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- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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Augustine on Second-Order Desires and Persons
- 2016
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Ingår i: Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. - Cham : Springer. ; , s. 9-24
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Examines Augustine's view of the will and the self and explores parallels between Augustine's and Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical accounts of personhood. Throws new light on Augustine's views on moral responsibility by showing that even if Augustine may have abandoned certain libertarian assumptions as to the nature of human free will in his mature works, he retains the underlying view of personhood as dependent on a capacity for a certain form of second-order desiring.
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| 3. |
- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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Falling Freely : Anselm of Canterbury on the Will
- 2005
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis clarifies the concept of will in Anselm of Canterbury in the context of his overall theologico-philosophical project. The will is central to Anselm's understanding of freedom of choice (libertas arbitrii), which he defines as “the power to keep rightness of will”. In Anselm, like in Kant, the will is also a crucial notion in spelling out the idea that it is the intention rather than an action per se, or its consequences, which matters from a moral standpoint. His approach to the problem of evil is therefore shaped by the presupposition that evil or injustice essentially consists in some fault in or of the will. In addition, Anselm subscribes to the Platonic notion that evil is a privation of good and ultimately identical to non-being, and therefore injustice is identified with a sort of lack of will.Anselm combines a naturalist conception of will with a rationalist conception of freedom. He construes voluntary action, i.e. action in which there is will involved, widely. Angels, human beings, and brute animals all act voluntarily, and by will. Freedom is, according to Anselm, precisely a power to act in accordance with right reason, and so a person’s freedom and rationality never conflict.Part 1 consists in a study of the central texts De veritate, De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli. Part 2 consists in a critical reconstruction of Anselm’s conception of the human will and its freedom against the background of his ethics, metaphysics, and views on modal semantics. In Part 3, Anselm’s position is assessed from the point of view of the contemporary debate of free will and determinism. In recent Anselm scholarship, it has been argued that Anselm is an incompatibilist and an indeterminist. These suggestions are here critically discussed.
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| 4. |
- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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La volonté abélardienne et la tradition augustinienne
- 2009
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Ingår i: Regards sur la France du Moyen Âge. - Stockholm : Sällskapet Runica et Mediævalia, Centre d'études médiévales de Stockholm. - 9789188568410 ; , s. 263-276
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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The Medieval Notion of the Superiority of the Will
- 2014
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Ingår i: Swedish Students at the University of Leipzig in the Middle Ages. - Stockholm : Centre for Medieval Studies, Stockholm University.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 9. |
- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury
- 2016
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 24:2, s. 215-230
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.
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