| 1. |
- Bäck, Hanna, 1975, et al.
(author)
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Chivalry or chauvinism? The impact of benevolent and hostile sexism in the 2016 US Presidential election.
- 2017
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In: The XVIII Nordic Political Science Association (NoPSA) Congress. Odense, Danmark: 8-11 August.
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Conference paper (other academic/artistic)abstract
- What role did sexism play in the 2016 presidential election, the first US election with a female major party candidate? In this paper, we draw on the literature on ambivalent sexism, differentiating between ‘hostile’ and ‘benevolent’ sexism. Hostile sexism is a set of attitudes representing prejudice toward women, whereas benevolent sexism consists of stereotypical views of women. We suggest that individuals holding hostile and benevolent sexist views should differ in their response to the context surrounding the 2016 election. Hostile sexists should devalue a female candidate (Clinton), resulting in lower support for her, and higher support for her opponent, especially one perceived to hold sexist views (Trump). However, we suggest that benevolent sexists should, in a context involving ‘attacks’ on women, become ‘protective’ towards a female candidate, resulting in higher support for her. The study presented here is based on a two-wave online panel survey with about 500 respondents, performed the week before and after the election. We find that hostile sexists were less likely to support Clinton and more likely to support Trump. Our results also show that benevolent sexists were more likely to support Clinton, and that these evaluations were based on ‘communal’ candidate traits.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Bergman, Torbjörn, 1957-, et al.
(author)
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Appendix : On definition and measurement
- 2021
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In: Coalition governance in Western Europe. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198868484 ; , s. 727-748
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The appendix introduces our empirical study of the coalition life cycle. The structure of each country chapter is based on six core tables, each one capturing a major stage in the coalition life cycle. In the book chapters, the tables help structure the analysis and provide wealth of information and details of the coalition cycle. Nevertheless, the book chapters and this appendix only present a sample of the data and information that we have collected for this research project. For reasons of space, we have had to limit the presentation in the book chapters in terms of time-periods and variables. This appendix presents many more details that are important for readers who are not familiar with the definitions used in coalition research or interested in how particular variables where measured. In addition to the definitions and measurements presented in this appendix, all the data and all the variables are presented in an on-line data appendix at www.erdda.org.
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| 4. |
- Bergman, Torbjörn, 1957-, et al.
(author)
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Coalition governance patterns across Western Europe
- 2021
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In: Coalition governance in Western Europe. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198868484 ; , s. 680-726
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We here summarize and compares the empirical results found by our country authors, focusing on the coalition life cycle in 17 countries. The chapter starts with a description of the changes that have occurred during the past decades in the party systems of Western Europe, and some institutional rules surrounding government formation and duration. We then turn to the comparing patterns of government formation across countries, showing that coalitions constitute almost 70 percent of the cabinets in Western Europe, and that the Scandinavian countries have been dominated by minority cabinets. Focusing on the coalition governance stage, we analyse the variation in the use of various control mechanisms across countries, for example showing that many coalition governments draft extensive contracts to control their partners in cabinet. The comparative data we present also shows that such agreements have become longer over time. Focusing on the last stage of the life cycle, we show that in a majority of countries, it is more common that a cabinet terminates early than serves the full term. There has also been a clear trend towards more government instability, even though the variation in cabinet duration across countries is large. We conclude this chapter by returning to the three coalition governance models described earlier in this volume, classifying the countries as being closer to one of the three models, based on a number of indicators and the information provided by our country experts.
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| 5. |
- Bergman, Torbjörn, 1957-, et al.
(author)
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The three stages of the coalition life cycle
- 2021
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In: Coalition governance in Western Europe. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198868484 ; , s. 15-40
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This chapter focuses on presenting the main research questions and answers provided in the literature on the different stages of the coalition life cycle. For example, focusing on the first stage, the formation stage, several researchers have tried to explain why specific types of governments form. Other scholars have asked why it take longer to form governments in some contexts. Other scholars have tried to explain how parties distribute ministerial and policy payoffs when forming a cabinet. Focusing on the second stage of the coalition life cycle, we review the growing literature on coalition governance, concentrating on three coalition governance models; the ministerial autonomy model, the coalition compromise model, and the PM dominated model – three models which make different assumptions about the actors that dominate the governance process in coalition governments. Focusing on the last phase of the coalition life cycle, the termination of governments, scholars have long aimed to explain the duration of cabinets, asking why some cabinets last longer than others. At the end of this chapter, we present some expectations about changes to the coalition life cycle which we are likely to observe considering the party system change we have seen in many Western European countries.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Bäck, Hanna, et al.
(author)
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Pre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation
- 2024
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In: West European Politics. - : Routledge. - 0140-2382 .- 1743-9655. ; 47:1, s. 88-112
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945-2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018-2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes.
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| 8. |
- Dahl, Svend, 1975-
(author)
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Efter folkrörelsepartiet : Om aktivism och politisk förändring i tre svenska riksdagspartier
- 2011
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The relationship between a party leadership and party activists is often illustrated by the use of John May’s "Law of curvilinear opinion structures in political parties", i.e. the idea that mid-level party activists are assumed to be more radical than both party sympathisers and the party elite. This tension between party leadership and party activists can be assumed to lead to a restriction on the party leadership’s freedom of action. However, in recent years we have seen a number of examples where political parties have made major realignments of their own policies without any substantial internal conflicts. Given the role assigned to conditions for involvement in the formulation of May's Law it appears reasonable to look in that direction when trying to understand these changes. This study covers the Moderate Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party in Sweden. The offer made by the parties to their members can be understood in terms of collective goods, such as ideological and political community, and selective goods, such as elected offices. This thesis shows how the political involvement for the interviewed party activists is intimately linked to selective goods. This finding can help us to understand ideological and political changes in present-day parties. If, as a party activist, one is attracted by the opportunities to become an elected representative or the opportunities to exercise political power, it is reasonable to imagine that one will be more inclined to support actions that increase the opportunity to enjoy these goods. Since both the party leadership and the party activists are attracted by the selective goods offered by the party organisation, the conflict between these groups decreases, as both groups are focused on winning elections and exercising political power. The result of this study therefore provides grounds for questioning the ideas of a tension between party activists and party leaderships.
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| 9. |
- Lindahl, Jonas, 1984-, et al.
(author)
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Sweden : Minority government as the norm
- 2020
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In: Coalition Government as a Reflection of a Nation’s Politics and Society. - London : Routledge. - 9781138392113 - 9780429422379 ; , s. 127-146
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Swedish coalition politics is markedly influenced both by a historically strong emphasis on near-unidimensional political conflict along the left-right economic dimension, the once-dominant position of the Social Democrats, and a negative parliamentarism system. These factors have contributed to most governments formed during the post-World War Two period comprising a minority of seats in parliament. Often, governments have been single-party Social Democrat cabinets, who have relied on support from one or more parties outside government. Swedish politics has long been characterized by “bloc politics”, where the socialist and the non-socialist bloc have competed for power. However, with the entry and growth of the populist radical-right party, the Sweden Democrats, the future of bloc politics has become more uncertain. Consequently, after the 2018 election, the formation of a centre-left, red-green government required drawn-out negotiations across and within the two blocs in order to obtain the necessary support of several non-socialist parties.
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| 10. |
- Lindvall, Johannes, et al.
(author)
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Sweden's Parliamentary Democracy at 100
- 2020
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In: Parliamentary Affairs. - : OXFORD UNIV PRESS. - 0031-2290 .- 1460-2482. ; 73:3, s. 477-502
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article assesses how Swedish parliamentary democracy works today, almost one hundred years into its history. Our main research question is whether the transformation of the Swedish party system since the 1980s and especially since 2010, when the populist-radical-right Sweden Democrats entered parliament has altered the way parliamentary democracy works. We provide new evidence on Sweden's changing party system, the formation and duration of cabinets, decision-making in parliament and the relationship between what parties say in election campaigns and what they do in government. Our main conclusion is that at least by the election of 2018, surprisingly little had changed. Cabinets have formed quickly, and once formed, they have survived until the next election. The bills governments have sent to parliament have usually passed, often getting the support of one or more opposition parties. Governing parties have managed to implement approximately 80 per cent of the promises they have made in their election manifestos. That said, the relationship between the executive and the legislature was contested in the 2010-2014 and 2014-2018 parliaments, and after the election of 2018, it took a very long time to form a new government. The concluding section discusses what the future might hold.
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