| 1. |
- Aksyutina, Yuliya, 1983, et al.
(författare)
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Properties of the 7He ground state from 8He neutron knockout
- 2009
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Ingår i: Physics Letters B. - : Elsevier BV. - 0370-2693. ; 679:3, s. 191-196
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The unbound nucleus 7He, produced in neutron-knockout reactions with a 240 MeV/u 8He beam in a liquid-hydrogen target, has been studied in an experiment at the ALADIN-LAND setup at GSI. From an R-matrix analysis the resonance parameters for 7He as well as the spectroscopic factor for the 6He(0+) + n configuration in its ground-state have been obtained. The spectroscopic factor is 0.61 confirming that 7He is not a pure single-particle state. An analysis of 5He data from neutron-knockout reactions of 6He in a carbon target reveals the presence of an s-wave component at low energies in the α+n relative energy spectrum. A possible low-lying exited state in 7He observed in neutron knockout data from 8He in a carbon target and tentatively interpreted as a Iπ=1/2− state, could not be observed in the present experiment. Possible explanations of the shape difference between the 7He resonance obtained in the two knockout reactions are discussed in terms of target-dependence or different reaction mechanisms at relativistic energies.
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| 2. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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A network perspective on the reshoring process : The relevance of the home- and the host-country contexts
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Industrial Marketing Management. - : ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC. - 0019-8501 .- 1873-2062. ; 70, s. 156-166
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While research on reshoring generally focuses on the host-country to explain why a company brings its previously offshored activities back home, this paper stresses the relevance also of the home-country context. Specifically, relying on the IMP (Industrial Marketing & Purchasing) perspective we show how offshoring and reshoring processes and decisions are both enabled and constrained by the micro-interactions and inter-dependencies in the industrial networks stretching over the home-country and the host-country. This work relies on a longitudinal case study about an Italian manufacturing firm to develop a model indicating how offshoring/reshoring is a long-term process which unfolds depending both on the focal firm's strategy and on its interplay with the embedding network. Next to this interactive process perspective, we contribute to the literature on reshoring and the global factory also the concept of "selective reshoring", whereby companies bring back a very specific sub-set of activities, which were previously fine-sliced and offshored, and re-embed these activities in their local home context. The more flexible and selective nature of this relocation of activities between different supply markets depends both on the firm's strategy and on the structure, overlap and evolution of the network elements located in the home- and host-country contexts.
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| 3. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Antibiotic Pipeline Coordinators
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC. - 1073-1105 .- 1748-720X. ; 46, s. 25-31
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The World Health Organization (WHO) has published a global priority list of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to guide research and development (R&D) of new antibiotics. Every pathogen on this list requires R&D activity, but some are more attractive for private sector investments, as evidenced by the current antibacterial pipeline. A pipeline coordinator is a governmental/non-profit organization that closely tracks the antibacterial pipeline and actively supports R&D across all priority pathogens employing new financing tools.
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| 4. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
-
Economic incentives for the development of new antibiotics : Report commissioned by the Public Health Agency of Sweden
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This report responds to a request by the Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten) concerning which incentives for antibiotics research and development (R&D) Sweden should take into consideration for potential public investments. Based on discussions and interviews with experts, feedback from stakeholders (i.e. potential recipients of Swedish incentives), company case studies and computer-based Monte Carlo simulations, this report provides a set of recommendations about the economic incentives that can be relevant for Sweden.The incentives identified for Sweden’s portfolio meet the following criteria: improving Sweden’s visibility in the antibiotics field, reinforcing Sweden’s national R&D infrastructure in this area, leveraging Sweden’s strengths and traditions, limiting the public expenditure per incentive, permitting rapid implementation and effects, providing highly needed support to the antibiotic pipeline in unique ways, and granting Sweden a key contribution and thus influence on the design and direction of each incentive.Based on these criteria, a Market Entry Reward (MER) was not considered a viable alternative for Sweden if implemented by Sweden alone, especially because of its demanding financial engagement (close to 1 B USD), which is necessary for this incentive to produce relevant effects on the antibiotics R&D pipeline. However, if Sweden were to decide to pilot an MER, it should focus on a fully delinked MER, which entirely substitutes market sales with lump sums paid on a yearly basis. An MER should moreover be financed primarily from the healthcare budget to avoid crowding out other incentives. A fully delinked MER would allow testing several features of this incentive model, such as the evaluation procedures to set the overall amount of the MER, the definition of the unit prizes to be paid by local healthcare facilities to the central government, and periodic reviews to reassess the amount of yearly lump-sum payments according to the confirmed therapeutic efficacy of the antibiotic.If Sweden were to collaborate with other countries, such as the G20 group or the 28 EU members, a reasonable amount for its share is 6 or 23 M USD, respectively, for a partially delinked MER and 9 or 34 M USD, respectively, for a fully delinked MER. There are, however, ways to combine push and pull incentives, which are quicker and more efficient than an MER, namely combinations of grants with milestone prizes, which are rewards paid to developers upon the successful completion of key R&D steps (e.g. Phase 1 clinical studies). In addition to producing better effects for the money spent, a combination of milestone prizes and grants also prevents large MERs from crowding out push investments as well as recipients such as small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs), who usually cannot wait for a reward that is delayed until the final approval of an antibiotic.The recommended portfolio of incentives for Sweden includes three incentives: grants, milestone prizes and Pipeline Coordinators, to be used in combination with each other as a way to cover the antibiotics R&D pipeline and achieve important synergies. The following features should be considered when implementing and funding the three selected incentives:1) Grants should be dedicated to early R&D projects (no later than Phase 2) and to reinforcing the national R&D infrastructure, with a longer-term perspective than the current 3-year timeframe. In this regard, Sweden should maintain and possibly increase its current yearly investments in antibiotics R&D grants of approximately 7 M USD/year (60 M SEK) over several years. These investments will pay off in the long run, both in terms of molecules that will enter the future R&D pipeline; and as a stock of competencies spread over an infrastructure of specialised R&D centres that can be leveragedfor future antibiotics research. These competences must be built up immediately and the seeds for future R&D projects need to be planted as soon as possible.2) Two types of milestone prizes should be in focus for Sweden: first, a prize awarding a sum between 10 and 20 M USD at the end of Clinical Phase 1 to highly innovative molecules addressing specific pathogens and, second, a prize for projects successfully completing preclinical steps. Establishing a prize at the end of Clinical Phase 1 is a much needed and unique initiative, with significant effects on the early R&D pipeline, granting also strong international visibility to Sweden. Sweden could also take major responsibility for such a milestone prize by covering a relatively large share. The other recommended milestone prize, awarded at the end of the preclinical steps, would help refill the clinical pipeline and would therefore have more of a long-term effect.3) Pipeline Coordinators, that is, organizations that take an active role in selecting and supporting a portfolio of antibiotics R&D projects in various ways, are the last recommended incentive. Selecting among currently existing Pipeline Coordinators rather than creating a new one, Sweden should fund two types of such organizations: R&D Collaborations, which create collaboration platforms to perform early development activities for the antibiotic projects they support, and Non-Profit Developers, who conduct their own antibiotic projects with the aim of bringing antibiotics to market but without pursuing profit goals. The first type of Pipeline Coordinator, R&D Collaborations, is relevant for a Swedish public investment because they are potentially the most efficient incentive in making R&D projects profitable. However, to fully exploit this potential, R&D Collaborations must be refined to become more flexible, reduce bureaucratic burden and avoid conflicts between participants.Non-Profit Developers provide the most extensive support to selected products by intervening across the entire antibiotic pipeline to ensure products reach the market. Moreover, this model strongly promotes both global availability and responsible use (stewardship). Therefore, Sweden may fund Non-Profit Developers through its international aid budget and in this way make important contributions to global health.Both types of Pipeline Coordinators also offer the advantage that they can help connect Swedish antibiotics R&D centres to international platforms, which reinforce the effects of infrastructure-related grants. Moreover, all forms of Pipeline Coordinators are incentive models that can be used as tools to manage the other two incentives (grants and milestone prizes). In this capacity, they can, for instance, evaluate grant applications and the antibiotic projects eligible for milestone prizes, which require a deep insight into the details of a drug development project.A fourth model, regulatory simplifications, which radically cut costs and times for Clinical Phase 3, can also be relevant for Sweden due to its contained costs, rapid implementation and effects and connection with Sweden’s expertise. However, this incentive requires further analysis to fully grasp its implications for regulators and patient safety before being recommended for implementation.The three incentives recommended by this report – grants, milestone prizes and Pipeline Coordinators – should be used in combination to exploit the synergies between them and their ability to push and pull molecules in different phases of the R&D pipeline. For instance, when grants and milestones are used together, the public investment per approved new antibiotic is lower than the combined spending if the two incentives were used in isolation. If it is not possible to introduce and use the three incentives simultaneously, the following priorities should be applied: first of all, grants need to be kept at current levels and possibly increased to fund both single antibiotic projects and competence development in the R&D infrastructure, while starting to invest in a Non-Profit Developer and a milestone prize at the end of Phase 1, followed by the development and funding of R&D Collaborations and, finally, a preclinical milestone prize.
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| 5. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
-
Ekonomiska incitamentsmodeller för utveckling av nya antibiotika : Rapport på uppdrag av Folkhälsomyndigheten
- 2018
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- På uppdrag av Folkhälsomyndigheten utreder vi i denna rapport en rad incitamentsmodeller för forskning och utveckling (FoU) av antibiotika som kan vara aktuella för en svensk offentlig investering. Baserat på diskussioner och intervjuer med experter, återkoppling från intressenter (d.v.s. potentiella mottagare av svenska incitament), företagsfallstudier och datorbaserade Monte Carlo-simuleringar lämnar rapporten rekommendationer kring de ekonomiska modeller som Sverige bör investera i. De incitamentsmodeller som valdes ut för den svenska portföljen uppfyller följande kriterier: de kan öka Sveriges visibilitet och förbättra den nationella FoU-infrastrukturen i antibiotikafältet, de bygger på Sveriges styrkor och tradition i detta fält, de innefattar begränsade investeringar, de kan införas och ge resultat relativt snabbt, de tillfredsställer på ett unikt sätt viktiga behov i antibiotikapipelinen, och de ger Sverige en möjlighet att spela en avgörande roll i själva skapandet och inriktningen av incitamentet. I enlighet med dessa kriterier, bedömdes att en ”Market Entry Reward” (MER) inte är genomförbar för Sverige ensamt. Det beror främst på att det krävs ett stort finansiellt åtagande (närmare 1 miljard USD) för att ett incitament som en MER ska kunna ge relevanta resultat på pipelinen. Om Sverige trots detta skulle välja att pilottesta en MER på egen hand, borde ett sådant försök fokusera på en s.k. ”totalt losskopplad” MER (Fully Delinked), vilket betyder att MER helt och hållet ersätter marknadsförsäljningen och istället ger fasta årliga utbetalningar till utvecklaren. En MER borde primärt finansieras via sjukvårdsbudgeten för att undvika undanträngningseffekter mot incitament i andra utgiftsområden. En totalt losskopplad MER skulle tillåta testning av flera olika aspekter såsom utvärderingsprocessen för att bestämma det totala värdet på en MER, internprissättning till sjukhus för att återfinansiera de statliga betalningarna, samt regelbundna mellanlägesrevideringar av årliga betalningar beroende på resistensläget. Om Sverige skulle samarbeta med andra länder, som exempelvis G20 eller EU:s medlemsländer, skulle en rimlig storlek på den svenska andelen vara 6 respektive 23 miljoner USD för en partiellt losskopplad MER, och 9 respektive 34 miljoner USD för en totalt losskopplad MER. Det finns dock andra sätt att kombinera push- och pull-incitament som är mer effektiva och snabbare än en MER, nämligen en rad kombinationer av ”grants” (forskningsanslag) och ”milestone prizes”, där det senare är belöningar som betalas ut till utvecklare när de framgångsrikt avslutar viktiga steg i sin FoU (t.ex. Fas 1 i kliniska studier). Förutom bättre effekter per investerat belopp, undviker en kombination av ”grants” och ”milestone prizes” dessutom att stora MER tränger undan push investeringar och mottagare såsom små- och medelstora företag (SMEs) som vanligtvis inte kan vänta på ett incitament ända tills det slutgiltiga godkännandet av ett antibiotikum. Den föreslagna incitamentportföljen för Sverige omfattar tre incitament: ”grants”, ”milestone prizes” och ”Pipeline Coordinators”. Dessa tre incitament skall användas tillsammans för att säkerställa att hela FoU-pipelinen för antibiotika stödjs och att viktiga synergier skapas. Följande aspekter borde tas i beaktning vid implementering och finansiering av de tre valda incitamenten: 1) ”Grants” borde riktas mot tidiga FoU-projekt (fram till Fas 2) och att förstärka den nationella FoUinfrastrukturen, med ett tidsperspektiv som ska vara längre än den nuvarande 3-åriga tidsramen. Det är viktigt att Sverige bibehåller och om möjligt höjer sina nuvarande årliga investeringar i ”grants” för FoU om antibiotika på cirka 60 miljoner SEK/år (7 M USD) och att dessa investeringar får fortsätta över många år i framtiden. Investeringarna kommer att ge långsiktiga effekter både i form av nya molekyler som kan fylla på den framtida FoU-pipelinen och genom fördjupade kompetenser, exempelvis i form av en nationell forskningsinfrastruktur bestående av specialiserade FoU-centra som kan utnyttjas i framtida antibiotikaforskning. Det bör understrykas att man inte kan fördröja dessa investeringar eftersom den här typen av kompetenser behöver byggas omedelbart och frön för framtida FoU-projekt behöver sås i detta nu. 2) Två typer av ”milestone prizes” borde implementeras av Sverige. Först och främst ett ”prize” som delar ut mellan 10 och 20 miljoner USD (bedömningar gjorda av de små företagen i fallstudien) vid slutet av klinisk Fas 1 som bör riktas mot höginnovativa molekyler mot specifika patogener. Därutöver bör ett ”prize” tilldelas projekt som framgångsrikt avslutar de prekliniska stegen. Att inrätta ett ”prize” vid slutet av klinisk Fas 1 skulle vara ett nödvändigt och unikt initiativ, som förutom starka effekter på den tidiga FoU-pipelinen dessutom skulle ge Sverige en stark internationell visibilitet. Genom att finansiera en större del av detta ”milestone prize” skulle Sverige ta ett stort ansvar för att aktivt skapa dessa mycket viktiga incitament. Det andra rekommenderade ”milestone prize”, som delas ut vid slutet av de prekliniska stegen, skulle bidra till att fylla på den kliniska pipelinen och skulle därmed ha mera långsiktiga effekter. 3) ”Pipeline Coordinators”, d.v.s. organisationer som på flera sätt tar en aktiv roll i att välja och stödja en portfölj av FoU-projekt om antibiotika, är det sista rekommenderade incitamentet. Snarare än att skapa en ny ”Pipeline Coordinator”, borde Sverige välja bland de som redan finns och finansiera följande två typer av sådana organisationer: ”R&D Collaborations”, som skapar samarbetsplattformar för att genomföra tidiga FoU aktiviteter för de projekten de stödjer, och ”Nonprofit Developers”, som genomför egna antibiotikaprojekt i syftet att föra nya antibiotika hela vägen till marknaden, dock utan vinstintressen. Den första typen av ”Pipeline Coordinator”, ”R&D Collaborations” är relevant för Sverige att investera i eftersom det handlar om den incitamentsmodell som potentiellt är mest effektiv i att skapa lönsamma FoU projekt. Men för att kunna utnyttja denna potential fullt ut behöver ”R&D Collaborations” vidareutvecklas för att bli mer flexibla samt minska byråkrati och konflikter mellan deltagarna. ”Non-profit Developers” är å andra sidan den modell som erbjuder det mest omfattande stödet till utvalda produkter genom att agera över hela antibiotikapipelinen för att se till att dessa produkter når marknadslansering. Dessutom, ger denna modell starkt stöd gällande global tillgång och ansvarsfull användning (”stewardship”). Därför, skulle Sverige kunna finansiera ”Non-profit Developers” via sin internationella biståndsbudget och därmed även ge ett viktigt bidrag till global hälsa. Båda typer av ”Pipeline Coordinators” har fördelen att de kan hjälpa att koppla svenska FoU-centra för antibiotika till internationella plattformar, vilket skulle förstärka effekterna av infrastrukturrelaterade ”grants”. Dessutom, är alla sorters ”Pipeline Coordinators” incitamentsmodeller som kan användas som verktyg för att styra övriga två incitament (”grants” och ”milestone prizes”). Tack vare denna förmåga, kan de utvärdera ansökningar till ”grants” och de antibiotikaprojekt som är berättigade till ”milestone prizes”, vilket kräver både djupa och detaljerade kunskaper i specifika antibiotikaprojekt. Utöver dessa tre incitamentsmodeller kan även en fjärde modell vara relevant: ”regulatory simplifications”. Denna modell innefattar regulatoriska förenklingar som radikalt sänker kostnader och tider för kliniska Fas 3-studier. Modellen kan vara relevant för Sverige tack vare att kostnaderna är begränsade, implementeringen och effekterna snabba samt att det finns en koppling till svensk expertis. Trots dessa fördelar, kräver detta incitament fortfarande vidare analyser för att fullt ut förstå dess implikationer för regelverket och patientsäkerhet innan den kan rekommenderas för implementering. De tre incitamenten som rekommenderas i denna rapport – ”grants”, ”milestone prizes” och ”Pipeline Coordinators” – bör användas tillsammans i särskilda kombinationer för att utnyttja synergierna mellan dem och deras förmåga att både trycka (”push”) och dra (”pull) molekylerna i olika faser i FoU-pipelinen. Dessa synergier innebär att när exempelvis ”grants” och ”milestone prizes” används samtidigt, blir den offentliga investeringen för varje nytt antibiotikum lägre än den sammanlagda investeringen om de två incitamenten används separat. Om det skulle vara omöjligt att införa och använda de tre incitamenten samtidigt, borde följande prioriteringsordning tillämpas: först och främst behöver nuvarande nivåer på ”grants” bibehållas och om möjligt höjas för att finansiera både enskilda projekt om FoU om antibiotika och för utveckling av kompetenser samt för FoU-infrastruktur, medan investeringar påbörjas i en ”Non-profit Developer” och i en ”milestone prize” vid slutet av Fas 1, följd av vidareutveckling och finansiering av ”R&D Collaborations” och slutligen av ett prekliniskt ”milestone prize”.
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| 6. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, Professor, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Managing interorganizational interactions for social impact : A study of two antibiotics R&D networks
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Business Research. - : Elsevier. - 0148-2963 .- 1873-7978. ; 141, s. 264-278
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper relies on a comparative case study of two antibiotics R&D networks, ENABLE and CARB-X, to understand how interorganizational interactions can be managed to achieve social impact. In particular, we investigate (1) how particular management mechanisms and interorganizational interactions relate to the network's intended social impact, and (2) how these management mechanisms influence interorganizational interactions. We find that (1) the intended social impact influences the choice of management mechanisms from the very start of a partnership and orients the kind of interactions occurring within the network, and (2) that management mechanisms can shape the interactions unfolding in the network, but that the structural elements of these interactions also make these mechanisms more or less applicable to the network. We contribute to the Industrial Marketing & Purchasing (IMP) view with a model of managing networks building on the three concepts of: intended social impact, management mechanisms, and interorganizational interactions.
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| 7. |
- Baraldi, Enrico, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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The impact of business networks on foreign subsidiaries development : Internationalizing by surfing on several global factories
- 2018
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Ingår i: The IMP Journal. - 2059-1403 .- 0809-7259. ; 12:3, s. 427-443
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore two specific areas pertaining to industrial networks and international business (IB). First, the authors look at how business relationships influence the internationalization in time, from the establishment of the first subsidiary in a foreign market to the following ones, and in space, that is, across different markets. Second, the authors investigate how an increasing external network dependence of subsidiaries in their internationalization may cause a detachment of a subsidiary from the mother company as its knowledge becomes insufficient to guide a subsidiary's internationalization.Design/methodology/approach: This paper utilizes an exploratory, longitudinal, single-case study of Loccioni - a manufacturer of measuring and automatic control systems for industrial customers - to illustrate the specific dynamics of the influences of industrial networks on the internationalization of subsidiaries.Findings: The case study helps to elucidate the roles, entailing also free will and own initiative, of small suppliers' subsidiaries which operate inside several global factories, and how surfing on many different global factories, by means of several local subsidiaries, actually supports these suppliers' own international developments. This notion adds to our understanding of the global factory phenomenon a supplier focus that stresses how the role of suppliers is not merely that of being passive recipients of activities and directions from a focal orchestrating firm, but can also be that of initiative-takers themselves.Originality/value: The paper contributes to the IMP tradition by providing a multi-layered and geographically more fine-grained view of the network embedding companies that operate on internationalized markets. This paper thereby sheds light on a less investigated area of research within the IMP tradition: the link between internationalization in different countries and the interconnectedness between the industrial networks spanning these countries. At the same time, this paper contributes to IB theories by showing how a late-internationalizing SME can enter highly international markets by plugging into several established Global Factories as a way to exploit further opportunities for international expansion.
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| 8. |
- Ciabuschi, Francesco, 1973-, et al.
(författare)
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Joining Forces to Prevent the Antibiotic Resistance Doomsday Scenario : The Rise of International Multisectoral Partnerships as a New Governance Model
- 2020
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Ingår i: Academy of Management Perspectives. - : Academy of Management. - 1558-9080 .- 1943-4529. ; 34:4, s. 458-479
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Humanity is facing a global threat caused by growing antibiotic resistance. If the current lack of innovation in antibiotics persists, we will face a doomsday scenario with drastic implications for society, health, and business worldwide. In this study, we examine international multisectoral partnerships (IMSPs), one of the policy interventions introduced to incentivize the antibiotic innovation necessary to avoid such a scenario. Based on insights from three recently launched antibiotics IMSPs, we present their key features and argue that such partnerships represent a novel type of organizational form and governance, different from others discussed in previous research. Specifically, antibiotics IMSPs are interorganizational structures showing great governance complexity, strong centralized control, strict boundaries, and formalization of roles and rules. We discuss how antibiotics IMSPs differ from other partnerships dealing, for instance, with the environmental global challenge, and their usefulness in other contexts where similar uncertain, risky, urgent, and complex tasks need to be faced. We conclude with implications for theory as well as for policy and managerial practice, along with avenues for future research.
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| 9. |
- Ciabuschi, Francesco, 1973-, et al.
(författare)
-
Manufacturing reshoring : A strategy to manage risk and commitment in the logic of the internationalization process model
- 2019
-
Ingår i: European Business Review. - 0955-534X .- 1758-7107. ; 31:1, s. 139-159
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose: This paper aims to theorize on the internationalization process model to explain cases of manufacturing reshoring as decisions taken to manage risk when internationalizing.Design/methodology/approach: The paper is of a conceptual nature. Building on the logic of the internationalization process model, the authors extend previous work by focusing on firms’ risk perception (determined by commitment, knowledge and uncertainty as key variables) to explain also reshoring decisions.Findings: Four propositions were developed, concerning the likelihood of firms to make manufacturing reshoring decisions. The first two propositions deal with the effects of new risk contingencies, and the other two refer specifically to the effects of managerial perceptions of three different typologies of risk, namely, host-country, home-country and reshoring-process specific risk.Originality/value: While reshoring has been discussed mainly on the basis of economic arguments, this paper offers an alternative, behavioural view of this phenomenon as a strategic risk-management process. Therefore, it offers initial steps to theorize about reshoring from a risk-management perspective and, in doing so, opens up a number of avenues for future research.
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| 10. |
- Ciabuschi, Francesco, 1973-, et al.
(författare)
-
Supporting innovation against the threat of antibiotic resistance : Exploring the impact of public incentives on firm performance and entrepreneurial orientation
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Journal of Business Research. - : Elsevier BV. - 0148-2963 .- 1873-7978. ; 112, s. 271-280
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although there is an urgent need to find new antibiotics to fight growing antibiotic resistance, the development of antibiotics is at its lowest level ever. This innovation drought in the antibiotics industry is a challenge for managers, policy makers, and public health authorities. Currently, several strategies to incentivize antibiotic innovation are being considered, but their effects are unknown. Using the theoretical lens of the entrepreneurial orientation framework and Monte Carlo-based simulations on state-of-the-art pharmaceutical industry data, this study found that several incentives can increase the innovativeness of firms in this industry. However, the results show that these effects vary between incentives, between large and small firms, and across different research and development stages. This study analyzed these findings in the light of the entrepreneurial orientation framework and presents implications for theory, policy makers, and managers.
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