| 1. |
- Dufwenberg, Martin, 1964, et al.
(författare)
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Lies in disguise - A theoretical analysis of cheating
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-0531. ; 175, s. 248-264
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.
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| 2. |
- van Damme, E., et al.
(författare)
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How Werner Guth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 108, s. 292-318
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Werner Guth's ultimatum game played a key role in the development of multiple research areas, several of which are highlighted. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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| 3. |
- Battigalli, P., et al.
(författare)
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Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Literature. - : American Economic Association. - 0022-0515. ; 60:3, s. 833-882
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on one's own or oth-ers' beliefs. It allows for incorporating, for example, emotions, reciprocity, image con-cerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology.
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| 4. |
- Battigalli, P., et al.
(författare)
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Deception: The role of guilt
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 93, s. 227-232
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Evidence suggests that whether or not people dislike lying is situation-dependent. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate this well. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
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| 5. |
- Battigalli, P., et al.
(författare)
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Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games
- 2019
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256. ; 117, s. 15-39
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Frustration, anger, and blame have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how frustration and anger, via blame and aggression, shape interaction and outcomes in a class of two-stage games. © 2019 Elsevier Inc.
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| 6. |
- Battigalli, P., et al.
(författare)
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Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 167:November, s. 185-218
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard game theoretic framework by letting players’ utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract and comprises complex mathematical objects, such as players’ infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus, PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and use them in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified – e.g., which beliefs matter – but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and show how to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role of time and of the perception of players’ intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts. © 2019 Elsevier B.V.
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| 7. |
- Chang, LJ, et al.
(författare)
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Triangulating the Neural, Psychological, and Economic Bases of Guilt Aversion
- 2011
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Ingår i: NEURON. - 0896-6273. ; 70:3, s. 560-572
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Why do people often choose to cooperate when they can better serve their interests by acting selfishly? One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of guilt can motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize a formal model of this process in conjunction with fMRI to identify brain regions that mediate cooperative behavior while participants decided whether or not to honor a partner's trust. We observed increased activation in the insula, supplementary motor area, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and temporal parietal junction when participants were behaving consistent with our model, and found increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and nucleus accumbens when they chose to abuse trust and maximize their financial reward. This study demonstrates that a neural system previously implicated in expectation processing plays a critical role in assessing moral sentiments that in turn can sustain human cooperation in the face of temptation.
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| 8. |
- Charness, G., et al.
(författare)
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Bare Promises: An experiment
- 2010
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. ; 107:2, s. 281-283
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 9. |
- Charness, G, et al.
(författare)
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Participation
- 2011
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Ingår i: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. - 0002-8282. ; 101:4, s. 1211-1237
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 10. |
- d'Adda, G., et al.
(författare)
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Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments
- 2020
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256. ; 124, s. 288-304
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose a simple theory of social norms that models the distinct influence on behavior of personal values, normative expectations and empirical expectations. The first and second moments of the distribution of normative expectations affect the strength of social norms' pull on behavior. We test the empirical predictions of the model through an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game. Consistent with the theory, we find that normative expectations influence generosity and that higher dispersion of such expectations leads to more variation in giving behavior. © 2020 Elsevier Inc.
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