Conservation Policy: Negative Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives
- 2013
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A critical issue in the design of incentive mechanisms is the choice of whom to target. For forests, the leading schemes: [i] target locations with high ecosystem-service density; [ii] target additionality, i.e., locations where conservation would not occur without the incentive; or, at least effectively, [iii] reward previous private choices to conserve forest. We use a field experiment to examine the changes in contributions to forest conservation when we introduce each of those three selection rules. For individuals who are selected, we find that targeting additionality (rule [ii]) is the only scheme to increase contributions. However that selection rule intentionally excludes those who contributed most previously and it is the only one to generate significant 'behavioral leakage', i.e., negative spillovers or falling contributions by those who are excluded (and face no price or income changes). Our results demonstrate a tradeoff in targeting and a challenge for optimal policy design.
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