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- Björklund, Fredrik, et al.
(författare)
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Recent Work on Motivational Internalism
- 2012
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Ingår i: Analysis. - Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 72:1, s. 124-137
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- Reviews recent work on motivational internalism.
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- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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A unified empirical account of responsibility judgments
- 2013
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Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0031-8205 .- 1933-1592. ; 87:3, s. 611-639
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of surprising factors, sometimes prompting apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.
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- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-
(författare)
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Alternatives
- 2008
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Ingår i: Philosophical communications. - 1652-0459. ; 49
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Discusses various attempts to define two key notions in consequentialist ethics, those of alternatives and consequences of actions, raises problems and proposes a solution. Hitherto unpublished manuscript from 1992.
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| 7. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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Argumentationsanalys : Färdigheter för kritiskt tänkande
- 2009. - 2
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Ny reviderad utgåva.Att tänka kritiskt är att självständigt ta ställning till rimligheten i påståenden och argument. Det är en ovärderlig förmåga när vi ställs inför frågor där svaren är många och motstridiga och argumentationen pekar i olika riktningar. I sådana situationer kan det vara svårt att skaffa sig överblick över argumenten, ta ställning till deras styrka och göra en samlad bedömning av alternativen. Lyckligtvis är detta svårigheter som går att hantera med just sådana verktyg som Argumentationsanalys erbjuder. Genom att använda dem förbättrar vi vår förmåga att både identifiera argument i text och tal och bedöma deras beviskraft. Den som själv behöver skriva en argumenterande text eller göra ett argumenterande framförande har dessutom god hjälp av bokens metod att åskådliggöra hur olika argument i en viss fråga förhåller sig till varandra. Argumentationsanalys är en teoretisk och praktisk handledning med övningar. Boken riktar sig till studenter i humanistiska och samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen, men också till alla andra som konfronteras med komplicerade argumentationer.
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- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-
(författare)
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Being Implicated : On the Fittingness of Guilt and Indignation over Outcomes
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 178, s. 3543-3560
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related but importantly different answer: What is required for fitting guilt and indignation is that the agent is relevantly implicated in that outcome: that the agent’s morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, it is further argued, makes sense because when an agent’s substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation.
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| 9. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-
(författare)
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Collective explanations, individual responsibility
- 2009
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Ingår i: Book of abstracts, International Conference on Moral Responsibility: Neuroscience, Organization & Engineering, Book of Abstracts. - Delft, Netherlands : 3TU.Centre for Ethics and Technology, Delft University of Technology. - 9789056382148 ; , s. 35-36
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Two philosophical discussions of moral responsibility run parallel. One is tightly connected to the debate about free will and its relation to determinism and indeterminism. Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility belonging to this discussion typically focus on individual agential responsibility, characterizing what must be true about individuals in order for them to be responsible for their actions. The other discussion is connected to normative ethics, and the question of when the normative status of an action is affected by the occurrence of some good or bad event. Accounts belonging to this discussion sometimes address questions of whether individuals can be responsible for outcomes of actions by collectives to which they belong or identify with, or for joint effects of a great number of similar actions. A branch of the normative debate about responsibility also concerns the responsibility of collective agents such as corporations and nations. The two discussions rarely meet, and for seemingly good reason, as they appear to be concerned with very different aspects of responsibility; one is concerned with the causes of actions and the conditions under which we decide to act, the other with the relation between actions and consequences of action. In this paper, however, I argue that the Explanation Account, a promising account of individual agential responsibility, extends naturally to both individual and collective outcome-responsibility, and suggests intuitively plausible answers to questions about the responsibility of collectives and their members. The crucial aspect of the Explanation Account is that for an agent to be responsible for an event is for some relevant aspect of the agent’s motivation or lack thereof to be part of a significant explanation of that event. In the paper, I discuss how this extends to cases where events are explained by the fact that, say, the US rejects an international treaty, or that affluent people keep flying more than necessary. Unlike many other accounts of responsibility in virtue of participation in collective action, this account does not presuppose that collectives are agents, or even that they are social or cultural units. What matters is whether the actions of these individuals are instances of a set of actions that explains the outcomes for which they are thereby responsible. References: * Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl “Judgments of Moral Responsibility: A Unified Account”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting 2009, available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004633/ * Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl “The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility”, forthcoming in Noûs
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