| 1. |
- Sutter, Matthias, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Social preferences in childhood and adolescence - A large-scale experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Social preferences have been shown to be an important determinant of economic decision making for many adults. We present a large-scale experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight to seventeen years. Participants make decisions in eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks, allowing us to study the distribution of social preference types across age and across gender. Our results show that when children and teenagers grow older, inequality aversion becomes a gradually less prominent motivating force of allocation decisions. At the same time, efficiency concerns increase in importance for boys, and maximin-preferences turn more important in shaping decisions of girls.
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| 2. |
- Sutter, Matthias, et al.
(författare)
-
Social preferences in childhood and adolescence: A large-scale experiment
- 2010
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Social preferences have been shown to be an important determinant of economic decision making for many adults. We present a large-scale experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight to seventeen years. Participants make decisions in eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks, allowing us to study the distribution of social preference types across age and across gender. Our results show that when children and teenagers grow older, inequality aversion becomes a gradually less prominent motivating force of allocation decisions. At the same time, efficiency concerns increase in importance for boys, and maximin-preferences turn more important in shaping decisions of girls.
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| 3. |
- Sutter, Matthias, 1968, et al.
(författare)
-
Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their firstand second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
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