| 1. |
- Andersen, David, et al.
(författare)
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Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy
- 2023
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Research. - : Wiley. - 0304-4130 .- 1475-6765. ; 62:4, s. 1122-1145
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy is the object of both classic and contemporary studies in political science. In classic works, scholars argue that there is an inherent conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, whereas contemporary scholars often assert that democracy is positively related to the development of bureaucracy. We argue that both classic and recent interpretations of the relationship are too simplistic since the two dimensions of democracy, contestation and inclusiveness, are likely to affect bureaucratic development in different ways. On the one hand, electoral contestation strengthens bureaucracy if voters demand public goods that politicians cater to by employing meritocratic recruitment. On the other hand, we cannot take for granted that all voters demand public goods. As poorer people are enfranchised, popular demands for particularistic goods increase, which incentivizes politicians to keep a patrimonial state administration, thus facilitating clientelistic linkages with the electorate. Based on new and improved data on electoral contestation and meritocratic recruitment and a measure of male suffrage, we examine the separate and combined effects of contestation and suffrage on meritocracy worldwide from 1790 to 2012. We find that contestation is positively related to meritocracy after the advent of World War II when universal suffrage and contested elections were generally introduced simultaneously. Before World War II, when suffrage was limited and only gradually extended to poorer segments, contestation is significantly related to meritocracy only at lower levels of suffrage.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Boräng, Frida, 1977, et al.
(författare)
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Cooking the books: Bureaucratic politicization and policy knowledge
- 2018
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Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 31:1, s. 7-26
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to demand from bureaucrats-and raises incentives for bureaucrats to supply-public policy knowledge that is strategically biased or suppressed in a manner that benefits incumbents reputationally. Due to electoral competition, we suggest that the link between bureaucratic politicization and politicized policy knowledge will be stronger in democracies than in autocracies. A case analysis of Argentina's statistical agency lends credence to the underlying causal mechanism. Time-series cross-sectional analyses confirm the broader validity of the expectations and show that the relationship is present only in democracies.
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| 4. |
- Cornell, Agnes, 1981
(författare)
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Actor-Related Contextual Factors in Democracy Promotion: Analyzing Democracy Aid's Impact in Divergent Political Regimes
- 2010
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Ingår i: ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17-20 February 2010.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study presents a theoretical and empirical exploration on the potential of democracy aid in promoting democracy in different types of authoritarian regimes. This study suggests that the effects of democracy aid could differ between different types of authoritarian regimes with different sets of the two characteristics; regime stability and institutionalized cooperation. The findings of this study indicate that the effects of democracy aid differ between different types of authoritarian regimes. Cross sectional time series analyses on aid receiving countries over the period 1990-2007 show that the positive effects of democracy aid are strongest in the most stable types of authoritarian regimes where also political institutions are at place; one-party regimes. However, transitions to democracy as a result of democracy aid are unlikely as these are very stable regimes.
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| 5. |
- Cornell, Agnes, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Brokering Bureaucrats: How Bureaucrats and Civil Society Facilitate Clientelism Where Parties are Weak
- 2023
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Ingår i: Comparative Political Studies. - : SAGE Publications. - 0010-4140 .- 1552-3829. ; 56:6, s. 788-823
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue, bureaucrats can act as brokers using their own networks. Bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to cultivate reciprocal relations with voters and leverage this political capital in negotiations with politicians to secure career advancements. As brokering requires networks, we hypothesize that bureaucrats with connections to civil society are more likely to exhibit brokering behavior, and especially in localities with stronger civil society. Original survey data of bureaucrats (N=1300) in a context of weak parties, Peru’s 25 regions plus the city of Lima, show that bureaucrats with connections to civil society are more likely to exhibit brokering behavior. Political and party connections are weaker predictors of brokering. The paper thus shows how locally connected bureaucrats may aid in coordinating clientelism.
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| 6. |
- Cornell, Agnes, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Bureaucracy and Growth
- 2020
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Ingår i: Comparative Political Studies. - : SAGE Publications. - 0010-4140 .- 1552-3829. ; 53:14, s. 2246-2282
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large-N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable us to move beyond the problematic cross-country correlations used in previous studies. Hence, we conduct tests that control for country-specific characteristics while ensuring sufficient variation on the slow-moving bureaucracy variables to enable precise estimation. Our analysis suggests that previous cross-country regressions have vastly overstated the strength of the relationship. While this casts uncertainty on the proposition that there is an effect of Weberian bureaucracy on growth, our further analysis suggests that-if an effect exists-it may operate in the short term and be stronger in recent decades.
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| 7. |
- Cornell, Agnes, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Civil Society, Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown in the Interwar Period
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The relationship between the strength of civil society and democratic survival in the interwar period has been much debated. Prominent studies have questioned the existence of a positive association, arguing that the relationship is conditioned by the level of party institutionalization. This revisionist perspective has been vindicated by case studies of important European cases, in particular Germany and Italy. But due to a lack of cross - national data, neither the direct effect of civil society nor the alternative perspective has so far been subjected to a comprehensive statistical analysis. In this paper we enlist novel data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project that enable us to carry out such an assessment of all democratic spells in the interwar years. Our survival analysis demonstrates that a vibrant civil society generally contributed to democratic survival in this period and that this effect was not moderated by the level of party institutionalization.
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| 10. |
- Cornell, Agnes, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Colonial Origins of Modern Bureaucracy? India and the Professionalization of the British Civil Service
- 2023
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Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 1468-0491 .- 0952-1895. ; 36:2, s. 533-553
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article examines the diffusion of meritocratic practices as a potential instance of policy transfer by scrutinizing the introduction of open and competitive examinations during the mid-nineteenth century in the British Civil Service. Scholars have argued that British reformers were inspired by meritocratic practices in British-ruled India. In order to assess this claim, we combine qualitative analysis of archival material documenting the interdepartmental debates on meritocratic reforms in the British Home Civil Service as well as in the Indian Civil Service with quantitative analyses of unique data on the implementation of examinations with open competition in British public offices and the India experience of Heads of Departments. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses largely reject the idea that the Indian Civil Service was a key source of inspiration for British merit reforms. While our quantitative analyses show some, albeit weak, evidence, no such evidence was found in the qualitative analysis.
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