| 1. |
- Herlitz, Anders, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Measuring needs for priority setting in healthcare planning and policy
- 2016
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Ingår i: Social Science and Medicine. - : Elsevier BV. - 0277-9536. ; 157:May, s. 96-102
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Much research aimed at developing measures for normative criteria to guide the assessment of healthcare resource allocation decisions has focused on health maximization, equity concerns and more recently approaches based on health capabilities. However, a widely embraced idea is that health resources should be allocated to meet health needs. Little attention has been given to the principle of need which is often mentioned as an alternative independent criteria that could be used to guide healthcare evaluations. This paper develops a model and indicator of need satisfaction that aggregates the health needs of a population in a particular time period into a single measure that weights individual health needs by the severity of their ill health. The paper provides a first step towards formalizing the principle of need as a measurable objective for healthcare policy and we discuss some challenges for future research, including incorporating the duration of time into need-based health evaluations.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Henrik, et al.
(författare)
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A More Plausible Collapsing Principle
- 2018
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Ingår i: Theoria (Sweden). - : Thales. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 84, s. 325-336
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non-conventional comparative relations (e.g., “parity,” “imprecise equality,” “incommensurability”) cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Henrik, et al.
(författare)
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Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters
- 2022
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Andrić, Vuko, et al.
(författare)
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Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value
- 2022
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 100, s. 595-604
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
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| 6. |
- Daoud, Adel, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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IMF fairness: Calibrating the policies of the International Monetary Fund based on distributive justice
- 2022
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Ingår i: World Development. - : Elsevier BV. - 0305-750X .- 1873-5991. ; 157
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides financial assistance to its member countries in economic difficulties but at the same time requires these countries to reform public policies. In several contexts, these reforms have been at odds with population health and material living standards. While researchers have empirically analyzed the consequences of IMF reforms on health, no analysis has yet identified under what conditions tradeoffs between consequences for populations and economic outcomes would be fair and acceptable. Our article analyzes and identifies five principles to govern such tradeoffs and thus define IMF fairness. The article first reviews existing policy-evaluation studies, which on balance show that IMF policies, in their pursuit of macroeconomic improvement, frequently produce adverse effects on children's health and material living standards. Secondly, the article discusses four theories from distributive ethics—maximization, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism—to identify which is most compatible with the IMF's core mission of improving macroeconomic conditions, while at the same time balancing the consequences for population outcomes. Using a distributive justice analysis of IMF policies, we argue that sufficientarianism constitutes the most compatible theory. Thirdly, the article formalizes IMF fairness in the language of causal inference. It also supplies a framework for empirically measuring the extent to which IMF policies fulfill the criteria of IMF fairness, using observational data.
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| 7. |
- Eyal, Nir, et al.
(författare)
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Input and output in distributive theory
- 2021
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Ingår i: Nous. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Distributive theories evaluate distributions of goods based on candidate recipients’ characteristics, e.g. how well off candidates are, how deserving they are, and whether they fare below sufficiency. But such characteristics vary across possible worlds, so distributive theories may differ in terms of the world which for them settles candidates’ characteristics. This paper examines how distributive theories differ in terms of whether candidate recipients’ relevant characteristics are grounded in the possible world that would take place if the distributor does not intervene (call it the “input” world) or if they are grounded in each possible world that the distributor can bring about through different decisions (call each an “output” world). We illustrate the importance of this distinction in relation to one distributive theory, prioritarianism. As we show, both input and output versions of prioritarianism are plausible interpretations of the literature, and there are good reasons to take input prioritarianism seriously. Ultimately, however, we argue that input prioritarianism should be rejected.
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| 8. |
- Hassoun, Nicole, et al.
(författare)
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Distributing global health resources: Contemporary issues in political philosophy
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophy Compass. - 1747-9991. ; 14
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How should states and international organizations allocate global health resources? This paper examines proposals for distributing these resources in the literature. First, we look at the literature on the metrics for measuring what matters and consider how they might be modified to avoid some common objections—e.g., that these measures discriminate against the disabled or fail to give due weight to helping the young (or old) or those in present (or future) generations. Second, we canvas existing approaches to evaluating allocations of health-related resources utilizing such measures and advance a new way of doing so. We suggest that it is important to provide substantive arguments for directly evaluating alternative allocations, but there is also room for deliberation about fair procedures for selecting allocation criteria and securing just outcomes.
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| 9. |
- Herlitz, Anders, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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A Model and Indicator of Aggregate Need Satisfaction for Capped Objectives and Weighting Schemes for Situations of Scarcity
- 2017
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Ingår i: Social Indicators Research. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0303-8300 .- 1573-0921. ; 133:2, s. 413-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms of social welfare functions which are essentially and importantly non-satiable. However, there are good reasons to consider certain normative criteria and many policy objectives to be capped, i.e. bounded, and thus satiable provided sufficient resources are made available for their satisfaction. Inspired by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke class of indicators, this paper uses an interdisciplinary approach to develop a model for assessing outcomes in terms of capped objectives based on an understanding of individual shortfalls from the objective, denoted needs. We present an indicator to measure need satisfaction in a population of individuals with heterogeneous needs and highlight an aggregation problem under scarcity. For such situations, we develop three ways in which the indicator can be weighted that reflect respectively concerns over the frequency, depth and severity of the need shortfalls and show that normative evaluations based on these weighting schemes can conflict, yielding mutually inconsistent outcome rankings. The indicator can be adapted to measure a wide variety of phenomena, e.g. health needs, education shortfalls, deprivation, etc., and it is suited for targeting exercises and other policy implementations. In particular, it allows for exogenous weighting schemes, i.e. weights that can incorporate non-shortfall characteristics relevant for the evaluation, e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, etc. The indicator thus enables new ways for researchers to promote and study satiable objectives in a wide variety of contexts relevant to economic and social policy, e.g. human development programs, poverty reduction, healthcare policies, etc.
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| 10. |
- Herlitz, Anders, 1981
(författare)
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Against lifetime QALY prioritarianism.
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of medical ethics. - : BMJ. - 1473-4257 .- 0306-6800. ; 44, s. 109-113
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification of the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse off should be given priority in health-related priority setting. This paper argues against this view with reference to how it relies on implausible assumptions. By referring to lifetime QALY as the basis for judgments about who is worse off lifetime QALY prioritarianism relies on assumptions of strict additivity, atomism and intertemporal separability of sublifetime attributes. These assumptions entail that a health state at some period in time contributes with the same amount to how well off someone is regardless of intrapersonal and interpersonal distributions of health states. The paper argues that this is implausible and that prioritarians should take both intrapersonal and interpersonal distributions of goods into account when they establish who is worse off. They should therefore not accept that lifetime QALY is a reasonable ground for ascribing priority and reject lifetime QALY prioritarianism.
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