| 1. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden
- 2013
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Ingår i: Games. - : MDPI AG. - 2073-4336. ; 4:3, s. 497-507
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher whencommunication is costly compared to when it is free.
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| 2. |
- Holm, Jerker, et al.
(författare)
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Intra-generational trust - A semi-experimental study of trust among different generations
- 2005
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 58:3, s. 403-419
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a public database in Sweden we obtained a subject pool consisting of one group of 20 years old and another group exactly 50 years older. The groups participated in a mail-based trust game, in which the young cohort exhibited more trust than the older one. Subjects significantly preferred to place trust in co-players of their own cohort and of the female sex. When amounts sent and proportions returned in the mail-based game are compared with other trust games conducted in standard laboratory environments, it is found that the mail-based game does not seem to generate extreme distributions. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 3. |
- Holm, Jerker, et al.
(författare)
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Trust in surveys and games - A methodological contribution on the influence of money and location
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 1872-7719 .- 0167-4870. ; 29:4, s. 522-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores methods to study trust. In a variety of settings, answers to survey questions and choices in a trust game are obtained from student sample pools. Some subjects are approached by mail and execute their task at home whereas others participate in classroom experiments. No differences between the results obtained by these methods are observed. Furthermore, one additional group plays the trust game with purely hypothetical payments, and another receives random lottery payments. This changes trust behavior dramatically, whereas trustworthiness is unaffected. Subjects without any financial incentives exhibit less trust and their trust choices are significantly correlated with survey trust answers. There is no such correlation for the corresponding choices with real payments. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 4. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim, 1966-
(författare)
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Multi-unit common value auctions : theory and experiments
- 2012
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions, and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic.This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format.The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid.Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Andersson, Fredrik, et al.
(författare)
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Transparency preference and economic behavior
- 1998
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - 0167-2681. ; 37:3, s. 56-349
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is shown that decision makers guided by Popperian epistemology will have a preference for transparency, even in situations where standard economic theory provides no rationale for such a preference. This provides a Popperian resolution of the Ellsberg paradox, and a rationale for suspicion in experiments as well as in economic life.
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| 7. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion
- 2016
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Ingår i: Management Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 62:1, s. 29-36
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do not. A large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population is conducted. We find that deciding for others reduces loss aversion. When choosing between risky prospects for which losses are ruled out by design, subjects make the same choices for themselves as for others. In contrast, when losses are possible, we find that the two types of choices differ. In particular, we find that subjects who make choices for themselves take less risk than those who decide for others when losses loom. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of loss aversion as a bias in decision making driven by emotions and that these emotions are reduced when making decisions for others.
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| 8. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games - An explorative experimental study
- 2006
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper explores experimentally the effects of costly communication possibilities in market entry games. It is shown that these effects depend on whether entry costs are symmetric or asymmetric. In the former, but not the latter case, communication possibilities increase coordination success substantially and are likely to generate inferior outcomes for consumers. Furthermore, cost asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue that is robust to changes in the game and is used by experienced players as a substitute to communication. It is also shown that although communication opens up for aggressive market domination strategies, such strategies are not used often successful.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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RISK AVERSION RELATES TO COGNITIVE ABILITY: PREFERENCES OR NOISE?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 14, s. 1129-1154
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent experimental studies suggest that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability. In this paper we report evidence that this relation may be spurious. We recruit a large subject pool drawn from the general Danish population for our experiment. By presenting subjects with choice tasks that vary the bias induced by random choices, we are able to generate both negative and positive correlations between risk aversion and cognitive ability. Our results suggest that cognitive ability is related to random decision making rather than to risk preferences.
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