| 1. |
- Capaci, Francesca
(författare)
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Contributions to the Use of Statistical Methods for Improving Continuous Production
- 2017
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Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Complexity of production processes, high computing capabilities, and massive datasets characterize today’s manufacturing environments, such as those of continuous andbatch production industries. Continuous production has spread gradually acrossdifferent industries, covering a significant part of today’s production. Commonconsumer goods such as food, drugs, and cosmetics, and industrial goods such as iron,chemicals, oil, and ore come from continuous processes. To stay competitive intoday’s market requires constant process improvements in terms of both effectivenessand efficiency. Statistical process control (SPC) and design of experiments (DoE)techniques can play an important role in this improvement strategy. SPC attempts toreduce process variation by eliminating assignable causes, while DoE is used toimprove products and processes by systematic experimentation and analysis. However,special issues emerge when applying these methods in continuous process settings.Highly automated and computerized processes provide an exorbitant amount ofserially dependent and cross-correlated data, which may be difficult to analyzesimultaneously. Time series data, transition times, and closed-loop operation areexamples of additional challenges that the analyst faces.The overall objective of this thesis is to contribute to using of statisticalmethods, namely SPC and DoE methods, to improve continuous production.Specifically, this research serves two aims: [1] to explore, identify, and outlinepotential challenges when applying SPC and DoE in continuous processes, and [2] topropose simulation tools and new or adapted methods to overcome the identifiedchallenges.The results are summarized in three appended papers. Through a literaturereview, Paper A outlines SPC and DoE implementation challenges for managers,researchers, and practitioners. For example, problems due to process transitions, themultivariate nature of data, serial correlation, and the presence of engineering processcontrol (EPC) are discussed. Paper B further explores one of the DoE challengesidentified in Paper A. Specifically, Paper B describes issues and potential strategieswhen designing and analyzing experiments in processes operating under closed-loopcontrol. Two simulated examples in the Tennessee Eastman (TE) process simulatorshow the benefits of using DoE techniques to improve and optimize such industrialprocesses. Finally, Paper C provides guidelines, using flow charts, on how to use thecontinuous process simulator, “The revised TE process simulator,” run with adecentralized control strategy as a test bed for developing SPC and DoE methods incontinuous processes. Simulated SPC and DoE examples are also discussed.
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| 2. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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Essays on value, preference and freedom
- 2009
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Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Essay I develops a new framework for preference relations, that makes further preference relations beyond the trichotomy of preference, dispreference and indifference conceptually possible. The new framework models relations in terms of swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. With this new preference framework the essay presents a fitting-attitude analysis of new value relations that avoids some problems of earlier proposals. Essay II examines the small-improvement argument that is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, that is, the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required to either prefer one of the alternatives to the other or be indifferent between them. The essay argues that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises. Essay III develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed that is able to take into account the values of the possible options.
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| 3. |
- Moberger, Victor
(författare)
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The Queerness of Objective Values : An Essay on Mackiean Metaethics and the Arguments from Queerness
- 2018
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book investigates the argument from queerness against moral realism, famously put forward by J. L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). The book can be divided into two parts. The first part, roughly comprising chapters 1 and 2, gives a critical overview of Mackie’s metaethics. In chapter 1 it is suggested that the argument from queerness is the only argument that poses a serious threat to moral realism. A partial defense of this idea is offered in chapter 2 via a discussion of Mackie’s argument from relativity, which is concluded to fail for reasons that generalize to other influential arguments against moral realism. Chapter 2 also explores Mackie’s moral semantics at length. The key notion of authoritative prescriptivity is analyzed, and a new interpretation of Mackie’s error theory is defended. In the second part, consisting roughly of chapters 3 and 4, the argument from queerness is taken apart and put back together, resulting in several different versions. Chapter 3 discusses three different supervenience-related arguments, all of which are found to be unpersuasive. Chapter 4 develops two different versions of the core argument from queerness, focusing on authoritative prescriptivity. A total of thirteen objections are discussed and rejected. It is concluded that the two arguments do indeed refute the targeted versions of moral realism. Finally, in chapter 5 the entire discussion is briefly summarized.
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| 4. |
- Wagner, Michael, 1957-
(författare)
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Clinical and Experimental Studies on Inflammatory Bowel Disease with special emphasis on Collagenous Colitis
- 2010
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis describes studies in patients with inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) and collagenous colitis (CC). We investigated mucosal eosinophil and neutrophil granulocytes and T-cells involved in the inflammatory processes and aimed at determining whether these processes are reflected in the faecal (F) contents of specific proteins secreted by cells in the intestinal mucosa. Thus, we measured eosinophil cationic protein (ECP) and eosinophil protein X (EPX) and the neutrophil derived myeloperoxidase (MPO) and calprotectin (C); and in addition, chromogranin A (CgA), Chromogranin B (CgB) and secretoneurin (SN), derived from EEC cells and cells in the enteric nervous system. We found that a normalised FC level can serve as a surrogate marker for successful treatment in patients with IBD, but persistently high FC levels need further evaluation (study I). Furthermore, FC and F-MPO appear to relate better than F-EPX to treatment outcome in IBD. We evaluated F-ECP, F-EPX, F-MPO and FC as markers of disease activity and treatment outcome in patients with CC (study III) and concluded that F-ECP was the best discriminator of detecting active CC. Normalised F-ECP and F-EPX could serve as markers of successful treatment. We showed that the inflammation in CC is characterised by activated eosinophils, but that there is no neutrophil activity (study II). T-cells have a lower grade of activity in active CC than in control subjects. During budesonide treatment the normal activation of eosinophils and T-cells is restored, with concomitant clinical remission. The findings in studies II and III indicate that the eosinophils have an essential role in the pathophysiology of CC. Markedly higher values of F-CgA, F-CgB and F-SN were found in patients with CC than in those with IBD and controls (study IV) indicating a crucial role for the intestinal neuro-endocrine system in the pathogenesis of collagenous colitis.
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| 5. |
- Duberg, Ann-Sofi, 1957-
(författare)
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Hepatitis C virus infection : a nationwide study of associated morbidity and mortality
- 2009
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The hepatitis C virus (HCV) was characterised in 1989. HCV was transmitted through transfusion of blood/blood products, but injection drug use is now the most common route of transmission. The infection is usually asymptomatic but becomes chronic in about 75%, and in 20 years 15-25% develops liver cirrhosis, with a risk for liver failure and liver cancer. HCV has also been associated with lymphoproliferative disorders. The aim of this thesis was to study morbidity and mortality in a national, population-based cohort of HCV-infected individuals. The study population consisted of all persons with a diagnosed HCV-infection recorded in the national surveillance database. This file was linked to other national registers to obtain information of emigration, deaths, cancers, and inpatient care. All personal identifiers were removed before analysis. In Paper I the standardized incidence ratios (SIR) for Hodgkin’s and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL), multiple myeloma, acute and chronic lymphatic leukaemia, and thyroid cancer were studied. In the HCV-cohort (n: 27,150) there was a doubled risk for NHL and multiple myeloma in patients infected for more than 15 years, compared with the general population (age-, sex- and calendar-year specific incidence rates). The results strengthened these earlier controversial associations. The SIR and also the absolute risk for primary liver cancer were estimated in Paper II. In the HCV-cohort (n: 36,126) the individuals infected for more than 25 years had a more than 40 times increased risk for liver cancer compared with the general population. The absolute risk of primary liver cancer was 7% within 40 years of HCV-infection. Mortality and cause of death were studied in Paper III. The standardized mortality ratio (SMR) demonstrated a 5.8 times excess mortality in the HCV-cohort (n: 34,235) compared with the general population, and a 35.5 times excess mortality from liver disease. Deaths from illicit drugs and external reasons were common in young adults. Paper IV presents a study of inpatient care. The HCV-cohort (n: 43,000) was compared with a matched reference population (n: 215,000). Cox regression was used to estimate the likelihood, a hazard ratio, for admission to hospital, and frequencies and rates to estimate the total burden. In the HCV-cohort inpatient care was high and about 50% was psychiatric, often drug-related care. The likelihood for liver-related admissions was very high, and serious liver complications increased in the 2000s, indicating that HCV-associated liver disease will increase the next decade. In the 2000s, about 1000 individuals per year were treated with HCV-combination therapy. To conclude, the risk for NHL and multiple myeloma was doubled, and liver- and drug-related morbidity and mortality was very high in the HCV-cohort. Serious liver complications increased in the 2000s and will probably increase the coming decade.
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| 6. |
- Ekendahl, Karl
(författare)
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The Good, the Bad, and the Dead : An Essay on Well-Being and Death
- 2019
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book examines some central arguments in the debate about the value of death. The first main chapter, Chapter 2, begins with an introduction to the debate and a clarification of Epicureanism, i.e. the view that it is not bad to die. I then go on to evaluate several versions of a popular Epicurean line of argument, according to which death’s failure or inability to cause its victim any unpleasant experiences gives us reason to deny that death can be bad for the person who dies. I argue that none of these arguments succeeds. In Chapter 3, I turn to a more promising argument against the badness of death: the Timing Argument. Because there is no time at which death can be bad for its victim, the argument goes, it cannot be bad for her at all. To clarify the nature of this rather obscure argument, I offer two different interpretations, only one of which, I argue, should be considered a challenge to the anti-Epicurean. In Chapter 4, I review different attempts at refuting the Timing Argument, many of which fail to address the argument in its most challenging form. I also argue that there is no time at which death is bad for its victim, but that the conclusion to draw from this is that death can be bad for its victim without being bad for her at any time. The final chapter, Chapter 5, starts with the widespread worry that Epicureanism is hard to combine with certain normative commonsense ideas, e.g. the idea that we often prudentially ought to avoid death. As it turns out, however, the anti-Epicurean faces similar problems: in certain cases where, intuitively, a person has prudential reasons to avoid her death, the most prominent anti-Epicurean accounts fail to yield that her death is bad for her. This is a serious problem for anti-Epicureanism, and I end with a few remarks on its potential implications.
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| 7. |
- Enflo, Karin, 1972-
(författare)
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Measures of Freedom of Choice
- 2012
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis studies the problem of measuring freedom of choice. It analyzes the concept of freedom of choice, discusses conditions that a measure should satisfy, and introduces a new class of measures that uniquely satisfy ten proposed conditions. The study uses a decision-theoretical model to represent situations of choice and a metric space model to represent differences between options.The first part of the thesis analyzes the concept of freedom of choice. Different conceptions of freedom of choice are categorized into evaluative and non-evaluative, as well as preference-dependent and preference-independent kinds. The main focus is on the three conceptions of freedom of choice as cardinality of choice sets, representativeness of the universal set, and diversity of options, as well as the three conceptions of freedom of rational choice, freedom of eligible choice, and freedom of evaluated choice.The second part discusses the conceptions, together with conditions for a measure and a variety of measures proposed in the literature. The discussion mostly focuses on preference-independent conceptions of freedom of choice, in particular the diversity conception. Different conceptions of diversity are discussed, as well as properties that could affect diversity, such as the cardinality of options, the differences between the options, and the distribution of differences between the options. As a result, the diversity conception is accepted as the proper explication of the concept of freedom of choice. In addition, eight conditions for a measure are accepted. The conditions concern domain-insensitivity, strict monotonicity, no-choice situations, dominance of differences, evenness, symmetry, spread of options, and limited function growth. None of the previously proposed measures satisfy all of these conditions.The third part concerns the construction of a ratio-scale measure that satisfies the accepted conditions. Two conditions are added regarding scale-independence and function growth proportional to cardinality. Lastly, it is shown that only one class of measures satisfy all ten conditions, given an additional assumption that the measures should be analytic functions with non-zero partial derivatives with respect to some function of the differences. These measures are introduced as the Ratio root measures.
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| 8. |
- Pettersson, Karl, 1981-
(författare)
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The Logical Structure of the Moral Concepts : An Essay in Propositional Deontic Logic
- 2010
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this thesis, the main focus is on deontic logic as a tool for formal representation of moral reasoning in natural language. The simple standard system of deontic logic (SDL), i.e. the minimal Kripkean modal logic extended with the deontic axiom, stating that necessity (interpreted as obligation) implies possibility (interpreted as permission), has often been considered inadequate for this aim, due to different problems, e.g. the so-called deontic paradoxes. A general survey of deontic logic and the problems with SDL is made in chapter 1. In chapter 2, a system denoted Classical Deontic-Modal logic (CDM1) is defined. In this system, there is a primary obligation operator indexed to sets of possible worlds, and a secondary requirement operator, defined in terms of strictly necessary conditions for fulfilling an obligation. This secondary operator has most of the properties of the necessity operator in SDL. In chapters 3 and 4, it is argued that CDM1 is able to handle the SDL problems presented in chapter 1 in an adequate way, and the treatment of these problems in CDM1 is also compared with their treatment in some other well-known deontic systems. In chapter 5, it is argued that even though the problems related to quantification in modal contexts are relevant to deontic logic, these issues are not specific to deontic logic. In chapter 6, the relations between some controversial features of moral reasoning, such as moral dilemmas and “non-standard” deontic categories like supererogation, and deontic logic are discussed. It is shown how CDM1 can be modified in order to accommodate these features.
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| 9. |
- Ryman, Peter, 1959-
(författare)
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On Free Will as Categorical and Conditional Freedom
- 2012
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation is about a complex of problems, related to the question: ‘Can we ever act differently from how we in fact act?’In Part I, the meaning of ‘can’ and ‘could’ is discussed. It is argued that when we say that an agent could do something he didn’t do (in a sense of ‘could’ involving control), this means, in what is called ‘Decision-Contexts’, that he was conditionally free to do it, and, in what is called ‘Strong-Autonomy-Contexts’, that he was categorically free to do it. That he was conditionally free to do it means, roughly, that if he had decided to do it he would have done it. That he was categorically free to do it means, roughly, that, given the fixity of everything causally relevant, he had control over whether he did it or not. Therefore, that he was categorically free to do it seems to imply that he could agent-cause it, i.e., that he could cause it in a way, not reducible to event causation. It is argued that categorical freedom is necessary for moral responsibility and strong autonomy, but not for making sense of our praxis of saying that someone ought to do so-and-so.In Part II, Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for the incom-patibility of determinism and our ability to act otherwise is discussed. Dif-ferent versions of the argument are compared. It is concluded that the argu-ment is sound under a certain interpretation but unsound under some others.In Part III, it is argued that each member of a certain family of arguments (Galen Strawson’s argument for the non-existence of moral responsibility, the Consequence Argument and the Mind argument) has as an implicit prem-ise that only event causation takes place, and that no one can do anything about that only event causation takes place. An argument is given, in the form of a series of thought-experiments, for the plausibility that this premise is false, and by doing so a first step in giving an argument for the existence of categorical freedom is taken.
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| 10. |
- Svedberg, Maria, 1981-
(författare)
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The Consequence Argument : An Essay on an Argument for the Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism
- 2014
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book is a contribution to the debate on free will and determinism. More specifically, it is an examination of Peter van Inwagen’s highly influential “Consequence Argument” for incompatibilism, i.e., the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism.The Consequence Argument runs as follows: if determinism is true, then all our present acts are the consequences of events in the remote past together with the laws of nature. But since it is not up to us what went on in the past before we were born or what the laws of nature are, the consequences of these things are not up to us. So if determinism is true, then our present acts are not up to us.A number of philosophers have argued that the Consequence Argument contains some kind of logical fallacy. In the first part of the book (Chapters Two to Four) I consider various specific objections to this effect and explain why they fail. Perhaps more importantly, I also show that there are several versions of the Consequence Argument that are immune to this type of criticism. These versions show that the compatibilist has to accept the thesis that a deterministic agent is sometimes able to perform an act whose occurrence is incompatible with the whole truth about the past and the laws of nature.In the second part (Chapters Five to Seven), I discuss various ways for the compatibilist to defend the latter thesis. I argue that neither the idea that the laws of nature are up to us nor the idea that the remote past is up to us is as incredible as it appears at first glance. While the discussion does not identify any clear winner, it does identify the price of the respective positions and the considerations that the debate crucially turns on.
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