| 1. |
- Pham, M. K., et al.
(författare)
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Certified reference material for radionuclides in fish flesh sample IAEA-414 (mixed fish from the Irish Sea and North Sea)
- 2006
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Radionuclide Metrology and its Applications (Applied Radiation and Isotopes). - Amsterdam : Elsevier BV. - 0969-8043 .- 1872-9800. ; 64:10-11, s. 1253-1259
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- A certified reference material (CRM) for radionuclides in fish sample IAEA-414 (mixed fish from the Irish Sea and North Seas) is described and the results of the certification process are presented. Nine radionuclides (K-40, Cs-137, Th-232, U-234, U-235, U-238, Pu-238, Pu239+240 and Am-241) were certified for this material. Information on massic activities with 95% confidence intervals is given for six other radionuclides (Sr-90, Pb-210(Po-210), Ra-226, Pu-239, Pu-240 Pu-241). Less frequently reported radionuclides (Tc-99, I-129, Th-228, Th-230 and Np-217) and information on some activity and mass ratios are also included. The CRM can be used for quality assurance/quality control of the analysis of radionuclides in fish sample, for the development and validation of analytical methods and for training purposes. The material is available from IAEA, Vienna, in 100 g units.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games
- 2010
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 28:5, s. 477-495
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are asymmetric, since asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue used by experienced players (as a substitute to communication). It is also shown that although communication is used both to achieve market domination equilibria and cooperative market separating equilibria, the latter type of communication is much more common and successful.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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GRIND OR GAMBLE? AN EXPERIMENT ON EFFORT AND SPREAD SEEKING IN CONTESTS
- 2020
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Ingår i: Economic Inquiry. - : Wiley. - 0095-2583 .- 1465-7295. ; 58:1, s. 169-183
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We conduct a contest experiment to study if spread seeking and effort can be managed when participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory, we observe higher investments in spread for the winner-take-all scheme. Both types of investments can be controlled with a three-level prize scheme. However, the control management is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. We also explore the correlation between effort and spread across subjects and find that is robustly positive.
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| 4. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Grind or Gamble? : An Experimental Analysis of Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We conduct a contest experiment where participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory we observe substantial investments in spread. We find that both types of investments can be controlled with a three level prize scheme. However, the control is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. The winner-take-all prize scheme has many disadvantages including high spread and heterogeneous behavior. The scheme where only one loser is punished appears superior; it generates high mean, low spread and is most popular.
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| 5. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Robust inference in risk elicitation tasks
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. - : Springer Nature. - 0895-5646 .- 1573-0476. ; 61:3, s. 195-209
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent experimental evidence suggests that noisy behavior correlates strongly with personal characteristics. Since decision noise leads to bias in most elicitation tasks, there is a risk of falsely interpreting noise-driven relationships as preference driven. This puts previous studies that found a negative relation between personality measures and risk aversion into perspective and in particular raises the question of how to achieve robust inference in this domain. This paper shows, by way of an economic experiment with subjects from all walks of life, that using structural estimation to model heterogeneity of noise in combination with a balanced design allows us to mitigate the bias problem. Our estimations show that cognitive ability is related to noisy behavior rather than risk preferences. We also find age and education to be strongly related to noise, but the personality characteristics obtained using the Big Five inventory are less related to noise and more robustly correlated to risk preferences.
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| 6. |
- Burt, Ronald S., et al.
(författare)
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Cooperation Beyond the Network
- 2022
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Ingår i: Organization Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 1047-7039 .- 1526-5455. ; 33:2, s. 495-517
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is well known in economics, law, and sociology that reputation costs in a closed network give insiders a feeling of being protected from bad behavior in their relations with one another. A person accustomed to doing business within a closed network is, therefore, likely to feel at unusual risk when asked to cooperate beyond the network because of absent reputation-cost security. It follows that business leaders in more closed networks should be less likely to cooperate beyond their network (Hypothesis 1). Success reinforces the status quo. Business leaders successful with a closed network associate their success with the safety of their network, so they should be even less likely to cooperate with a stranger (Hypothesis 2). We combine network data from a heterogeneous area probability survey of Chinese CEOs with a behavioral measure of cooperation to show strong empirical support for the two hypotheses. CEOs in more closed networks are less likely to cooperate beyond their network, especially those running successful businesses: successful CEOs in closed networks are particularly likely to defect against people beyond their network. The work contributes to a growing literature linking network structure with behavior: here, the closure that facilitates trust and cooperation within a network simultaneously erodes the probability of cooperation beyond the network, thereby reinforcing a social boundary around the network. Taking our results as a baseline, we close sketching new research on personality, homophily, network dynamics, and variation in themeaning of "beyond the network."
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| 7. |
- Habte, Osmis Areda, et al.
(författare)
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Competition Makes Inspectors More Lenient : Evidence from the Motor Vehicle Inspection Market
- 2022
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Ingår i: Review of Industrial Organization. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0889-938X .- 1573-7160. ; 61:1, s. 45-72
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate whether increased competition among inspection firms leads to an increase in the inspection pass rate in the Swedish car inspection market, which is heavily regulated and consciously designed to mitigate incentives to violate government regulations. We use a panel dataset that represent 22.5 million car roadworthiness tests that were conducted during the period 2010–2015. Fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations, which are used to account for the endogeneity of competition, show that inspection stations that operate in highly competitive markets are more lenient toward their customers than are stations that operate in less competitive markets.
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| 8. |
- Holm, Håkan J., et al.
(författare)
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Strategic Decisions : Behavioral Differences Between CEOs and Others
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Differences in strategic decision making between CEOs and other people are interesting since CEOs make important economic decisions and impact values and norms in society. Our study combines a large stratified random sample of 199 CEOs of medium-size firms with a carefully selected control group of 200 comparable people. All subjects participated in three different incentivized strategic games — Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Battle-of-the-Sexes. We report substantial and robust differences in both behavior and beliefs between the CEOs and the control group. The CEOs are closer to the socially optimal strategy profile in all games. Hence, as a group the CEOs out-competes the control-group members and thereby receives higher average earnings, but not by being smarter (in the narrow “rationalistic” sense) or more selfish, but by being more cooperative and less aggressive.
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| 9. |
- Holm, Håkan J., et al.
(författare)
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Strategic decisions : behavioral differences between CEOs and others
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:1, s. 154-180
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study whether CEOs of private firms differ from other people with regard to their strategic decisions and beliefs about others’ strategy choices. Such differences are interesting since CEOs make decisions that are economically more relevant, because they affect not only their own utility or the well-being of household members, but the utility of many stakeholders inside and outside of the organization. They also play a central role in shaping values and norms in society. We expect differences between both groups, because CEOs are more experienced with strategic decision making than comparable people in other professional roles. Yet, due to the difficulties in recruiting this high-profile group for academic research, few studies have explored how CEOs make incentivized decisions in strategic games under strict controls and how their choices in such games differ from those made by others. Our study combines a stratified random sample of 200 CEOs of medium-sized firms with a carefully selected control group of 200 comparable people. All subjects participated in three incentivized games—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Battle-of-the-Sexes. Beliefs were elicited for each game. We report substantial and robust differences in both behavior and beliefs between the CEOs and the control group. The most striking results are that CEOs do not best respond to beliefs; they cooperate more, play less hawkish and thereby earn much more than the control group.
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| 10. |
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