| 1. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Differences Attract: An Experimental Study of Focusing in Economic Choice
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Several recent models of choice build on the idea that decision makers are more likely to choose an option if its attributes stand out compared to the attributes of the available alternatives. One example is the model of focusing by Köszegi and Szeidl (2013) where decision makers focus disproportionally on the attributes in which the available options differ more, implying that some attributes will be overweighted. We test this prediction in a controlled experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to make inconsistent choices when we manipulate the choice set by adding new options that are unchosen, but affect the maximal difference in attributes among the options. Hence, our results suggest that there exists a focusing effect.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Differences Attract : An Experimental Study of Focusing in Economic Choice
- 2021
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 131:639, s. 2671-2692
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several behavioural models of choice assume that decision makers place more weight on attributes where options differ more, an assumption we test in a set of experiments. We find that subjects are more likely to choose an option when we add options increasing the maximal difference in the original option's strongest attribute, suggesting that the decision maker's focus is drawn to attributes with a high spread. Additional experiments corroborate this finding. Still, we document that the focusing effect diminishes when options are presented using numbers instead of graphs or when subjects are forced to wait before submitting their answers.
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| 4. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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A Method for Finding the Maximal Set in Excess Demand
- 2014
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 125:1, s. 18-20
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in "large" partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payoff vectors at which there is no overdemanded set of agents. This minimum element corresponds to the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector in a special case of the partnership formation problem.
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| 7. |
- Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim
(författare)
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A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- 2020
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Ingår i: Annals of Operations Research. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0254-5330 .- 1572-9338. ; 288:1, s. 65-93
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents a combinatorial auction, which is of particular interest when short completion times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of item when complementarity between the two may exist. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if all bidders either view the items as substitutes or complements. If the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition, then the set of approximated Walrasian equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed that is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector. Simulation results suggest that the approximation procedure works well as the difference between the approximated and true minimal Walrasian prices is small.
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| 8. |
- Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim
(författare)
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An Approximate Auction
- 2015
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents an auction procedure which is of particular interest when short execution times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of items when complementarity between the two may exist. In particular, linear approximations of the bidders' indifference curves are made. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition. Said condition also ensures that the set of approximated equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed which is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector.
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| 9. |
- Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim
(författare)
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An Auction with Approximated Bidder Preferences - When an Auction has to be Quick
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents a combinatorial auction which is of particular interest when short completion times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of items when complementarity between the two may exist. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition. This condition also ensures that the set of approximated equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed which is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector.
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| 10. |
- Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim
(författare)
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Essays on economic behavior, focusing and auctions
- 2018
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis contributes to research on experimental and behavioral economics as well as auction theory. It consists of five papers.The first paper, Differences Attract: An Experimental Study of Focusing in Economic Choice, studies whether individuals' decisions are affected by focus effects. The focus effect suggests that individuals focus more on an attribute that has a larger difference among the available consumption options. This leads in turn to the observation that individuals overweigh such attributes and are thus more likely to choose a consumption option if the choice set displays a large difference in its strongest attribute. This experimental study finds that individuals do display a focusing bias. This bias is also contrasted by the decoy (attraction) effect in the study. The results suggest that the focusing effect is stronger than the decoy effect.The second paper, Visual Attraction: Modes of Presentation and Focusing in Economic Choice, examines whether the focus effect found in the first paper is affected by the visual interface. Specifically, we present options either by bar graphs or in tables. We find a strong focus effect when options are presented as bar graphs, but no such effect when the options are presented in a table. The third paper, Shill Bidding and Information in Sequential Auctions: A Laboratory Study, studies the effects of shill bidding, which occurs when sellers bid on their own item in order to increase its price. We also study the effect of providing shill bidding sellers with the bidding history from previous auctions. Using two sequential auctions in each round of the experiment, the study finds that shill bidding affects bidders' behavior and outcomes. However, the amount of information provided to the shill bidding sellers has no important effects. The fourth paper, An Auction with Approximated Bidder Preferences - When an Auction has to be Quick, provides a solution to the problem of accommodating bidders' possible non-quasi-linear preferences in a quick combinatorial auction setting. The solution is based on a method for approximating bidders' preferences. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists under a certain condition and a process for finding the minimum approximated Walrasian price vector is provided.The fifth paper, A Method for Finding the Maximal Set in Excess Demand, provides a computationally improved process for finding an equilibrium in the partnership formation problem. The method builds on finding the set of agents who are in maximal excess demand, then raises the payoffs of these. The process is shown to always stop at the minimum Walrasian price vector.
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