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- Nielsen, Max, et al.
(författare)
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Can small-scale fisheries survive market-based management? Nordic evidence
- 2022
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Ingår i: Fish and Fisheries. - : Wiley. - 1467-2960 .- 1467-2979. ; 23:1, s. 256-272
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Market-based fisheries management systems give incentives to reduce the fleet size and employment, which increases earnings and contributes to resolve the tragedy of the commons. However, the often-stated expectation that economies of scale cause the disappearance of small-scale fishery is not observed in many cases. In this study, we investigate the effects on fleet structure in the period after introducing individual fishing quotas or individual fishing days with various degrees of transferability in selected fisheries in the seven Nordic countries. Despite observing economies of scale in most cases, it is found that the market-based fisheries management often does not reduce the small-scale fleet more than the fleet of large vessels. This is explained partly by small vessels targeting demersal species and large vessels pelagic species, and partly by the larger need of larger than small vessels to continuously utilize their capital stocks through fast adaptation to ensure return. A more important explanation is the regulation design, with limitations in sale of fishing rights and lease between vessel groups and regions and in the share of the total quota holdings of fishing rights by individuals and vessels. This is important for countries considering the introduction of market-based fisheries management, since the Nordic experiences show that with proper regulation design, economic gains can be achieved with small-scale fishing surviving even under economies of scale.
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| 2. |
- Waldo, Staffan, et al.
(författare)
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Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries
- 2016
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Ingår i: Marine Resource Economics. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0738-1360 .- 2334-5985. ; 31:2, s. 233-257
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
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