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| 2. |
- Berglin, Lena, et al.
(författare)
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Interaction Design Methods in Fashion Design Teaching
- 2007
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Ingår i: The Nordic Textile Journal 2006-07, p. 26-51. - : University College of Borås. The Swedish School of Textiles.
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The expressiveness of use is of focal interest in fashion design, which makes the perspective of act design important in learning/teaching. The objective of the project presented here was to introduce interaction design methods in fashion design teaching to make act design explicit throughout the different stages of the design process in a systematic manner; to develop a general workshop curriculum in experimental fashion design focusing on the expressiveness of wearing and use. A series of test workshops were implemented to provide a foundation for reflection and critical discussions. The main results, motivated by workshop evaluations, consist of theoretical models for a systematic development of workshop exercises in fashion design aesthetics.
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| 4. |
- Fröding, Barbro, Docent, 1974-, et al.
(författare)
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Friendly AI
- 2020
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Ingår i: Ethics and Information Technology. - : Springer. - 1388-1957 .- 1572-8439.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we discuss what we believe to be one of the most important features of near-future AIs, namely their capacity to behave in a friendly manner to humans. Our analysis of what it means for an AI to behave in a friendly manner does not presuppose that proper friendships between humans and AI systems could exist. That would require reciprocity, which is beyond the reach of near-future AI systems. Rather, we defend the claim that social AIs should be programmed to behave in a manner that mimics a sufficient number of aspects of proper friendship. We call this “as-if friendship”. The main reason for why we believe that ‘as if friendship’ is an improvement on the current, highly submissive behavior displayed by AIs is the negative effects the latter can have on humans. We defend this view partly on virtue ethical grounds and we argue that the virtue-based approach to AI ethics outlined in this paper, which we call “virtue alignment”, is an improvement on the traditional “value alignment” approach.
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| 5. |
- Fröding, Barbro, et al.
(författare)
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How to be a virtuous recipient of a transplant organ
- 2015
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Ingår i: Organ Transplantation in Times of Donor Shortage. - Cham : Springer Netherlands. - 9783319164410 ; , s. 89-98
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 6. |
- Fröding, Barbro, et al.
(författare)
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Virtuous Choice and Parity
- 2012
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 15:1, s. 71-82
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.
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| 7. |
- Fröding, Barbro, et al.
(författare)
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Why computer games can be essential for human flourishing
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society. - 1477-996X .- 1758-8871. ; 11:2, s. 81-91
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing. Design/methodology/approach: The authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all people under all circumstances; but only seek to show that the claim holds true for some people under some circumstances and the authors try to spell out the relevant circumstances in detail. Findings: The authors provide a list of situations in which playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, is an integral part of human flourishing. Originality/value: The paper puts some novel pressure on the widely-held belief that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important. The paper claims that playing some computer games and partaking in some forms of online activities could be highly conducive to what it actually means in practice to take care of oneself and, to paraphrase Aristotle, to be eager for fine actions.
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| 8. |
- Fröding, Barbro, et al.
(författare)
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Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship
- 2012
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Ingår i: Ethics and Information Technology. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1388-1957 .- 1572-8439. ; 14:3, s. 201-207
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.
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