| 1. |
- Himes, Austin, et al.
(författare)
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Correction to: Why nature matters : A systematic review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values
- 2023
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Ingår i: BioScience. - : Oxford University Press. - 0006-3568 .- 1525-3244. ; 74:1, s. 25-43
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct futureresearch.
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| 2. |
- Himes, Austin, et al.
(författare)
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Why nature matters : A systematic review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values
- 2023
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Ingår i: BioScience. - : Oxford University Press. - 0006-3568 .- 1525-3244. ; , s. 1-19
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research.
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| 3. |
- Isacs, Lina
(författare)
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Deliberating value : On the theory and practice of valuation of nature from neoclassical to ecological economics
- 2021
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis is about whether it is a good idea to place monetary value on nature, to remedy the fact that we treat it as having no particular value to us humans, although it clearly has. The thesis is based on five research papers that can be said to position themselves on opposite sides in the debate on monetisation of nature. The first two papers consider the basis of neoclassical environmental economics and apply the value theory and valuation methods from normative neoclassical welfare theory, on which monetisation of nature is based. The other three papers examine, with increasing degrees of criticism, this theory of value and especially its central assumption that value can be derived from people’s choices, or “revealed preferences”. The thesis itself is a “reflective story” about the journey I made as I learned to think about and understand neoclassical environmental economics in new ways. I reflect upon my work from a philosophy of science perspective, consider how for-granted-taken ideas from neoclassical economics affect environmental economic analysis and its conclusions, and examine the subject of value and valuation from what has become my new theoretical standpoint, ecological economics. It concerns meta-theoretical questions about ontology, that is, ideas in a research discipline about how things really are (what is), and epistemology, ideas about how researchers can provide relevant knowledge about reality. Such ideas are often taken for granted in neoclassical economic analysis and how they affect the analysis and its conclusions is not seldom unreflective. In the thesis, I move from explaining why neoclassical environmental economists advocate monetisation and pricing of nature as important solutions to environmental problems, to exemplifying how this turned out in research projects intended to serve as decision support in practice, and then to exploring and clarifying an alternative theory of value and valuation from ecological economics based on value pluralism and so-called deliberative valuation. In a concluding discussion, I point out that there are reasons to be sceptical about whether monetisation of nature is the right path to follow if we want to change our unsustainable relationship with nature and tackle the serious ecological crises we currently face. I show that monetisation of nature in practice requires a considerable amount of pragmatism, since the applied version of the theory deviates far from its idealised claims about the possibility to capture actual, total values. I also show that the descriptive (so-called positive) part of neoclassical theory and its normative part overlap in a way that makes it very difficult to speak of “objective” science in environmental economics. Instead, and despite strong recognition in the discipline that environmental problems are “market failures”, neoclassical theory has an ethical and ideological bias that favours individuals’ freedom of choice and market solutions, at the expense of collective decision-making and discussions about values that cannot be quantified. The important contribution of the thesis is that it clarifies the consequences of a central idea in the theory behind environmental economic analysis, namely the idea of values as commensurable, that is, measurable in one single unit. This idea links to the misleading conception of choices as “trade-offs”, where all choices are essentially viewed as the result of people’s constant exchange of costs and benefits within themselves in every choice they make, with the result that everything gets better (or at least not worse). Based on my research, I suggest that, in reality, people do not generally “make” trade-offs. If anything, people try to avoid them, especially when it comes to difficult choices, such as those concerning the true value of nature, because such choices involve moral conflicts between values that are incommensurable. As a basis for valuing transformational change, monetisation is therefore unsuitable, as it conceals rather than reveals the ethical dilemmas that are the very definition of sustainability problems and causes us to search for the efficient or so-called “optimal” solutions claimed possible in neoclassical theory and rhetoric, although such solutions do not exist. What we need instead is to represent public opinion in environmental decision-making in ways that do not conceal people’s actual moral considerations. Environmental valuation is political. It must be done together with others through reason-sensitive means, where people’s actual experiences of value conflicts – within us and between us – can be deliberated before making decisions. This makes decision-making more complex, but as an alternative to monetisation, this realism is not necessarily unrealistic. The fact that incommensurability is grounded in human experience means that the complexity of social and environmental decision-making has a real counterpart in conflicts within ourselves. One could see this as a potentiality, because we may have more confidence in people’s ability to recognise the relevance and necessity of less simplification and more complexity in decision-making. People need to “deliberate values” rather than “consuming” them and being expected to express all sorts of values through money.
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| 4. |
- Isacs, Lina, et al.
(författare)
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What does value pluralism mean in practice? An empirical demonstration from a deliberative valuation
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The increasing calls for value pluralism within research on valuation in environmental decision-making responds to an increasing recognition that conventional approaches to environmental valuation based in neoclassical economics do not account for important aspects of human-nature relations. Few studies have however explored how value plurality actually plays out in practice. In this paper, we draw on Alan Holland’s (2002) essay “Are choices trade-offs?”, which goes to the heart of issues behind valuation and illuminates differences in conceptions of value and rationality between neoclassical and ecological economists. In a quasi-experimental study on values related to marine management in a coastal community in Sweden with local citizens and politicians, we empirically investigate how participants in a deliberative valuation handle different values in their reasoning and choicemaking. The results demonstrate the relevance of value pluralism for policy by showing the prevalence of preference uncertainty, value incommensurability and both inter- and intrapersonal value conflicts. Value conflicts played out as the inability to achieve multiple transcendental values that were aspired to, including conflicts between social and environmental goals. Rather than attempting to commensurate, participants sought to avoid moral conflicts, and showed emotional anguish where these conflicts came to the fore. This evidence thus suggests that choices are not, fundamentally, trade-offs. Incommensurability appeared as felt experience and deliberate positions rather than expressions of irrationality. Legitimately resolving value conflicts thus demands reason-sensitive means for deciding upon which sacrifices are made and for how to represent public opinion in environmental decision-making in a way that reveals the actual moral considerations of people.
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| 5. |
- Isacs, Lina, PhD, et al.
(författare)
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What does value pluralism mean in practice? An empirical demonstration from a deliberative valuation
- 2023
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Ingår i: People and Nature. - : Wiley. - 2575-8314. ; 5:2, s. 384-402
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The intensified call for value pluralism within research on valuation in environmental decision-making responds to the recognition that neoclassical economic approaches to environmental valuation do not sufficiently account for important aspects of human–nature relations. However, few studies have explored how value plurality actually plays out in social deliberative reasoning and decision-making in practice, and these studies have mostly been deductive and quantitative.In his essay ‘Are choices trade-offs?’ Alan Holland (2002) goes to the heart of differences in conceptions of value and rationality between neoclassical and ecological economics. These conceptions differ in terms of whether values are seen as commensurable or incommensurable, whether people's choices amount to willing exchanges of gains and losses between different values and whether unwillingness to trade values off for net gain is irrational.Addressing Holland's question, we present a quasi-experimental study on deliberative valuation of marine issues on the Swedish west coast, where we considered how local citizens and politicians approached values in their reasoning and choice-making. Mixing quantitative and qualitative empirical material, we used an abductive analytical approach, iterating between data and theory to link our observations and interpretations to prevalent understandings of value, valuation and deliberation in the literature.The results demonstrate the relevance of value pluralism for environmental policy by showing the prevalence of preference uncertainty and intrapersonal value conflicts in participants' reasoning and interaction. Value conflicts played out as the inability to achieve multiple transcendental values that participants aspired to, including conflicts between social and environmental goals. Rather than attempting to commensurate different value dimensions, participants sought to avoid moral conflicts, showed emotional anguish when value conflicts came to the fore and tried to bridge conflicting aspirations and experiences through inclusive reason-giving and compromise.Thus, choices were not resolved through rational trade-offs, supporting Holland's claim and challenging the neoclassical trade-off model of choice. Incommensurability appeared as deliberate positions grounded in participants' experiences rather than as irrationality. Legitimately resolving value conflicts thus demands reason-sensitive means for deciding upon the sacrifices to be made and supporting public participation in environmental decision-making in ways that reveal peoples' actual moral considerations.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Islar, Mine, et al.
(författare)
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Diverse values of nature for sustainability
- 2022
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Ingår i: Nature. - 0028-0836 .- 1476-4687. ; 620, s. 813-823
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Twenty-five years since foundational publications on valuing ecosystem services for human well-being1,2, addressing the global biodiversity crisis3 still implies confronting barriers to incorporating nature’s diverse values into decision-making. These barriers include powerful interests supported by current norms and legal rules such as property rights, which determine whose values and which values of nature are acted on. A better understanding of how and why nature is (under)valued is more urgent than ever4. Notwithstanding agreements to incorporate nature’s values into actions, including the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF)5 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals6, predominant environmental and development policies still prioritize a subset of values, particularly those linked to markets, and ignore other ways people relate to and benefit from nature7. Arguably, a ‘values crisis’ underpins the intertwined crises of biodiversity loss and climate change8, pandemic emergence9 and socio-environmental injustices10. On the basis of more than 50,000 scientific publications, policy documents and Indigenous and local knowledge sources, the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) assessed knowledge on nature’s diverse values and valuation methods to gain insights into their role in policymaking and fuller integration into decisions7,11. Applying this evidence, combinations of values-centred approaches are proposed to improve valuation and address barriers to uptake, ultimately leveraging transformative changes towards more just (that is, fair treatment of people and nature, including inter- and intragenerational equity) and sustainable futures.
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| 8. |
- Kenter, Jasper O., et al.
(författare)
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Cultural Values Related to Marine and Coastal Environments
- 2024. - 2
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Ingår i: Treatise on Estuarine and Coastal Science. - : Academic Press. - 9780323910422 - 9780323907989 ; , s. 166-179
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Cultural values of the coast and sea are rooted in specific land and seascapes, material and non-material heritage, including language and cultural practices. The way they are managed matters greatly for our quality of life. Concepts of cultural values include broad, overarching values, specific values ascribed to particular aspects of the marine environment, diverse value indicators, and the diverse contributions of culture to society. This chapter presents the typology of values developed by the Intergovernmental Science Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), including four life frames (living from, with, in, and as nature) that are used to organize the typology. We build on this conceptual foundation to develop key aspects and types of cultural values in more detail. We then present a diverse range of qualitative and quantitative methods to assess cultural values and discuss five case studies from the UK and Sweden, pertaining to relational values of wild swimming, economic assessment of living fishing heritage, deliberation on value conflicts in fjord management, cultural values of seaweed farming, and understanding local values of marine management in the context of the life frames. Finally, we consider the implications of these diverse cases for how cultural values are to be understood, including with regard to place, relationality, substitutability of value, power relations, framing conflicts, participation, method integration, sectoral integration in management, and the potential of harnessing cultural values for transformation towards sustainability and justice.
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| 9. |
- Kenter, Jasper O., et al.
(författare)
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Loving the mess : navigating diversity and conflict in social values for sustainability
- 2019
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Ingår i: Sustainability Science. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1862-4065 .- 1862-4057. ; 14:5, s. 1439-1461
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: (1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses.
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