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- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?
- 2015
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Ingår i: Evolution. - : Wiley: 12 months. - 0014-3820. ; 69:7, s. 1858-1873
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A long-standing question in biology and economics is whether individual organisms evolve to behave as if they were striving to maximize some goal function. We here formalize this “as if” question in a patch-structured population in which individuals obtain material payoffs from (perhaps very complex multimove) social interactions. These material payoffs determine personal fitness and, ultimately, invasion fitness. We ask whether individuals in uninvadable population states will appear to be maximizing conventional goal functions (with population-structure coefficients exogenous to the individual's behavior), when what is really being maximized is invasion fitness at the genetic level. We reach two broad conclusions. First, no simple and general individual-centered goal function emerges from the analysis. This stems from the fact that invasion fitness is a gene-centered multigenerational measure of evolutionary success. Second, when selection is weak, all multigenerational effects of selection can be summarized in a neutral type-distribution quantifying identity-by-descent between individuals within patches. Individuals then behave as if they were striving to maximize a weighted sum of material payoffs (own and others). At an uninvadable state it is as if individuals would freely choose their actions and play a Nash equilibrium of a game with a goal function that combines self-interest (own material payoff), group interest (group material payoff if everyone does the same), and local rivalry (material payoff differences).
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2. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier. - 1095-7235 .- 0022-0531. ; 185
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals' preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms of fitness and in terms of material payoffs. At the fitness level, individuals can be regarded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates own behavior in the light of the consequences for own fitness if others adopted this behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection. At the material-payoff level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and a Kantian motive (in terms of material payoffs), but also in part by other-regarding preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group resource constraints and the risk of conflict with other groups. We show how group size, the migration rate, the risk of group conflicts, and cultural loyalty shape the relative strengths of these motives.
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