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- Nagurney, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Pharmaceutical supply chain networks with outsourcing under price and quality competition
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Transactions in Operational Research. - : Wiley. - 0969-6016. ; 20:6, s. 859-888
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present a pharmaceutical supply chain network model with outsourcing under price and quality competition, in both equilibrium and dynamic versions. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that is engaged in determining the optimal pharmaceutical flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the pharmaceutical firm seeks to minimize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm's weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simultaneously, the contractors, who compete with one another noncooperatively in prices in the manner of Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the pharmaceutical product from the pharmaceutical firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal pharmaceutical product flows associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing network activities and provides the pharmaceutical firm with its optimal make-or-buy decisions and the optimal contractor selections. We state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We then propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm yields a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment processes. We present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.
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| 3. |
- Nagurney, Anna, et al.
(författare)
-
Spatial price equilibrium with information asymmetry in quality and minimum quality standards
- 2014
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Ingår i: International Journal of Production Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0925-5273. ; 158, s. 300-313
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A spatial price equilibrium model with information asymmetry in quality is developed in both static and dynamic versions. Producers at the supply markets are aware of the quality of their products, whereas consumers, located at the demand markets, are aware only of the average quality of the products that are shipped to their demand markets. Minimum quality standards are also captured in order to assess the impacts of such policy interventions. We establish qualitative results, in the form of existence, uniqueness, and stability analysis. An algorithm is proposed, along with a convergence proof. It is then utilized to compute solutions to a spectrum of spatial price equilibrium numerical examples in order to explore the impacts of information asymmetry under different scenarios. The numerical examples, which are of quite general functional forms, reveal that, as the number of supply markets increases, the "anonymizing" effect leads to a decrease in the average quality. On the other hand, as the number of demand markets increases, the pressure to improve quality increases, and the average quality increases. Finally, we demonstrate that, after the imposition of minimum quality standards, the average quality at the demand markets increases and the prices also increase. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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