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- Leth, Palle, 1976-
(författare)
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Intentions in Utterance Interpretation
- 2015
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Ingår i: Modeling and Using Context. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 9783319255903 - 9783319255910 ; , s. 501-505
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Which is the role of intentions in utterance interpretation? I sketch an argument to the effect that the role of intentions is indirect; the interpreter’s assignment of meaning rather depends on considerations of what meaning is most reasonably assigned and her interest. This approach often results in the assignment of intended meaning, but might also result in the assignment of non intended meaning. I consider the three basic options offered to the interpreter when, in the course of the conversation, she is confronted with further evidence about the speaker’s intention.
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- Leth, Palle, 1976-
(författare)
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Is There any Use for a Notion of the Correct Interpretation of an Utterance?
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophical Insights into Pragmatics. - : Walter de Gruyter. - 9783110623765 - 9783110626339 ; , s. 83-106
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Philosophers of language and theoretical linguists disagree about whether the meaning of an utterance is determined by the speaker’s more or less constrained communicative intention or by public features available to the hearer such as conventional linguistic meaning and diverse contextual cues. In this paper I question the common presupposition that there is such a thing as the correct interpretation of an utterance. I set out to show that, from the viewpoint of the three options at stake in the interpretive interaction between the speaker and the hearer, the notion of correct interpretation is dispensable. If the hearer takes an interest in the speaker’s intended meaning, as she most frequently does, she has no reason to be concerned with the actual meaning of the utterance. If the hearer wants to hold the speaker responsible for the normative consequences of the utterance, what is at issue is whether the hearer had the best reasons to take the utterance the way she did, i.e. the hearer opts for the most reasonable interpretation of the utterance, irrespective of the speaker’s intention and also of the objective meaning of the utterance. Finally, the hearer may opt for a merely imagined meaning of the utterance, which accounts for the remaining purposes a hearer can have with respect to an utterance, e.g. merriment. If there is no use for the notion of the correct interpretation of an utterance in interpretive practice, it seems that there are good reasons to dispense with this notion also in the theory about language and communication.
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- Leth, Palle, PhD, 1976-
(författare)
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Lying and Misleading in Context
- 2022
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Ingår i: Argumenta. - 2465-2334. ; 8:1, s. 125-136
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper I question the lying/misleading distinction from three different angles.I argue, first, that if speakers are responsible for what they explicitly say only andhearers for what they infer that speakers implicitly convey, it is practically impossibleto enforce speaker responsibility. An implication of this view is that the lying/misleading distinction is untenable. Other attempts at questioning the distinctionhave been countered by empirical evidence of the robustness of the distinction.However, there is also contrasting empirical evidence that people do think that it ispossible to lie by implicit means. I argue, second, that empirical evidence is irrelevantto the question which ought to be at issue, namely whether there are goodreasons to make the distinction. Third, I argue that to the extent that the notion ofmisleading is in the service of inducing false beliefs by the statement of truths, thedistinction does not seem to be morally well-founded. In short, I sketch an argumentto the effect that there are no conceptual, empirical or moral reasons for makingthe lying/misleading distinction.
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