| 1. |
- Andrighetto, Giulia, et al.
(författare)
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Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching
- 2015
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-1078. ; 6
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' “empirical” or “normative” expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.
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| 2. |
- Ebersole, Charles R., et al.
(författare)
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Many Labs 5: Testing Pre-Data-Collection Peer Review as an Intervention to Increase Replicability
- 2020
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Ingår i: Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science. - : Sage. - 2515-2467 .- 2515-2459. ; 3:3, s. 309-331
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Replication studies in psychological science sometimes fail to reproduce prior findings. If these studies use methods that are unfaithful to the original study or ineffective in eliciting the phenomenon of interest, then a failure to replicate may be a failure of the protocol rather than a challenge to the original finding. Formal pre-data-collection peer review by experts may address shortcomings and increase replicability rates. We selected 10 replication studies from the Reproducibility Project: Psychology (RP:P; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) for which the original authors had expressed concerns about the replication designs before data collection; only one of these studies had yielded a statistically significant effect (p < .05). Commenters suggested that lack of adherence to expert review and low-powered tests were the reasons that most of these RP:P studies failed to replicate the original effects. We revised the replication protocols and received formal peer review prior to conducting new replication studies. We administered the RP:P and revised protocols in multiple laboratories (median number of laboratories per original study = 6.5, range = 3-9; median total sample = 1,279.5, range = 276-3,512) for high-powered tests of each original finding with both protocols. Overall, following the preregistered analysis plan, we found that the revised protocols produced effect sizes similar to those of the RP:P protocols (Delta r = .002 or .014, depending on analytic approach). The median effect size for the revised protocols (r = .05) was similar to that of the RP:P protocols (r = .04) and the original RP:P replications (r = .11), and smaller than that of the original studies (r = .37). Analysis of the cumulative evidence across the original studies and the corresponding three replication attempts provided very precise estimates of the 10 tested effects and indicated that their effect sizes (median r = .07, range = .00-.15) were 78% smaller, on average, than the original effect sizes (median r = .37, range = .19-.50).
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| 3. |
- Przepiorka, Wojtek, et al.
(författare)
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How Norms Emerge from Conventions (and Change)
- 2022
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Ingår i: SOCIUS. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC. - 2378-0231. ; 8:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Social norms regulate our behavior in a variety of mundane and far-reaching contexts, from tipping at the restaurant to social distancing during a pandemic. However, how social norms emerge, persist, and change is still poorly understood. Here the authors investigate experimentally whether spontaneously emerging behavioral regularities (i.e., conventions) gain normativity over time and, if so, whether their normative underpinning makes them resistant to changes in economic incentives. To track the coevolution of behavior and normativity, the authors use a set of measures to elicit participants' first- and second-order normative beliefs and their (dis)approval of other participants' behaviors. The authors find that even in the limited duration of their lab experiment, conventions gain normativity that makes these conventions resistant to change, especially if they promote egalitarian outcomes and the change in economic incentives is relatively small. These findings advance our understanding of how cognitive, social and economic mechanisms interact in bringing about social change.
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| 4. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(författare)
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Aggression, Conflict, and the Formation of Intimidating Group Reputation
- 2020
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Ingår i: Social psychology quarterly. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC. - 0190-2725 .- 1939-8999. ; 83:1, s. 70-87
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From inmates in prison gangs to soldiers in elite units, the intimidating reputation of groups often precedes its members. While individual reputation is known to affect people's aggressiveness, whether one's group reputation can similarly influence behavior in conflict situations is yet to be established. Using an economic game experiment, we isolate the effect of group reputation on aggression and conflict from that of individual reputation. We find that group reputation can increase the willingness to inflict costs on others but only when individuals are able to punish their fellow members. Even if internal discipline can sustain their shared reputation, more intimidating groups provide fewer benefits to their members in the short run. Using an agent-based simulation, we show that this might not be the case in the long run. Our findings yield insights into the effects of group reputation on aggression, conflict, and possible consequences for group survival.
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| 5. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(författare)
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Evidence from a long-term experiment that collective risks change social norms and promote cooperation
- 2021
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Ingår i: Nature Communications. - : Nature Publishing Group. - 2041-1723. ; 12:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change toreducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength ofthe norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.
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| 6. |
- Tummolini, Luca, et al.
(författare)
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A convention or (tacit) agreement betwixt us : on reliance and its normative consequences
- 2012
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 190:4, s. 585-618
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance. We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming from conventions are “tacit” in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed.
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| 7. |
- Vriens, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Risk, sanctions and norm change: the formation and decay of social distancing norms
- 2024
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Ingår i: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Biological Sciences. - : ROYAL SOC. - 0962-8436 .- 1471-2970. ; 379:1897
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Global challenges like the climate crisis and pandemic outbreaks require collective responses where people quickly adapt to changing circumstances. Social norms are potential solutions, but only if they themselves are flexible enough. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to study norm formation and decay in real-world contexts. We tracked empirical and normative expectations about social distancing and empirical and normative expectations of sanctioning from June 2021 to February 2022 to explore how norms and meta norms evolved as COVID-19 risk decreased and increased. We found that norms and meta norms partially coevolve with risk dynamics, although they recover with some delay. This implies that norms should be enforced as soon as risk increases. We therefore tested how sanctioning intentions vary for different hypothetical norms and find them to increase with a clear meta norm of sanctioning, yet decrease with a clear social norm of distance. In conclusion, social norms evolve spontaneously with changing risk, but might not be adaptive enough when the lack of meta norms of sanctioning introduce tolerance for norm violations. Moreover, norm nudges can potentially have negative externalities if strengthening the social norm increases tolerance for norm violations. These results put some limits to social norms as solutions to guide behaviour under risk.This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.
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