| 1. |
- Graham, Jesse R., et al.
(författare)
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The pipeline project: Pre-publication independent replications of a single laboratory's research pipeline
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. - : Elsevier. - 1096-0465 .- 0022-1031. ; 66, s. 55-67
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientific research, in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative final results. To illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted replications of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had “in the pipeline” as of August 2014. Six findings replicated according to all replication criteria, one finding replicated but with a significantly smaller effect size than the original, one finding replicated consistently in the original culture but not outside of it, and two findings failed to find support. In total, 40% of the original findings failed at least one major replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication on a large scale are discussed.
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| 2. |
- Washburn, Anthony N., et al.
(författare)
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Data from a pre-publication independent replication initiative examining ten moral judgement effects
- 2016
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Ingår i: Scientific Data. - : Nature Research (part of Springer Nature): Fully open access journals / Nature Publishing Group. - 2052-4463. ; 3
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We present the data from a crowdsourced project seeking to replicate findings in independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. In this Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) initiative, 25 research groups attempted to replicate 10 moral judgment effects from a single laboratory's research pipeline of unpublished findings. The 10 effects were investigated using online/lab surveys containing psychological manipulations (vignettes) followed by questionnaires.
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| 3. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a ‘Trembling Hand’ Game
- 2009
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Ingår i: PLoS ONE. - : Public Library of Science. - 1932-6203. ; 4:8
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution.
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