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- Dahlbeck, Johan, et al.
(författare)
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The moral fallibility of Spinoza’s exemplars: exploring the educational value of imperfect models of human behavior
- 2020
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Ingår i: Ethics and Education. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1744-9642 .- 1744-9650. ; 15:2, s. 260-274
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While Spinoza stipulates an ideal moral person in the propositions on the ‘free man’ in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of political relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely moral person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. We argue that the purpose of this is to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people and communities in ethical self-transformation.
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| 2. |
- De Lucia Dahlbeck, Moa, 1981
(författare)
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AI and Spinoza: a review of law's conceptual treatment of lethal autonomous weapons systems
- 2021
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Ingår i: AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0951-5666 .- 1435-5655. ; 36, s. 797-805
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article I will argue that the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) may assist us in coming to terms with some of the conceptual challenges that the phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses on law and legal thought. I will pursue this argument in three steps. First, I will suggest that Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge may function as an analytical tool for making sense of the prevailing conception of AI within the legal discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Then, I will continue the argument with the aid of Spinoza’s political philosophy which partly complicates the picture as it seems to disqualify a normative process grounded directly upon the means stipulated for achieving a robust understanding of AI. Based on these two separate discussions I will conclude by outlining a composite critique – from the twofolded perspective of Spinoza’s ethical and political discussions – of the ongoing negotiations of a new Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) protocol on LAWS.
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| 3. |
- De Lucia Dahlbeck, Moa, 1981
(författare)
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Spinoza, Ecology and International Law - Radical Naturalism in the Face of the Anthropocene
- 2018
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book addresses the use of Benedict Spinoza’s philosophy in current attempts to elaborate an ecological basis for international environmental law. Because the question of environmental protection has not been satisfactory resolved, the legal debate concerning our responsibility for the environment has – as evidenced in the recent UN report series Harmony with Nature – come to invite calls for a new eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric, legal paradigm. In this respect, Spinoza appears as a key figure. He is one of the few philosophers in the history of western philosophy who cares, and writes extensively, about the roots of anthropocentrism; the core issue of contemporary normative debates in ecology. And in response to the rapidly developing ecological crisis, his work has become central to a re-thinking of the human relationship with nature. Addressing the contention that Spinoza’s ethics might provide a useful source for developing a new, eco-centred framework for environmental law, this book elaborates a more nuanced understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza cannot, it is argued here, simply be reduced to an eco-ethicist. That is: his metaphysics cannot be used as basis of an essentially naturalised or extended humanmorality. At the same time, however, this book argues that the radicality of Spinoza’s naturalism nevertheless offers the possibility of developing a more adequate ecological basis for environmental law.
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