| 1. |
- Grossmann, Igor, et al.
(författare)
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Insights into the accuracy of social scientists' forecasts of societal change
- 2023
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Ingår i: Nature Human Behaviour. - : Springer Nature. - 2397-3374. ; 7, s. 484-501
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How well can social scientists predict societal change, and what processes underlie their predictions? To answer these questions, we ran two forecasting tournaments testing the accuracy of predictions of societal change in domains commonly studied in the social sciences: ideological preferences, political polarization, life satisfaction, sentiment on social media, and gender-career and racial bias. After we provided them with historical trend data on the relevant domain, social scientists submitted pre-registered monthly forecasts for a year (Tournament 1; N = 86 teams and 359 forecasts), with an opportunity to update forecasts on the basis of new data six months later (Tournament 2; N = 120 teams and 546 forecasts). Benchmarking forecasting accuracy revealed that social scientists' forecasts were on average no more accurate than those of simple statistical models (historical means, random walks or linear regressions) or the aggregate forecasts of a sample from the general public (N = 802). However, scientists were more accurate if they had scientific expertise in a prediction domain, were interdisciplinary, used simpler models and based predictions on prior data. How accurate are social scientists in predicting societal change, and what processes underlie their predictions? Grossmann et al. report the findings of two forecasting tournaments. Social scientists' forecasts were on average no more accurate than those of simple statistical models.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Guath, Mona, et al.
(författare)
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Optimizing Electricity Consumption : A Case of Function Learning
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of experimental psychology. Applied. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 1076-898X .- 1939-2192. ; 21:4, s. 326-341
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A popular way to improve consumers' control over their electricity consumption is by providing outcome feedback on the cost with in-home displays. Research on function learning, however, suggests that outcome feedback may not always be ideal for learning, especially if the feedback signal is noisy. In this study, we relate research on function learning to in-home displays and use a laboratory task simulating a household to investigate the role of outcome feedback and function learning on electricity optimization. Three function training schemes (FTSs) are presented that convey specific properties of the functions that relate the electricity consumption to the utility and cost. In Experiment 1, we compared learning from outcome feedback with 3 FTSs, 1 of which allowed maximization of the utility while keeping the budget, despite no feedback about the total monthly cost. In Experiment 2, we explored the combination of this FTS and outcome feedback. The results suggested that electricity optimization may be facilitated if feedback learning is preceded by a brief period of function training.
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| 4. |
- Juslin, Peter, et al.
(författare)
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Sequential and myopic : On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Cognitive Psychology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 2044-5911 .- 2044-592X. ; 28:1, s. 106-128
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.
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| 5. |
- Millroth, Philip
(författare)
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Additive Weighting of Outcomes in Duplex Gambles : Spontaneous Prevalence, Cognitive Processing, and Effect of Financial Literacy
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many descriptive theories of judgment and decision making under risk assume that people align with normative theory in that they add up the possible outcomes weighted by their adherent probabilities (or decision weights). Yet, few studies test this assumption by a systematic comparison between all of the plausible integration models that may connect the outcomes and probabilities in the prospects. In two experiments, we explore if people spontaneously weight outcomes by their adherent probabilities in evaluations of duplex prospects that involve two independent events, taking the plausible integration models into account. Based on a Brunswikian conception of analysis and intuition and the observed response distributions, we also examine if people perform this additive weighting by analytic thought-processes, explicitly “number-crunching” the value, or by intuitive processes. The results show that people often spontaneously weight the outcome values by the probabilities also in duplex gambles – and mainly by intuitive integration in the form of an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy – but with individual differences in the extent to which they spontaneously engage in this integration, which seem most strongly predicted by culturally acquired beliefs related to economy (e.g., financial literacy). The results carry important implications for modeling and interpreting behavior in judgment and decision making under risk in that risk preferences elicited from monetary lotteries are strongly contaminated by information-processing demands of the task. The results also question the notion that people switch from additive weighting to heuristics because they are unable to engage in weighting strategies.
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| 6. |
- Millroth, Philip, et al.
(författare)
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Cognitiva Speciebus : Towards a Linnaean Approach to Cognition
- 2021
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Ingår i: Trends in cognitive sciences. - : Elsevier. - 1364-6613 .- 1879-307X. ; 25:3, s. 173-176
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Research points to the limitations of approaches to decision-making, that rest on general ‘Newtonian principles’ derived from unitary a priori conceptions of rationality. To understand how the mind exploits environments, we instead propose a process of more open-ended discovery and systematization in the mold of Linnaeus’s famous taxonomy of plants.
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| 7. |
- Millroth, Philip, et al.
(författare)
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Disentangling the Effects of Serotonin on Risk Perception: S-Carriers of 5-HTTLPR Are Primarily Concerned With the Magnitude of the Outcomes, Not the Uncertainty
- 2017
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Ingår i: Behavioral Neuroscience. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0735-7044 .- 1939-0084. ; 131:5, s. 421-427
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Serotonin signaling is vital for reward processing, and hence, also for decision-making. The serotonin transporter gene linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) has been connected to decision making, suggesting that short-allele carriers (s) are more risk averse than long-allele homozygotes (ll). However, previous research has not identified if this occurs because s-carriers (i) are more sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcomes or (ii) are more sensitive to the magnitude of the outcomes. This issue was disentangled using a willingness-to-pay task, where the participants evaluated prospects involving certain gains, uncertain gains, and ambiguous gains. The results clearly favored the hypothesis that s-carriers react more to the magnitude of the outcomes. Self-reported measures of everyday risk-taking behavior also favored this hypothesis. We discuss how these results are in line with recent research on the serotonergic impact on reward processing.
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| 8. |
- Millroth, Philip, et al.
(författare)
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Examining the Integrity of Evaluations of Risky Prospects Using a Single-Stimuli Design
- 2017
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Ingår i: Decision-Washington. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 2325-9965 .- 2325-9973. ; 5:4, s. 362-377
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Expected utility theory, the normative benchmark for evaluation of risky prospect, implies that the evaluation is linear in probability, that it is concave in the outcome, and that probabilities and outcomes are multiplied. The present study examines how the evaluations of risky prospects are affected by the availability of comparative anchors. We report an experiment comparing a within-subjects design (WSD), in which 20 participants evaluated 36 prospects, with a single-subject design (SSD), in which each of 720 participants evaluated a single prospect. The results of fitting cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) to data showed that in the WSD, there was a roughly linear probability weighting function and a concave value function, as suggested by expected utility theory. In the SSD, on the other hand, there was a linear value function and a severely nonlinear weighting function for probability. The participants thus found it difficult to maintain the linear use of single-event probability disclosed in the WSD when they made evaluations in an SSD without access to comparative anchors. We argue that people may have much of the normative competence captured by expected utility theory, but this competence can only be manifested as normative performance given the availability of relevant comparative anchors. We discuss the possibility that this could explain why some economic markets are deemed rational, whereas others are not.
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| 9. |
- Millroth, Philip, et al.
(författare)
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Fear and anxiety in the face of COVID-19 : Negative dispositions towards risk and uncertainty as vulnerability factors
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Anxiety Disorders. - : Elsevier. - 0887-6185 .- 1873-7897. ; 83
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic it is important to identify factors that make people particularly vulnerable of developing mental-health issues in order to provide case-specific treatments. In this article, we examine the roles of two psychological constructs - originally put forth in the behavioral decision sciences - in predicting interindividual differences in fear responses: general risk aversion (GRA) and intolerance of uncertainty (IU). We first provide a review of these constructs and illustrate why they may play important roles in shaping anxietyrelated disorders. Thereafter we present an empirical study that collected survey data from 550 U.S. residents, comprising self-assessments of dispositions towards risk and uncertainty, anxiety- and depression levels, as well as demographic variables - to thus test the extent to which these psychological constructs are predictive of strong fear responses related to COVID-19 (i.e., mortal fear, racing heart). The results from Bayesian multi-model inference analyses showed that GRA and IU were more powerful predictors of fear responses than demographic variables. Moreover, the predictive power of these constructs was independent of general anxiety- and depression levels. Subsequent mediation analyses showed that the effects of GRA and IU were both direct and indirect via anxiety. We conclude by discussing possible treatment options, but also highlight that future research needs to further examine causal pathways and conceptual overlaps.
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| 10. |
- Millroth, Philip
(författare)
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Integrating Probability- and Value Information in Judgment and Decision-Making under Risk : Cognitive Processes, Competence, and Performance
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many instances in human affairs involve considering the value of different outcomes and the probability (or risk) of these outcomes occuring (e.g., gambling, financial decision-making, medical decision-making, criminal behavior). The point of departure for present thesis is that descriptive theories of judgment- and decision making under risk have yet to fully utilize explanations grounded in accounts of how people integrate outcomes with their adherent probabilities. The most widely embraced accounts are positioned on opposite ends of a spectrum, holding either (i) that people consistently and effortlessly engage in the normative principle of multiplicatively integrating the value or utility of possible outcomes with their adherent probabilities (i.e., weighting), or (ii) that people only have the ability to engage in simple heuristics or context-dependent sampling strategies. The present thesis proposes that the field should consider positions between these extreme positions. To this end, three empirical studies were conducted in which people evaluated risky prospects in the form of numerically described monetary lotteries.The studies show that use of weighting was robust to increases of cognitive demands, as when (i) other evaluations are not available as reference points (Study I), (ii) outcomes and probabilities are presented sequentially before the evaluation (Study II), and (iii) the prospect structure involves two independent outcomes (Study III). The results suggest that - even if people can turn to heuristics when they are more efficient, for specific stages in the decision process, or for very complex problems - people indeed have both the inclination and ability to weight the outcomes by their probabilities in the evaluation of individual prospects, or for a subset of decision alternatives.In contrast to popular weighting models, however, the cognitive-modeling efforts throughout the studies speak against the notion that the weighting process can be assumed to be consistent and effortless. Instead, the cognitive process of weighting outcomes and probabilities is better characterized as an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy: people anchor on the value of the outcome and make linear adjustments downwards to account for probability. The studies show that these adjustments are often insufficient or noise-prone when the cognitive demands increase due to (i) properties of the task environment (Study I and Study II), or (ii) lack of domain-specific knowledge (i.e., numeracy and financial literacy, Study III). In conclusion, the thesis has highlighted the important, but previously neglected, nuances of human cognition in judgment and decision-making under risk - nuances found between previously conflicting standpoints. Future research exploring these nuances should make a necessary distinction between people’s underlying competence and the performance they exhibit at a given moment.
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