| 1. |
- Adach, Malina, et al.
(författare)
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A Combined Security Ontology based on the Unified Foundational Ontology
- 2022
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Ingår i: Proceedings - 16th IEEE International Conference on Semantic Computing, ICSC 2022. - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. - 9781665434188 ; , s. 187-194
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- While ontology comparison and alignment have been extensively researched in the last decade, there are still some challenges to these disciplines, such as incomplete ontologies, those that cover only a portion of a domain, and differences in domain modeling due to varying viewpoints. Although the literature has compared ontological concepts from the same domain, comparisons of concepts from different domains (e.g., security and safety) remain unexplored. To compare the concepts of security and safety domains, a security ontology must first be created to bridge the gap between these domains. Therefore, this paper presents a Combined Security Ontology (CSO) based on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) that could be compared to or aligned with other ontologies. This CSO includes the core ontological concepts and their respective relationships that had been extracted through a previous systematic literature review. The CSO concepts and their relationships were mapped to the UFO to get a common terminology that facilitates to bridge the gap between the security and safety domains. Since the proposed CSO is based on the UFO, it could be compared to or aligned with other ontologies from different domains.
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| 2. |
- Adach, Malina, et al.
(författare)
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Concepts and Relationships in Safety and Security Ontologies : A Comparative Study
- 2022
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Ingår i: 2022 6th International Conference on System Reliability and Safety, ICSRS 2022. - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. - 9781665470926 ; , s. 357-364
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Safety and security ontologies quickly become essential support for integrating heterogeneous knowledge from various sources. Today, there is little standardization of ontologies and almost no discussion of how to compare concepts and their relationships, establish a general approach to create relationships or model them in general. However, concepts with similar names are not semantically similar or compatible in some cases. In this case, the problem of correspondence arises among the concepts and relationships found in the ontologies. To solve this problem, a comparison between the Hazard Ontology (HO) and the Combined Security Ontology (CSO) is proposed, in which the value of equivalence between their concepts and their relationships was extracted and analyzed. Although the HO covers the concepts related to the safety domain and the CSO includes securityrelated concepts, both are based on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). For this study, HO and CSO were compared, and the results were summarized in the form of comparison tables. Our main contribution involves the comparisons among the concepts in HO and CSO to identify equivalences and differences between the two. Due to the increasing number of ontologies, their mapping, merging, and alignment are primary challenges in bridging the gaps that exist between the safety and security domains.
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| 3. |
- Adach, Malina, et al.
(författare)
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Hazard Analysis on a System of Systems using the Hazard Ontology
- 2023
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Ingår i: 2023 18th Annual System of Systems Engineering Conference, SoSe 2023. - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. - 9798350327236
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Today, well-established hazard analysis techniques are available and widely used to identify hazards for single systems in various industries. However, hazard analysis techniques for a System of Systems (SoS) are not properly investigated. SoS is a complex system where multiple systems work together to achieve a common goal. However, the interaction between systems may lead to unforeseen interactions and interdependencies between systems. This increases the difficulty of identifying and assessing system failures and potential safety hazards. In this paper, we explore whether Hazard Ontology (HO) can be applied to an SoS and whether it can identify emergent hazards, their causes, sources, and consequences. To conduct our exploration, we apply the HO to a quarry automation site (an SoS) from the construction equipment domain. The results indicate that the HO is a promising technique that facilitates the identification of emergent hazards and their components.
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| 4. |
- Adach, Malina, et al.
(författare)
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Security Ontologies : A Systematic Literature Review
- 2022
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Ingår i: Lecture Notes In Computer Science. - Cham : Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. - 9783031176036 ; , s. 36-53
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Security ontologies have been developed to facilitate the organization and management of security knowledge. A comparison and evaluation of how these ontologies relate to one another is challenging due to their structure, size, complexity, and level of expressiveness. Differences between ontologies can be found on both the ontological and linguistic levels, resulting in errors and inconsistencies (i.e., different concept hierarchies, types of concepts, definitions) when comparing and aligning them. Moreover, many concepts related to security ontologies have not been thoroughly explored and do not fully meet security standards. By using standards, we can ensure that concepts and definitions are unified and coherent. In this study, we address these deficiencies by reviewing existing security ontologies to identify core concepts and relationships. The primary objective of the systematic literature review is to identify core concepts and relationships that are used to describe security issues. We further analyse and map these core concepts and relationships to five security standards (i.e., NIST SP 800-160, NIST SP 800-30 rev.1, NIST SP 800-27 rev.A, ISO/IEC 27001 and NISTIR 8053). As a contribution, this paper provides a set of core concepts and relationships that comply with the standards mentioned above and allow for a new security ontology to be developed.
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| 5. |
- Bohlin, Markus, et al.
(författare)
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Bounding Shared-Stack Usage in Systems with Offsets and Precedences
- 2008
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Ingår i: ECRTS 2008: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH EUROMICRO CONFERENCE ON REAL-TIME SYSTEMS. - 9780769532981 ; , s. 276-285
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper presents two novel methods to bound the stack memory used in preemptive, shared stack, real-time systems. The first method is based on branch-and-bound search for possible preemption patterns, and the second one approximates the first in polynomial time. The work extends previous methods by considering a more general task-model, in which all tasks can share the same stack. In addition, the new methods account for precedence and offset relations. Thus, the methods give tight bounds for a large set of realistic systems. The methods have been implemented and a comprehensive evaluation, comparing our new methods against each other and against existing methods, is presented. The evaluation shows that our exact method can significantly reduce the amount of stack memory needed.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Bohlin, Markus, et al.
(författare)
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Safe Shared Stack Bounds in Systems with Offsets and Precedences
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper presents two novel methods to bound the stack memory used in preemptive, shared stack, real-time systems. The first method is based on branch-and-bound search for possible preemption patterns, and the second one approximates the first in polynomial time. The work extends previous methods by considering a more general taskmodel, in which all tasks can share the same stack. In addition, the new methods account for precedence and offset relations. Thus, the methods give tight bounds for a large set of realistic systems. The methods have been implemented and a comprehensive evaluation, comparing our new methods against each other and against existing methods, is presented. The evaluation shows that our exact method can significantly reduce the amount of stack memory needed. In our simulations, a decrease in the order of 40% was typical, with a runtime in the order of seconds. Our polynomial approximation consequently yields about 20% higher bound than the exact method.
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| 8. |
- Bohlin, Markus, et al.
(författare)
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Shared Stack Analysis in Transaction-Based Systems
- 2007
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Ingår i: Work in Progress Proceedings RTSS'07, Tucson, Arizona, USA. ; , s. 37-40
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present our ongoing work on shared stack analysis for hybrid (static and dynamic) scheduled fixed priority systems. We present two methods that extend our previous work to support stack analysis for the general tasks model with offsets where several transactions can share a common run-time stack. The aim of this work is to support stack analysis of a wider range of systems.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Hänninen, Kaj, et al.
(författare)
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Determining maximum stack usage in preemptive shared stack systems
- 2007. - 1
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 9th Real-Time in Sweden (RTiS'07), Västerås, Sweden. ; , s. 118-126
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents a novel method to determine the maximum stack memory used in preemptive, shared stack, real-time systems. We provide a general and exact problem formulation applicable for any preemptive system model based on dynamic (run-time) properties. We also show how to safely approximate the exact stack usage by using static (compile time) information about the system model and the underlying run-time system on a relevant and commercially available system model: A hybrid, statically and dynamically, scheduled system. Comprehensive evaluations show that our technique significantly reduces the amount of stack memory needed compared to existing analysis techniques. For typical task sets a decrease in the order of 70% is typical.
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