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Träfflista för sökning "WFRF:(Cabrera Arteaga Javier 1992 ) "

Sökning: WFRF:(Cabrera Arteaga Javier 1992 )

  • Resultat 1-9 av 9
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1.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992- (författare)
  • Artificial Software Diversification for WebAssembly
  • 2022
  • Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • WebAssembly has become the fourth official web language, along with HTML, CSS and JavaScript since 2019. WebAssembly allows web browsers to execute existing programs or libraries written in other languages, such as C/C++ and Rust. In addition, WebAssembly evolves to be part of edge-cloud computing platforms. Despite being designed with security as a premise, WebAssembly is not exempt from vulnerabilities. Therefore, potential vulnerabilities and flaws are included in its distribution and execution, highlighting a software monoculture problem. On the other hand, while software diversity has been shown to mitigate monoculture, no diversification approach has been proposed for WebAssembly. This work proposes software diversity as a preemptive solution to mitigate software monoculture for WebAssembly.Besides, we provide implementations for our approaches, including a generic LLVM superdiversifier that potentially extends our ideas to other programming languages. We empirically demonstrate the impact of our approach by providing Randomization and Multivariant Execution (MVE) for WebAssembly. Our results show that our approaches can provide an automated end-to-end solution for the diversification of WebAssembly programs. The main contributions of this work are:We highlight the lack of diversification techniques for WebAssembly through an exhaustive literature review.We provide randomization and multivariant execution for WebAssembly with the implementation of two tools, CROW and MEWE respectively.We include constant inferring as a new code transformation to generate software diversification for WebAssembly.We empirically demonstrate the impact of our technique by evaluating the static and dynamic behavior of the generated diversification.Our approaches harden observable properties commonly used to conduct attacks, such as static code analysis, execution traces, and execution time.
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2.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • CROW: Code Diversification for WebAssembly
  • 2021
  • Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
    • The adoption of WebAssembly increases rapidly, as it provides a fast and safe model for program execution in the browser. However, WebAssembly is not exempt from vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious observers. Code diversification can mitigate some of these attacks. In this paper, we present the first fully automated workflow for the diversification of WebAssembly binaries. We present CROW, an open-source tool implementing this workflow through enumerative synthesis of diverse code snippets expressed in the LLVMintermediate representation. We evaluate CROW’s capabilitieson303C programs and study its use on a real-life security-sensitive program: libsodium, a modern cryptographic library. Overall, CROW is able to generate diverse variants for239out of303 (79%)small programs. Furthermore, our experiments show that our approach and tool is able to successfully diversify off-the-shelf cryptographic software (libsodium).
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3.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • Multi-variant Execution at the Edge
  • Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • Edge-Cloud computing offloads parts of the computations that traditionally occurs in the cloud to edge nodes. The binary format WebAssembly is increasingly used to distribute and deploy services on such platforms. Edge-Cloud computing providers let their clients deploy stateless services inthe form of WebAssembly binaries, which are then translated to machine code, sandboxed and executed at the edge.In this context, we propose atechnique that (i) automatically diversifies WebAssembly binaries that are deployed to the edge and (ii) randomizes execution paths at runtime. Thus, an attacker cannot exploit all edge nodes with the same payload. Given aservice, we automatically synthesize functionally equivalent variants for thefunctions providing the service. All the variants are then wrapped into a singlemultivariant WebAssembly binary. When the service endpoint is executed, every time a function is invoked, one of its variants is randomly selected. We implement this technique in the MEWE tool and we validate it with 7 servicesfor which MEWE generates multivariant binaries that embed hundreds of function variants. We execute the multivariant binaries on the world-wide edge platform provided by Fastly, as part as a research collaboration. We show that multivariant binaries exhibit a real diversity of execution traces across the whole edge platform distributed around the globe.
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4.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • Multi-variant Execution at the Edge
  • 2022
  • Ingår i: MTD 2022. - New York, NY, USA : Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). ; , s. 11-22
  • Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Edge-Cloud computing offloads parts of the computations that traditionally occurs in the cloud to edge nodes. The binary format WebAssembly is increasingly used to distribute and deploy services on such platforms. Edge-Cloud computing providers let their clients deploy stateless services in the form of WebAssembly binaries, which are then translated to machine code, sandboxed and executed at the edge. In this context, we propose a technique that (i) automatically diversifies WebAssembly binaries that are deployed to the edge and (ii) randomizes execution paths at runtime. Thus, an attacker cannot exploit all edge nodes with the same payload. Given a service, we automatically synthesize functionally equivalent variants for the functions providing the service. All the variants are then wrapped into a single multivariant WebAssembly binary. When the service endpoint is executed, every time a function is invoked, one of its variants is randomly selected. We implement this technique in the MEWE tool and we validate it with 7 services for which MEWE generates multivariant binaries that embed hundreds of function variants. We execute the multivariant binaries on the world-wide edge platform provided by Fastly, as part as a research collaboration. We show that multivariant binaries exhibit a real diversity of execution traces across the whole edge platform distributed around the globe.
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5.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • Scalable comparison of JavaScript V8 bytecode traces
  • 2019
  • Ingår i: Proceedings of the 11th ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Virtual Machines and Intermediate Languages, VMIL@SPLASH. - New York, NY, USA : ACM Publications. ; , s. 22-31
  • Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
    • The comparison and alignment of runtime traces are essential, e.g., for semantic analysis or debugging. However, naive sequence alignment algorithms cannot address the needs of the modern web: (i) the bytecode generation process of V8 is not deterministic; (ii) bytecode traces are large.We present STRAC, a scalable and extensible tool tailored to compare bytecode traces generated by the V8 JavaScript engine. Given two V8 bytecode traces and a distance function between trace events, STRAC computes and provides the best alignment. The key insight is to split access between memory and disk. STRAC can identify semantically equivalent web pages and is capable of processing huge V8 bytecode traces whose order of magnitude matches today's web like https://2019.splashcon.org, which generates approx. 150k of V8 bytecode instructions.
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6.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992- (författare)
  • Software Diversification for WebAssembly
  • 2024
  • Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • WebAssembly, now the fourth ocially recognized web language, enables web browsers to port native applications to the Web. Furthermore, WebAssembly has evolved into an essential element for backend scenarios such as cloud and edge computing. Therefore, WebAssembly finds use in a plethora of applications, including but not limited to, web browsers, blockchain, and cloud computing. Despite the emphasis on security since its design and specification, WebAssembly remains susceptible to various forms of attacks, including memory corruption and side-channels. Furthermore, WebAssembly has been manipulated to disseminate malware, particularly in cases of browser cryptojacking. Web page resources, including those containing WebAssembly binaries, are predominantly served from centralized data centers in the modern digital landscape. In conjunction with browser clients, thousands of edge devices operate millions of identical WebAssembly instantiations every second. This phenomenon creates a highly predictable ecosystem, wherein potential attackers can anticipate behavior either in browsers or backend nodes. Such predictability escalates the potential impact of vulnerabilities within these ecosystems, paving the way for high-impact side-channel and memory attacks. For instance, a flaw in a web browser, triggered by a defective WebAssembly program, holds the potential to aect millions of users. This work aims to harden the security within the WebAssembly ecosystem through the introduction of Software Diversification methods and tools. Software Diversification is a strategy designed to augment the costs of exploiting vulnerabilities by making software less predictable. The predictability within ecosystems can be diminished by automatically generating dierent, yet functionally equivalent, program variants. These variants strengthen observable properties that are typically used to launch attacks, and in many instances, can eliminate such vulnerabilities. This work introduces three tools: CROW, MEWE as compiler-based approaches, and WASM-MUTATE as a binary-based approach. Each tool has been specifically designed to tackle a unique facet of Software Diversification. We present empirical evidence demonstrating the potential application of our Software Diversification methods to WebAssembly programs in two distinct ways: Oensive and Defensive Software Diversification. Our research into Oensive Software Diversification in WebAssembly unveils potential paths for enhancing the detection of WebAssembly malware. On the other hand, our experiments in Defensive Software Diversification show that WebAssembly programs can be hardened against side-channel attacks, specifically the Spectre attack. 
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7.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • Superoptimization of WebAssembly bytecode
  • 2020
  • Ingår i: Conference Companion of the 4th International Conference on Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming. - Portugal : Aakar Books.
  • Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Motivated by the fast adoption of WebAssembly, we propose the first functional pipeline to support the superoptimization of WebAssembly bytecode. Our pipeline works over LLVM and Souper. We evaluate our superoptimization pipeline with 12 programs from the Rosetta code project. Our pipeline improves the code section size of 8 out of 12 programs. We discuss the challenges faced in superoptimization of WebAssembly with two case studies.
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8.
  • Cabrera-Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • Wasm-Mutate : Fast and effective binary diversification for WebAssembly
  • 2024
  • Ingår i: Computers & security (Print). - : Elsevier. - 0167-4048 .- 1872-6208. ; 139, s. 103731-103731
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • WebAssembly is the fourth officially endorsed Web language. It is recognized because of its efficiency and design, focused on security. Yet, its swiftly expanding ecosystem lacks robust software diversification systems. We introduce Wasm-Mutate, a diversification engine specifically designed for WebAssembly. Our engine meets several essential criteria: 1) To quickly generate functionally identical, yet behaviorally diverse, WebAssembly variants, 2) To be universally applicable to any WebAssembly program, irrespective of the source programming language, and 3) Generated variants should counter side-channels. By leveraging an e-graph data structure, Wasm-Mutate is implemented to meet both speed and efficacy. We evaluate Wasm-Mutate by conducting experiments on 404 programs, which include real-world applications. Our results highlight that Wasm-Mutate can produce tens of thousands of unique and efficient WebAssembly variants within minutes. Significantly, Wasm-Mutate can safeguard WebAssembly binaries against timing side-channel attacks, especially those of the Spectre type.
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9.
  • Cabrera Arteaga, Javier, 1992-, et al. (författare)
  • WebAssembly diversification for malware evasion
  • 2023
  • Ingår i: Computers & security (Print). - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-4048 .- 1872-6208. ; 131
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • WebAssembly has become a crucial part of the modern web, offering a faster alternative to JavaScript in browsers. While boosting rich applications in browser, this technology is also very efficient to develop cryptojacking malware. This has triggered the development of several methods to detect cryptojacking malware. However, these defenses have not considered the possibility of attackers using evasion techniques. This paper explores how automatic binary diversification can support the evasion of WebAssembly cryptojacking detectors. We experiment with a dataset of 33 WebAssembly cryptojacking binaries and evaluate our evasion technique against two malware detectors: VirusTotal, a general-purpose detector, and MINOS, a WebAssembly-specific detector. Our results demonstrate that our technique can automatically generate variants of WebAssembly cryptojacking that evade the detectors in 90% of cases for VirusTotal and 100% for MINOS. Our results emphasize the importance of meta-antiviruses and diverse detection techniques and provide new insights into which WebAssembly code transformations are best suited for malware evasion. We also show that the variants introduce limited performance overhead, making binary diversification an effective technique for evasion.
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  • Resultat 1-9 av 9

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