| 1. |
- Broms, Rasmus, 1984, et al.
(författare)
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Inheritance regimes: Medieval family structures and current institutional quality
- 2019
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Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 32:4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This study highlights the impact that medieval patterns of intrafamily inheritance practices wield on contemporary institutional quality. We argue that regions that practiced inegalitarian inheritance developed stronger institutions than regions that practiced egalitarian inheritance, for two reasons. First, we argue that transmitting land to a single heir resulted in a sense of personal ownership and, by extension, encouraged individual property rights. Second, we argue that the fact that disinherited children were incentivized to seek training and employment outside the family domicile in regions practicing inegalitarian inheritance resulted in trust-building social interactions. We test our argument using data on medieval inheritance patterns and modern-day institutional quality in European subnational regions and across countries globally. Our results show that historical inegalitarian inheritance practices are strongly positively associated with contemporary institutional quality. We conclude that historical norms at the family level are still affecting important modern-day societal functions.
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| 2. |
- Esaiasson, Peter, 1957, et al.
(författare)
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In pursuit of happiness: Life satisfaction drives political support
- 2020
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Research. - : Wiley. - 0304-4130 .- 1475-6765. ; 59:1, s. 25-44
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is argued in this article that citizens in democracies use their subjective well-being (SWB) as an evaluative criterion when deciding how willing they are to support and comply with government dictates (political system support). When life is satisfactory, government authorities are rewarded with support, when it is not, citizens punish authorities by withholding their support. To make sense of the relationship, it is suggested that citizens act as if they have signed a happiness contract with ‘those in power’. In support of this argument, comparative survey data shows that SWB predicts attitudes on political system support across country contexts and under strong control conditions. Establishing that the relationship is causal, panel data documents that attitudes on political system support can be undermined following the termination of a close personal relationship, and that the causal effect is mediated via changes in SWB. Finally, as predicted, the happiness-support relationship is weaker among individuals who are high on spirituality/religiousness and attribute blame for external events to both worldly and non-worldly powers.
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| 3. |
- Harteveld, E., et al.
(författare)
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A tough trade-off? The asymmetrical impact of populist radical right inclusion on satisfaction with democracy and government
- 2021
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Ingår i: European Political Science Review. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1755-7739 .- 1755-7747. ; 13:1, s. 113-133
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002-2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists' and non-nativists' SWD depends on mainstream parties' strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton's 'reservoir of goodwill', that is, a buffer of political support generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.
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| 4. |
- Harteveld, E., et al.
(författare)
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Adapting to party lines: the effect of party affiliation on attitudes to immigration
- 2017
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Ingår i: West European Politics. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0140-2382 .- 1743-9655. ; 40:6, s. 1177-1197
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Public opinion on immigration is increasingly relevant for political behaviour. However, little is known about the way in which citizens' political allegiances in turn shape their attitudes to immigration. Abundant existing evidence suggests that voters often take cues from the parties they support. Using panel data from the Netherlands and Sweden, this article investigates the dynamic relation between attitudes to immigration and party preferences. The longitudinal nature of the data allows for making stronger claims about causal mechanisms than previous cross-sectional studies. The analysis shows that voters who change their preference to the Radical Right become stricter on immigration, whereas voters changing to the Greens become less strict on immigration over time. This confirms that citizens' support for anti- and pro-immigration parties results in a radicalisation' of their views on immigration along party lines. A similar spiral' of radicalisation can be found around the issue of European integration.
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| 5. |
- Harteveld, E., et al.
(författare)
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Gender Differences in Vote Choice: Social Cues and Social Harmony as Heuristics
- 2019
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Ingår i: British Journal of Political Science. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0007-1234 .- 1469-2112. ; 49:3, s. 1141-1161
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some parties are more popular among men, while other parties attract more female voters. This article proposes that these differences can be partially explained by two recurring gender differences in the socio-psychological literature. It argues that men's generally lower sensitivity to social cues makes them more likely to vote for stigmatized and small parties, whereas women's greater concern with social harmony is expected to make them less likely to vote for extreme parties. The models are tested at the individual and party levels using three waves of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data from twenty-eight countries. Ceteris paribus, men are more likely than women to vote for parties that are socially stigmatized or ideologically extreme. This has consequences for the current understanding of gender gaps in voting, and reiterates that voting has important social aspects.
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| 6. |
- Harteveld, E., et al.
(författare)
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Social Stigma and Support for the Populist Radical Right: An Experimental Study
- 2019
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Political Studies. - : Wiley. - 0080-6757 .- 1467-9477. ; 42:3-4, s. 296-307
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The 'taboo' or 'stigma' associated with many populist radical right parties (PRRPs) has been argued to be an important constraint on their electoral success. In comparison to mainstream parties, there seems to be a higher barrier keeping voters from supporting PRRPs. However, this mechanism has not been tested directly. We conducted a randomized survey-embedded experiment manipulating the social stigma of a fictitious radical right party in Sweden. We compare three conditions. Two of these contain subtle signals about how other respondents feel about this party. In one condition the fictitious party is supported by many voters (the neutralizing condition) and in the other it is evaluated negatively by the overwhelming majority (the stigma condition). Both experimental groups do not differ significant from the control group in support for this fictitious party. However, the difference between the two experimental groups is borderline significant. This suggests that there is a causal effect of social stigma on support for a RRP, even though the evidence is rather tentative.
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| 7. |
- Harteveld, Eelco, et al.
(författare)
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The gender gap in populist radical-right voting: Examining the demand side in Western and Eastern Europe
- 2015
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Ingår i: Patterns of Prejudice. - 0031-322X .- 1461-7331. ; 49:1-2, s. 103-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In most countries, men are more likely to vote for parties of the populist radical right (PRR) than women. The authors argue here that there are two mechanisms that might potentially explain this gender gap: mediation (women’s attitudes and characteristics differ from men’s in ways that explain the PRR vote) and moderation (women vote for different reasons than men). They apply these two mechanisms to general theories of support for PRR parties—the socio-structural model, the discontent model, and the policy vote model—and test these on a large sample of voters in seventeen Western and Eastern European countries. The study shows that the gender gap is produced by a combination of moderation and mediation. Socio-structural differences between men and women exist, but the extent to which they explain the gender gap is limited, and primarily restricted to post- Communist countries. Furthermore, women generally do not differ from men in their level of nativism, authoritarianism or discontent with democracy. Among women, however, these attitudes are less strongly related to a radical-right vote. This suggests that men consider the issues of the radical right to be more salient, but also that these parties deter women for reasons other than the content of their political programme. While the existing research has focused almost exclusively on mediation, we show that moderation and mediation contribute almost equally to the gender gap. © 2015 Taylor & Francis.
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| 8. |
- Kokkonen, Andrej, 1978, et al.
(författare)
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A nativist divide? Anti-immigration attitudes and diffuse support for democracy in Western Europe
- 2023
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Research. - : Wiley. - 0304-4130 .- 1475-6765. ; 62:3
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Earlier research has shown a strong connection between anti-immigration attitudes and political trust in Western Europe. In this research note, we examine if nativists’ low levels of specific political support translate into a more general scepticism about democracy as a system of government. Using comparative data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS), we investigate the relationship between nativist attitudes and several indicators of principled, or diffuse, support for democracy. The findings testify to a nativist divide in diffuse political support. We find a systematic and significant difference in support for democracy between strong nativists and other citizens. West European nativists are less likely than other citizens to view their country as democratic. They also tend to perceive living in a democracy as less important than people with a more positive outlook on immigrants. Moreover, and maybe more worrying, nativists express lower levels support for democracy in relation to non-democratic regime alternatives, that is, they are less likely to be “principled” democrats. The found negative associations remain also after controlling for nativists’ levels of specific support, which indicates that there may be a more fundamental opposition between nativism and diffuse support for democracy than previously acknowledged. We believe that these findings have important implications for research trying to understand challenges to liberal democracy in a time when nativist parties have been successful in politicizing immigration and continue to score electoral victories all over Europe.
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| 9. |
- Kokkonen, Andrej, 1978, et al.
(författare)
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Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Political Participation in Europe
- 2024
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Ingår i: POLITICAL STUDIES. - 0032-3217 .- 1467-9248.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article investigates the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and political participation in European democracies. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002-2018), we first show that a participation gap between pro- and anti-immigrant citizens exists for all types of political participation, even though the gap in voting is relatively small. The analyses also show that leftist and centrist anti-immigrant citizens participate less than leftist and centrist pro-immigration citizens, whereas their right-leaning counterparts participate almost as much in politics as do right-leaning pro-immigrant citizens. The observed participation gap points to the fact that there is a reservoir of anti-immigrant leftist and centrist citizens potentially waiting to be mobilized in many European countries.
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| 10. |
- Kokkonen, Andrej, 1978
(författare)
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Bedroom Politics. How family policies affect women’s fertility and union formation decisions.
- 2011
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Most studies on policies’ effect on fertility depart from the assumption that fertility decisions are taken within unions, by partners who behave altruistically towards each other. This study argues that such a focus misses a fundamental fact: namely, that fertility decisions are closely interrelated with decisions about union formation and union dissolution. Many fertility decisions are taken by individuals long before they form unions and can be certain that their partners will share the burdens of raising potential children with them. In addition, in a time of high union dissolution rates, far from all fertility decisions within unions are taken by partners who are altruistically inclined toward each other. Consequently, the previous research’s focus, on how policies that reduce altruistic partners’ costs of reproduction affect within-union fertility, is too narrow to capture the entire effect that policies have on fertility. More specifically, this study argues that policies can affect fertility in two ways that the previous research has failed to notice; namely 1) by affecting women’s incentives to form unions, and 2) by affecting women’s incentives to have children in unstable unions. The empirical investigation, which builds on multilevel analyses of data from the European Social Survey on nearly 15000 women in 22 European countries, contributes to the field with three main findings. First, it is shown that generous family policies increase women’s likelihood of living in unions. Because a union is an almost necessary precondition for having children in contemporary Europe this finding means that generous family policies have a strong indirect positive effect on fertility. It is not possible to detect this indirect effect only by studying within-union fertility. Second, it is shown that family policies that reduce the economic risks of having children in unstable unions increase women’s likelihood of living in unstable unions (as opposed to remaining single). Because union instability lowers fertility this means that within-union fertility rates, on average, are lower in countries implementing such policies. However, total fertility rates are likely to be higher, as, for most women, the alternative to form an unstable union is to remain single. Third, it is shown that policies that reduce the economic risks of having children in unstable unions reduce the negative effect of union instability on fertility. Thus, such policies have a stronger positive effect on the likelihood of women in unstable unions having children than they have on the likelihood of women in stable unions having children. Previous studies have not considered this possibility, but assumed policies to have a uniform impact on women’s fertility regardless of how stable the women’s unions are. Together the study’s findings point to that previous research, in so far as it has focused on within-union fertility, has underestimated generous family policies’ positive effect on fertility. Thus, family policies are probably a more effective means for raising fertility than hitherto has been acknowledged. This is in particular true of family policies that reduce women’s economic risks of having children in unstable unions, by helping them reconcile work-family conflicts (e.g. paid parental leaves with high replacement rates and subsidized professional child care). Europe’s current fertility crisis can likely be solved if states implement more of such policies.
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