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Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences : From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics
- 2021
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science. Logical Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricism’s philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwell’s role in the worldview of logical empiricism, on Reichenbach’s account of objectivity, on the impact of Poincaré on Neurath’s early views on scientific method, Frank’s exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics, and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories, including Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s positions on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Reichenbach’s critique of unified field theory, and the logical empiricists’ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Mises’ frequentism; Frank’s account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagel’s, Feigl’s, and Hempel’s versions of logical empiricism. This book offers a comprehensive account of the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics. It is a valuable resource for researchers interested in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, and the history of analytic philosophy.
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- Lutz, Sebastian, Senior Lecturer, 1976-
(författare)
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Armchair Philosophy Naturalized
- 2020
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 197:3, s. 1099-1125
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic–synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic–synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau.
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- Lutz, Sebastian, 1976-
(författare)
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Artificial language philosophy of science
- 2012
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Ingår i: European Journal for Philosophy of Science. - : Springer Science + Business Media. - 1879-4912 .- 1879-4920. ; 2:2, s. 181-203
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 4. |
- Lutz, Sebastian, 1976-
(författare)
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Carnap on Empirical Significance
- 2014
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 6. |
- Lutz, Sebastian, 1976-
(författare)
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Editorial
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Reasoner. - 1757-0522. ; 11:3, s. 7-8
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 7. |
- Lutz, Sebastian, 1976-
(författare)
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Empirical Adequacy in the Received View
- 2014
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Ingår i: Philosophy of Science. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0031-8248 .- 1539-767X. ; 81:5, s. 1171-1183
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories involving constants or functions from observable to unobservable objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informativeness’ in Constructive Empiricism.
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