| 1. |
- Arai, Mahmood, et al.
(författare)
-
On Fragile Grounds : A replication of "Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration?" Technical documentation
- 2009
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This is a technical documentation of Arai et al.(2008) which replicates “Are Muslim Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration?” by Alberto Bisin, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou, published in Journal of European Economic Association,6, 445-456, 2008. Bisin et al.(2008) report that they have 5963 observations in their study. Using their empirical setup, we can only identify 1901 relevant observations in the original data. After removing missing values we are left with 818 observations. We cannot replicate any of their results and our estimations yield no support for their claims.
|
|
| 2. |
- Arai, Mahmood, et al.
(författare)
-
On Fragile Grounds : A Replication of 'Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?'
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 9:5, s. 1002-1011
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study is a replication of "Are Muslim Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration?" by Alberto Bisin, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou, published in the Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 445-456, 2008. Bisin et al. (2008) report that they have 5,963 observations in their study. Using their empirical setup, we can only identify 1,901 relevant observations in the original data. After removing missing values we are left with 818 observations. We cannot replicate any of their results and our estimations yield no support for their claims. (JEL: A14, C21, C87, J15)
|
|
| 3. |
- Armelius, Hanna, 1973-
(författare)
-
Distributional Side Effects of Tax Policies: An Analysis of Tax Avoidance and Congestion Tolls
- 2004
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of three self-contained essays.Essay 1This essay examines the effects of tax avoidance on saving and income distribution. In an intertemporal model taxes can be avoided through asset trade. We find that including an avoidance response to taxation will increase all the negative distortions of increased tax progressivity. This result is in contrast to previous findings that tax avoidance can be used to escape some of the negative incentives that a highly progressive tax system leads to. Furthermore, we find that in the presence of tax avoidance measurements of income inequality will be biased downward, since avoidance is more common among the relatively rich. A simulation of a representative economy shows that standard measurements of inequality can be seriously misleading, particularly for economies with relatively high marginal tax rates.Essay 2The paper analyses an integrated urban road pricing policy based on an automatic payment system for cars. Like Glazer and Niskanen (2000) we study congestion tolls with heterogeneous commuters, but we focus on welfare effects and extend their model to include a choice of departure time, as well as travel mode. We find that tolls can be welfare improving even if the public transit mode normally used for substitution is also congested. If, for some reason, public transit charges cannot be changed, substitution towards off-peak travel can be stimulated by a combined road toll and parking duties policy made possible by modern automatic vehicle-identification technologies.Essay 3This essay focuses on the distributional impact and political acceptance of congestion tolls, which, we find, will depend on the location of a switch point income level, at which tolls become regressive. The latter, in turn, depends on the relative attractiveness of the car versus the mass transit system. We find that in a European setting, congestion tolls will most likely have a negative effect on the middle classes, while individuals at both tails of the income distribution will find themselves better off. An investment in the public transportation system will increase the number of individuals who would favor a reform involving congestion tolls on the road network. Such investments might therefore be warranted not only for environmental reasons, but also as a means of making an optimal road pricing policy politically acceptable, something which can be useful particularly in developing countries where financing traffic improvements can be difficult.
|
|
| 4. |
- Dufwenberg Martin, Lundholm, et al.
(författare)
-
Social norms and moral hazard
- 1997
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more
|
|
| 5. |
|
|
| 6. |
|
|
| 7. |
- Lundholm, Michael, 2000, et al.
(författare)
-
Negative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Response
- 2002
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Systematic pediatric evidence shows that the morbidity rates for children in day care are increasing in the group size. Sick children are usually cared for at home by parents. This creates a negative externality of parents' labor force participation. The social optimum implies lower group size than the non--intervention market equilibrium. We study the optimal tax policy. The cost of labor force participation should be increased. This can be done by either or both tax on day care services and a home car allowance. The cost of providing day care should be decreased by a subsidy to entrepreneurs running day care centers. This policy will decrease the group size. It is, however, not necessarily the case that this will decrease labor force participation.
|
|
| 8. |
|
|
| 9. |
- Lundholm, Michael, et al.
(författare)
-
Post mortem reputation, compensatory gifts and equal bequests
- 2000
-
Ingår i: Economics Letters. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 68:2, s. 165-171
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Suppose that gifts are private information, only known to donor and donee, while bequests are public. Also suppose that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will give them and that reputation deteriorates with the difference in amounts inherited. Then the optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests. This is also what data show.
|
|
| 10. |
- Lundholm, Michael, et al.
(författare)
-
Post mortem reputation, compensatory gifts and equal bequests
- 1999
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and financial property) to compensate less well off children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, first, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More specifically, this reputation is deteriorating in the difference in amounts inherited. We show that, given these assumptions, the optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
|
|
