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Sökning: WFRF:(Lundgren Björn 1984 )

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1.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984- (författare)
  • A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles : Can we use Waymo's results from accident simulations?
  • 2024
  • Ingår i: AI & Society. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0951-5666 .- 1435-5655. ; 39:2, s. 669-673
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use self-driven vehicles or human-driven vehicles in the future, which means that we need to consider whether other technological solutions, which are available but not broadly used in human-driven vehicles, could result in human-driven vehicles managing to avoid the same accidents. In this article, a proposal for a new standard of selection criteria is made.
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2.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984-, et al. (författare)
  • Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?
  • 2023
  • Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420.
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle. 
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3.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984-, et al. (författare)
  • Defining Information Security
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Science and Engineering Ethics. - : Springer. - 1353-3452 .- 1471-5546.
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This article proposes a new definition of information security, the ‘Appropriate Access’ definition. Apart from providing the basic criteria for a definition—correct demarcation and meaning concerning the state of security—it also aims at being a definition suitable for any information security perspective. As such, it bridges the conceptual divide between so-called ‘soft issues’ of information security (those including, e.g., humans, organizations, culture, ethics, policies, and law) and more technical issues. Because of this it is also suitable for various analytical purposes, such as analysing possible security breaches, or for studying conflicting attitudes on security in an organization. The need for a new definition is demonstrated by pointing to a number of problems for the standard definition type of information security—the so-called CIA definition. Besides being too broad as well as too narrow, it cannot properly handle the soft issues of information security, nor recognize the contextual and normative nature of security.
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4.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984- (författare)
  • Does Semantic Information Need to be Truthful?
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964.
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • The concept of information has well-known difficulties. Among the many issues that have been discussed is the alethic nature of a semantic conception of information. Floridi (Minds Mach 14(2):197–222, 2004; Philos Phenomenol Res 70:351–370, 2005; EUJAP 3(1):31–41, 2007; The philosophy of information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) argued that semantic information must be truthful. In this article, arguments will be presented in favor of an alethically neutral conception of semantic information and it will be shown that such a conception can withstand Floridi’s criticism. In particular, it is argued that an alethically neutral conception of semantic information can manage the so-called Bar-Hillel Carnap paradox, according to which contradictions have maximum informational content. This issue, as well as some of Floridi’s other arguments, is resolved by disentangling the property of being information from the property of being informative. The essay’s final conclusion is that although semantic information is alethically neutral, a veridical conception of semantic information can, and should, be retained as a subconcept of semantic information (i.e., as veridical semantic information), as it is essential for the analysis of informativity, which, unlike the property of being information, depends on truth.
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5.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984- (författare)
  • Information, Security, Privacy, and Anonymity : Definitional and Conceptual Issues
  • 2018
  • Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This doctoral thesis consists of five research papers that address four tangential topics, all of which are relevant for the challenges we are facing in our socio-technical society: information, security, privacy, and anonymity. All topics are approached by similar methods, i.e. with a concern about conceptual and definitional issues. In Paper I—concerning the concept of information and a semantic conception thereof—it is argued that the veridicality thesis (i.e. that information must be true or truthful) is false. In Paper II—concerning information security—it is argued that the current leading definitions suffer from counter-examples, and lack an appropriate conceptual sense. Based on this criticism a new kind of definition is proposed and defended.  In Paper III—concerning control definitions of privacy—it is argued that any sensible control-definition of privacy must properly recognize the context as part of the defining criteria. In Paper IV—concerning the concept of privacy—it is argued that privacy is a normative concept and that it is constituted by our social relations. Final, in Paper V—concerning anonymity—it is argued that the threat from deanonymization technology goes beyond harm to anonymity. It is argued that a person who never is deanonymized can still be harmed and what is at stake is an ability to be anonymous.
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6.
  • Lundgren, Björn, 1984- (författare)
  • Semantic Information and Information Security : Definitional Issues
  • 2016
  • Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This licentiate thesis consist of two separate research papers which concern two tangential topics – that of semantic information and that of information security. Both topics are approached by similar methods, i.e. with a concern about conceptual and definitional issues. In Paper I – concerning the concept of information, and a semantic conception thereof – the conceptual, and definitional, issues focus on one property, that of truthfulness. It is argued – against the veridicality thesis – that semantic information need not be truthful. In Paper II – concerning information security – it is argued that the current leading definitions (so-called ‘CIA’ definitions, which define information as secure if, and only if, the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained) suffer from both actual and possible counter-examples, and lack an appropriate conceptual sense. On the basis of this criticism a new kind of definitions is proposed and argued for.
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