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- Hamnell, Bruno
(författare)
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Bortom realismen? : Historieteori och kunskapssyn i Historisk tidskrift och Scandia, 1965-2009
- 2020
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Ingår i: Scandia. - 0036-5483. ; 86:1, s. 55-80
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article examines debates on historical theory in the journals Historisk tidskrift and Scandia between 1965, when theory is frequently said to have been introduced in Swedish historiography, and 2009. The study focuses on discussions on the epistemological concepts “theory”, “objectivity”, “relativism”, “truth”, and “neutrality”. It is shown that some historians initially perceived theory as a threat to empirically driven studies. Theory was sometimes understood as synonymous with social science theory and sometimes as synonymous with historical materialism. This was only the case up until the late 1970s, when the notion that theory in some sense should be part of historical research gained increasing acceptance. It was no longer thought of as a threat to empiricism and realist epistemology.Accepting the place of theory in historical research led to insights about the impossibility of neutrality, which brought about debates on relativism, objectivity, subjectivism, and truth. The threat from relativism was intensified as postmodernism was introduced in the journals in the late 1980s. Postmodernism was initially seen as the antithesis to knowledge, and some commentators thought that postmodernism reduced history to fiction. However, by the end of the studied period, postmodernism was rather thought of as a possible “inspiration” than as a threat.Epistemological stances are seldom articulated in the debate and central concepts are rarely defined. For this reason, many of the historians talk past one another and have trouble navigating between the extreme positions of total relativism and absolute objectivism, even though few historians actually embrace either of these positions. The main argument of the article is that what is primarily at stake in the debates is a realist view of knowledge. Most historians share the view of knowledge as correspondence and the idea that history is supposed the create representations of a past reality. Postmodernism and theory are only accepted as long as they do not question this underlying assumption.The article concludes by suggesting that history should abandon the realist view of knowledge and its associated vocabulary for a pragmatic approach to historiography. According to Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, such an approach would look upon history as a rational practice and a matter of argumentation, rather than representation.
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- Hamnell, Bruno
(författare)
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Historiografi och naturalism i ljuset av antropocen
- 2022
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Ingår i: Salongen – Nettidsskrift for filosofi og idéhistorie. - 2703-7053.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Jordens inträde i antropocen har lett till att historievetenskapens traditionella motsättningar mellan natur och kultur, samt den mänskliga historiens tid och geologisk tid har börjat ifrågasättas. Hur står sig historievetenskapens traditionella syften och metoder i förhållande till den pågående omförhandlingen mellan historiografi och naturalism?
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- Hamnell, Bruno
(författare)
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Two Quests for Unity : John Dewey, R. G. Collingwood, and the Persistence of Idealism
- 2021
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- After having dominated philosophical thought in Britain and the United States during the end of the nineteenth century, idealism was in steady decline by the outbreak of World War I. Its ideas and ideals seemed unsuited to face the transition from Victorianism to modernism and the rapid social changes of the post-war era. Its Anglo-American proponents—who were often liberals—were accused of indirectly promoting Prussian militarism and authoritarianism because of idealism’s German background. Idealism was also charged with being ill-attuned to the development of the natural sciences, and was replaced by the narrower and more scientific ideal of analytical philosophy. While idealists had been preoccupied with religion, history, aesthetics, and metaphysics, the analysts turned toward an increasingly specialized and theoretical notion of philosophy focused on formal logic, epistemology, and language analysis.This study of two philosophers avoids the simplistic but well-established division between (Anglo-American) analytical and continental philosophy. I claim that the overlooked similarities between John Dewey (1859–1952) and Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943) can be explained with reference to their shared background in idealism. Their philosophies should be regarded as continuous struggles regarding which aspects of idealism should be kept, rejected, or revised. By choosing an American and a British philosopher as the main subjects, this study also aims to highlight the transatlantic philosophical connections that have often been neglected due to methodological nationalism. Comparing Collingwood’s idealism to Dewey’s pragmatism will also highlight the historical similarities between these philosophical traditions.The overarching aims of Dewey’s and Collingwood’s thought are interpreted as quests for unity, drawing attention to the continuing influence of a persistent idealist notion. I argue that there were four types of unity shared by Anglo-American idealists, Dewey and Collingwood: unity of experience, unity of opposites, unity in diversity, and social unity. Furthermore, I argue that Dewey’s and Collingwood’s social and political thought should be regarded as a continuation of the social liberalism of the Oxford idealist T. H. Green. Like earlier Anglo-American idealists, Dewey and Collingwood insisted on the importance of philosophy’s practical value. While both came to reject transcendental, metaphysical, and absolutistic notions in favor of a more historical and humanistic idealism, they nevertheless kept idealism’s basic view of philosophy as a broad, synthetic, situated, and reconstructive form of cultural criticism committed to the common good. This ideal has unfortunately been lost, but a critical conversation with philosophers like Collingwood and Dewey may help us imagine what such a philosophy—adapted for the twenty-first century—might look like.
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- Hamnell, Bruno
(författare)
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Understanding Others
- 2019
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Ingår i: Lychnos: årsbok för idé- och lärdomshistoria. - 0076-1648. ; 2019, s. 338-340
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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