| 1. |
- Hauge, Karen Evelyn, et al.
(författare)
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Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al. 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load, to test if greed is affected by the load. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results show consistently that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects’ decisions are more driven by their feelings and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.
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| 2. |
- Hauge, K. E., et al.
(författare)
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Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 19:3, s. 562-576
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427-430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects' decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.
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| 3. |
- Johansson, Lars-Olof, 1957, et al.
(författare)
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Goal conflicts in political decision making: a survey of municipality politicians' view of road pricing.
- 2004
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Ingår i: Environment & Planning C: Government & Policy. - 0263-774X. ; 21:4, s. 615-624
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Investigates the existence of goal conflicts in political decision-making in the case of municipality politicians in Sweden on the issue of road pricing scheme. Goals of municipality politicians other than reducing car use; Possibility of failure in achieving environmental goals because of goal conflicts.
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| 7. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, et al.
(författare)
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Anonymity, Reciprocity, and Conformity: Evidence from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in Costa Rica
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based on a natural field experiment conducted at a national park in Costa Rica. Contributions made in public in front of the solicitor are 25% higher than contributions made in private. Giving subjects a small gift before requesting a contribution increases the likelihood of a positive contribution. At the same time, the conditional contribution decreases. The total effect of giving a gift is positive but small, and taking the cost of the gift into account, it is far from profitable. When the subjects are told that the typical contribution of others is $2 (a small contribution), the probability of a contribution increases and the conditional contribution decreases, compared with providing no reference information. Providing a high reference level ($10) increases the conditional contributions. Overall, the total effects have the expected signs, although the magnitudes are smaller than what one might have expected based on existing evidence from laboratory experiments.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Does context matter more for hypothetical than for actual contributions? Evidence from a natural field experiment
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We investigate the importance of the social context for people’s voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica, using a natural field experiment. Some subjects make actual contributions while others state their hypothetical contribution. Both the degree of anonymity and provided information about the contributions of others influence subject contributions in the hypothesized direction. We do find a substantial hypothetical bias with regard to the amount contributed. However, the influence of the social contexts is about the same when the subjects make actual monetary contributions as when they state their hypothetical contributions. Our results have important implications for validity testing of stated preference methods: a comparison between hypothetical and actual behavior should be done for a given social context.
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