| 1. |
- Dimico, Arcangelo, et al.
(författare)
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Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Since its first appearance in the late 1800s, the origins of the Sicilian mafia have remained a largely unresolved mystery. Both institutional and historical explanations have been proposed in the literature through the years. In this paper, we develop an argument for a market structure-hypothesis, contending that mafia arose in towns where firms made unusually high profits due to imperfect competition. We identify the produc tion of citrus fruits as a sector with very high international demand as well as substantial fixed costs that acted as a barrier to entry in many places and secured high profits in others. We argue that the mafia arose out of the need to protect citrus production from predation by thieves. Using the original data from a parliamentary inquiry in 1881-86 on Sicilian towns, we show that mafia presence is strongly related to the production of orange and lemon. This result contrasts recent work that emphasizes the importance of land reforms and a broadening of property rights as the main reason for the emergence of mafia protection.
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| 2. |
- Dimico, Arcangelo, et al.
(författare)
-
Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic History. - 0022-0507. ; 77:4, s. 1083-1115
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, we study the emergence of an extractive institution that hampered economic development in Italy for more than a century: the Sicilian mafia. Since its first appearance in the late 1800s, the reasons behind the rise of the Sicilian mafia have remained a puzzle. In this article, we argue that the mafia arose as a response to an exogenous shock in the demand for oranges and lemons, following Lind's discovery in the late eighteenth century that citrus fruits cured scurvy. More specifically, we claim that mafia appeared in locations where producers made high profits from citrus production for overseas export. Operating in an environment with a weak rule of law, the mafia protected citrus production from predation and acted as intermediaries between producers and exporters. Using original data from a parliamentary inquiry in 1881-1886 on Sicilian towns, the Damiani Inquiry, we show that mafia presence is strongly related to the production of oranges and lemons. The results hold when different data sources and several controls are employed.
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