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Sökning: WFRF:(Ewald Jonas 1959 )

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1.
  • Ewald, Jonas, 1959-, et al. (författare)
  • A Democracy Profile of Tanzania - a background study : A Report presented to the EU-delegation in Tanzania
  • 2015
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This report highlights the successes and the most serious challenges of democracy at this stage in Tanzania and the priorities needed to address them. The summary also outlines possible entry points through which political dialogue and technical cooperation initiatives could be feasible and have the greatest impact.Tanzania is going through a period of rapid economic, political and cultural change. In a relatively short time, some 25 years, the country has moved from being a one-party state-led system to a market economy and multi-party system, all within the context of limited institutional capacity and resources. Electoral democracy is now fairly well established in principle, even if the independence of the Electoral Management Bodies is questioned. Democratic institutions have been strengthened, although the executive branch continues to dominate over the legislative and judiciary. Freedom of press, association and speech has improved. However, Tanzania cannot be regarded as a deep democracy. The conditions for an open and competitive political system, such as the full respect for political rights, competitive elections, independence of the institutions in charge of accountability promotion and protection of key democratic stakeholders, are not yet fully met. A more comprehensive, substantive democracy would better deliver on political, economic, social and cultural rights by increasing the accountability and participation around political decision-making.However, compared with its neighbours in the sub-region and the whole of Africa, Tanzania does fairly well, as indicated by e.g., in Freedom House index.The main challenge is whether the current political system and power structure has the capacity to continue reforms, furthering the opening up of the political space; and leading to a stronger democratic culture and better economic and social development for the Tanzanian people, in a peaceful way.The economy grows but reduction of poverty remains limited New economic activities develop, and so do an elite and a small middle class in urban, and some rural areas. Expectations are rising, not least among the youth. However, despite economic growth, basic needs poverty has only slightly been reduced from 34,4% to 28%, while the number of people below the poverty line has increased in absolute terms, as a result of continued high population growth. 44 per cent of the population live on less than 1.25 USD a day. Cleavages between the poor and the better off, and between urban and rural areas are deepening. The 2012/2013 household budget survey indicates that poverty has increased everywhere except in Dar es Salaam, and a few larger cities. Hence there is a trajectory of poverty decline but it is still very fragile. Even if the provision of health and education services has improved, - the relative quality of service delivery is arguably not improving or even deteriorating.Changing values. An important heritage of Tanzania is Julius Nyerere’s legacy of nationalism and altruism. However these values have eroded over time, weakening the social fabric that has held the nation together since independence.Globalisation and an increasing number of young people completing their education cycle; rapid urbanisation (particularly among young adults); and the rapid expansion of TV, mobile telephones and internet access have brought about a change in values and expectations and have increased divides between generations and societies, men and woman urban and rural areas. These changing values have also raised awareness, not least of girls and women’s rights, which clash with the traditional patriarchal values. New networks and tools to voice concerns and hold those in power to account have started to develop. Old paternalistic power structures have started to be questioned, potentially opening up the political landscape.New economic actors, especially BRIC countries, are changing the rules of the international game. With an increase in foreign direct investments, Tanzania is becoming less dependent on western aid, causing the majority of the ruling party, and the political administration to challenge traditional reliance on western donors and western perspectives. As a result, support for a western-type liberal democracy from some factions of the political and economic elite might shift towards new role models, such as the BRIC states.A diverse multi-party system has continued to develop since its inception in 1992.Although opposition parties have made progress over the last 10 years, they are still weak and the former only party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), is still ruling. CCM has a well-developed organisation, characterised by a strong central authority. The party has robust personal networks, with close links to all levels of the administration, as well as to various economic elites and power centres outside the party, including the security forces. Even if gradually fading away, the one-party culture is still alive, especially at the local level in rural areas, where the majority of the population still lives. A remarkable change appears to have occurred between 2010 and 2014: In the 2014 Afro barometer survey, 75% of respondents from Tanzania gave support to multi-party democracy, which is among the highest in the Sub Saharan Africa.Until recently, no other party has proven strong enough to challenge CCM. Even though Tanzania now has 21 registered political parties, only five managed to get into Parliament in 2010. The majority election system contributes to preserving CCMs dominance. Only CUF and CHADEMA, and to a lesser extent NCCR-Mageuzi, have transformed into institutionalised political parties and, having received substantial support in the elections, command a degree of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the distribution of financial, human and organisational resources between CCM and the opposition parties remains skewed. Power struggles exist not only between the ruling party and the opposition, but also within each party between different factions and between the opposition parties. These divisions are rarely based on ideological or political differences, but rather on personalities and patronage. Nevertheless, changes have taken place both within the ruling party, through new generations of members whose political world view was formed in a multi-party context, and from outside the party where rapid urbanisation, globalisation and changes of values have provided a breeding ground for new political ideas. In the last five years CHADEMA has developed as a viable alternative to CCM and managed to capture the attention of the young, entrepreneurs and the educated urban middle class. The party won a substantive 27 percent of votes in the 2010 election, and a much higher share of votes in the cities. In the December 2014 local election the opposition preliminarily secured 34% of the seats. Four parties in the opposition have formed a loose coalition called Ukawa, with the aim to field one joint candidate in all constituencies and for the Presidency. For the first time, CCM is facing a real challenge in the 2015 election, even if it is unlikely that it would lose its power on the mainland. In any case, the low voter turnout on the mainland in the 2010 elections (39 percent compared with 73 percent 2005) and the civic polls in December 2014  might signal voter (or democracy) fatigue. Zanzibar maintained its traditionally high voter participation with 89 percent of voters exercising their right in the island of Unguja, and 85 percent in Pemba. Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT) started by a breakaway faction from CHADEMA 2014 after a power struggle over ideology and leadership with one the periods most effective politicians, Zitto Kabwe, Public Account Committee chairman and a driving force in exposing corruption and misuse of power as one of the leaders, might contribute to a vitalisation of ideology based political debate as the party has declared itself as socialist, while the CHADEMA and CUF have taken on faith based conservative and liberal ideology, respectively.The integrity of the political parties and freedom of organisation and assembly are still limited by various outdated laws and institutions. The Police at times use excessive force with political activists and do not allow public demonstrations. As the multi-party system is not yet consolidated, issues surrounding intimidation and unfair competition are likely to persist for years. The opposition parties would not necessarily be more democratic or efficient than the current ruling party, but they have not yet been given the chance to prove themselves.
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  • Ewald, Jonas, 1959-, et al. (författare)
  • A Matter of Choice? Cost sharing in health and education from a rights of the child perspective in Pangani, Rombo and Geita Disticts in Tanzania : Final report to Sida/Sarec
  • 2007
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This report analyse findings from extensive field research on local level in Pangani, Rombo and Geita districts in the period 2000-2004, on the effects of the introduction of user fees in health and eduction for various types of childrens rights to health and education. The report conclude that a number of reforms have been decided upon and implemented. Still however, the rights of the child to health and education as spelled out in the by Tanzania signed convention on Children’s rights has not been fully respected. Particular children to poorer families, and to a certain girl child’s, rights are violated. Especially vulnerable are orphaned or abandon children, even if they are taken care of by grandmothers. Access to health and education for all children is important for ensuring not only improved life chances for individual children, and households, but also for long term development of the whole country. To increase the fees to health and education does not seem to be a viable road to achieve that, if not poor peoples incomes increase first.Concerning choice health was considered as an emergency cost and always had priority, gender or type of child did not matter. Education was considered to be an investment, and in times of scarce resources, the child considered to have the best opportunities to pass school was given priority, and gender played a lesser role then the team had assumed from the beginning. In no few cases girls were given priority to boys, as girls was considered to be more trustworthy to return the investment in the future. Children belonging to the core family was to a larger exten given priority then other children in the family. 
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  • Ewald, Jonas, 1959-, et al. (författare)
  • Recentralisation? Interrogating the state of local democracy, good governance and development in Tanzania
  • 2019
  • Rapport (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This report presents fieldwork data from four case studies carried out between May 2013 and December 2015 on to the extent to which Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programme has brought about more democratic decision-making processes. The main findings point to several positive changes. Good governance reforms, aiming to restructure central and local governments, decentralise, improve capacity and good — and democratic — governance at all levels, have been undertaken and implemented. Parliament and the councils have been strengthened, as well as civil society organisations and media, and they are better able to participate in policy formulation and decision-making. The local government now has well elaborated structures for governance and democratic participation from the sub-village level to the district level. However, the outcomes of the government reforms on democratic processes at the local level have been limited. This study examines the extent to which various actors at different levels can exercise horizontal and vertical accountability. Our findings indicate that the reforms have not adequately changed existing power relations, the interests of the political elite, or the dominant ideology of political actors. Real power still lies in the hands of the ruling party elites at the national and district level and constrains power sharing at the local government authority level and at the ward, village, and sub-village level. Making it difficult for the op-position parties to establish themselves as a viable democratic force at local level. The Local Government Reform Programme has not provided adequate mech- anisms, processes, and incentives to hold political elites and the duty bearers to account, neither vertically nor horizontally, at the different levels of local government. Power distribution has remained top-down with increasing conflict of interest between political and economic elites and citizens, which have not been adequately addressed by local governance. In addition, mediating competing claims over resources remainsa challenge, as the reforms have failed to sufficiently strengthen the governance system at the local levels. A key constraint to improved governance is the lack of awareness, knowledge, and capacity to process information by citizens and elected members of the political structures. The village and the sub-village structures have a huge and underestimated potential, both as entry points into the political system, and as effective mechanisms for democratic governance. However, the opportunity the local government reform programmes had to make a “local turn” – and that briefly did so – appears rather to have turned back to recentralisation.
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  • Ewald, Jonas, 1959-, et al. (författare)
  • Recentralisation? The missed opportunity to make a local turn of development, the case of the decentralisation reforms in Tanzania
  • 2015
  • Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This paper present fresh field work data from three case studies carried out in May 2013 to January 2015 on to what extent the Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programmes (LGRP) 1996/2000-2013 has brought about more democratic decision making processes, and hence heralding a “local turn” of development. The main findings point to that even if the local government has well elaborated structures for governance and democratic participation from the sub-village/street to the district level, the outcomes of the LGRP on improving the democratic processes at the local level has been limited. The study examine to what extent various actors at various levels can exercise horizontal and vertical accountability. Our findings indicate that the local government reforms have inadequately changed the existing power relations, political elite interests and ideology of the political actors. Real power still lies in the hands of the ruling party elites at the National and District level and constrains power sharing at the Local Government Authority (LGA) levels and at the Ward, Village and Sub village level. The Local Government Reform has not provided adequate mechanisms, processes and Incentives to hold political elites and the duty bearers to account, neither vertically nor horizontally, at the different levels of local government. Power distribution has remained Top-Down with increasing conflict of interest between the Top and the Bottom. Local governance is inadequately addressing the existing competing interests e.g. personal versus public, party versus collective, local versus national. In addition, mediating competing claims over resources remains a challenge as the local government reforms have inadequately strengthened the governance system at the local levels. One of the largest constraints is the lack of awareness, information and capacity to process information by citizens, and elected members of the political structures. The Village and in particular the Sub-village structures have, however, a huge and underestimated potential, both as entry point in the political system, and as effective mechanisms for democratic governance.  However, this opportunity to make ta “local turn” appears to rather have turned to recentralisation
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  • Ewald, Jonas, 1959-, et al. (författare)
  • Tanzania Local government reform - towards de-centralisation or recentralisation? (Abstract accepted for presentation in the panel Local State-making in Africa.
  • 2015
  • Ingår i: AEGIS V (Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies) Bi-annual Conference, Paris, July 7-8 2015. - Paris, France.
  • Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • Tanzania Local government reform - towards de-centralissation or recentralisation? This paper present fresh field work data from case studies carried out from January 2014 to Mars 2015 on to what extent the Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programmes (LGRP) 2000-2013 has brought about more democratic decision making processes – and state building on local level. The LGRP is a typical “Blueprint administrative reform funded and guided by international donors’ agencies”. The main findings is that the outcomes of the LGRP on improving the democratic processes at the local level has been limited. We examine to what extent various actors, including national and local CSO, at various levels can exercise horizontal and vertical accountability. We also look at the role of large international mining companies and local governments. Our findings indicate that the LGR have inadequately changed the existing power relations, political elite interests and ideology of the political actors. Real power still lies in the hands of the ruling party elites at the National and District level and constrains power sharing at the Local Government Authority (LGA) levels and at the Ward, Village and Sub village level. The LGR has not provided adequate mechanisms, processes and incentives to hold political elites and the duty bearers to account, neither vertically nor horizontally. Power distribution has remained Top-Down with increasing conflict of interest between the Top and the Bottom. Local governance is inadequately addressing the existing competing interests e.g. personal versus public, party versus collective, local versus national. In addition, mediating competing claims over resources remains, in particular in mineral rich areas. One of the largest constraints is the lack of awareness, information and capacity to process information by citizens, and elected members of the political structures.
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  • Resultat 1-10 av 62

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