| 1. |
|
|
| 2. |
- Berggren, Niclas, et al.
(författare)
-
The looks of a winner : Beauty and electoral success
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 94:1-2, s. 8-15
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the role of beauty in politics using candidate photos that figured prominently in electoral campaigns. Our investigation is based on visual assessments of 1929 Finnish political candidates from 10,011 respondents (of which 3708 were Finnish). As Finland has a proportional electoral system, we are able to compare the electoral success of non-incumbent candidates representing the same party. An increase in our measure of beauty by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 20% in the number of votes for the average non-incumbent parliamentary candidate. The relationship is unaffected by including education and occupation as control variables and withstands several other robustness checks.
|
|
| 3. |
- Berggren, Niclas, et al.
(författare)
-
The right look : Conservative politicians look better and voters reward it
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - Munich : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 146, s. 79-86
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Since good-looking politicians win more votes, a beauty advantage for politicians on the left or on the right is bound to have political consequences. We show that politicians on the right look more beautiful in Europe, the United States and Australia. Our explanation is that beautiful people earn more, which makes them less inclined to support redistribution. Our model of within-party competition predicts that voters use beauty as a cue for conservatism when they do not know much about candidates and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-information elections. Evidence from real and experimental elections confirms both predictions.
|
|
| 4. |
- Berggren, Niclas, et al.
(författare)
-
The Right Look : Conservative Politicians Look Better and Voters Reward It
- 2015
-
Rapport (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Since good-looking politicians win more votes, a beauty advantage for politicians on the left or on the right is bound to have political consequences. We show that politicians on the right look more beautiful in Europe, the United States and Australia. Our explanation is that beautiful people earn more, which makes them less inclined to support redistribution. Accordingly, our model predicts that voters use beauty as a cue for conservatism when they do not know much about candidates and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-information elections. Evidence from real and experimental elections confirms both predictions.
|
|
| 5. |
- Elinder, Mikael, et al.
(författare)
-
Promises, policies and pocketbook voting
- 2015
-
Ingår i: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 75, s. 177-194
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Do voters respond to political parties' promises or to their past actions? We use a suitable sequence of events in Swedish politics to provide the first answer to this question. In the 1994 election campaign the Social Democrats proposed major cuts in transfers to parents with young children, whereas in the 1998 campaign they promised to increase transfers. The Social Democrats won both elections and delivered on both promises. Using voting among parents with slightly older children as counterfactual, we find that voters with young children responded markedly to economic promises rather than to implemented policies.
|
|
| 6. |
- Elinder, Mikael, et al.
(författare)
-
Selfish and Prospective Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting
- 2008
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We present and test a theory of prospective and retrospective pocketbook voting. Focusing on two large reforms in Sweden, we establish a causal chain from policies to sizeable individual gains and losses and then to voting. The Social Democrats proposed budget cuts affecting parents with young children before the 1994 election, but made generous promises to the same group before the 1998 election. Since parents with older children were largely unaffected we use a difference-in-differences strategy for identification. We find clear evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Voters respond to campaign promises but not to the later implementation of the reforms.
|
|
| 7. |
|
|
| 8. |
- Jonsson, Thomas, 1976-
(författare)
-
Essays on agricultural and environmental policy
- 2007
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two papers address political economy and indus-trial organization aspects of agricultural policy, and the last two international aspects of environmental policy.Paper [I] explains Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the influence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership. The analysis is based on panel-data for fifteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, effective lobbying presents a collective ac-tion problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support.In Paper [II], the Bresnahan-Lau framework is used to analyze whether policy reforms, i.e. the two-price sys-tem (an input quota, 1986-1991) and a general deregulation of dairy policy (1991-1994) had any market power effects on the Swedish butter market. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected, for any of the specific policy reforms, at any reasonable significance level.Paper [III] concerns the welfare consequences of environmental policy cooperation. It is assumed that coun-tries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that they differ with respect to compe-tition in the labor market. It is shown how the welfare effect of an increase in the expenditures on abatement depends on changes in the environmental damage, employment and work hours. The welfare effect is also related to the strategic interaction among the countries in the prereform equilibrium.In Paper [IV] environmental policy in an economic federation, where each national government faces a mixed tax problem, is addressed. It is assumed that the federal government sets emission targets, which are imple-mented at the national level. It is also assumed that the economic federation is decentralized. The results high-light a strategic role of income and commodity taxation, i.e. each country uses its policy instruments, at least in part, to influence the emission target.
|
|
| 9. |
- Jordahl, Henrik, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
-
Education returns of wage earners and self-employed workers : Comment
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Economics of Education Review. - : Elsevier. - 0272-7757 .- 1873-7382. ; 28:5, s. 641-644
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a recent paper, García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez [García-Mainar, I. & Montuenga-Gómez, V. M. (2005). Education returns of wage earners and self-employed workers: Portugal vs. Spain. Economics of Education Review, 24(2), 161−170] apply the generalized IV model of Hausman and Taylor to estimate education returns of wage earners and the self-employed in Portugal and in Spain. Our examination reveals several problems which relate to the validity and documentation of the instrumental variables, as well as the robustness of the results.
|
|
| 10. |
- Jordahl, Henrik, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
-
Education returns of wage earners and self-employed workers : Rejoinder
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Economics of Education Review. - : Elsevier. - 0272-7757 .- 1873-7382. ; 28:5, s. 648-648
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In their reply to our comment, García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez [García-Mainar, I., & Montuenga-Gómez, V. M. (2009). A response to the comment on education returns of wage earners and self-employed workers. Economics of Education Review] did not address our fundamental criticism that they have not provided the information necessary to replicate their study.
|
|
