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- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969, et al.
(författare)
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Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:1, s. 101-112
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
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- Eriksson, John, 1973, et al.
(författare)
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Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty
- 2016
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 94:4, s. 719-735
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection to non-cognitivism, immune to the problems afflicting earlier replies. First, we argue that fundamental moral uncertainty is best understood as classificatory uncertainty, since (i) the psychological factors behind fundamental moral uncertainty are analogous to the factors behind fundamental uncertainty regarding descriptive, non-moral, matters, and (ii) fundamental descriptive uncertainty is naturally understood as classificatory uncertainty. We call this the classification account of moral uncertainty. Second, we argue that it is congenial with non-cognitivism, given certain plausible assumptions about the psychology of moral judgment formation.
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- Francén Olinder, Ragnar, 1977
(författare)
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Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism
- 2016
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Ingår i: Philosophy Compass. - : Wiley. - 1747-9991. ; 11:10, s. 529-540
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This opinionated survey article discusses a relativist view in metaethics that we can call Appraiser-standard Relativism. According to this view, the truth value of moral judgments varies depending on the moral standard (the norms or values, etc.) of the appraiser – that is, someone who makes or assesses the judgments. On this view, when two persons judge that, say, lying is always morally wrong; one of the judgments might be true and the other false. The paper presents various forms of this view, contrasts it against other forms of moral relativism, and shortly describes the main arguments for it. It considers the two most pressing objections – from disagreement and from counterintuitivity – and discusses how different forms of Appraiser-standard Relativism are affected by, or can be seen as responses to, these objections. Lastly, it discusses whether Appraiser-standard Relativism rules out moral realism, the view that there are objective moral truths. © 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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