| 1. |
- Jansson Boström, Erik, 1985-
(författare)
-
Max Weber och idealtypernas nödvändighet
- 2020
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis has two aims: first, to investigate Max Weber’s account of “objective validity” in the cultural sciences; second, to elaborate a more concrete version of this position using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later remarks on language.Chapter 1 introduces Weber’s idea of objective validity and proposes that in order to understand Weber’s idea of ideal types, we need to re-evaluate Weber’s understanding of the term Bedeutung in “The ‘Objectivity’ of knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”.Chapter 2 presents Weber’s notion of ideal types and raises a number of problems to be dealt with in the following chapters. The central questions are i) why Weber thinks that ideal types are sometimes necessary in order to reach objective validity, and ii) under which circumstances this might be the case. The chapter argues that the answer to the last question is that Weber thinks that ideal types are necessary for objectivity within a specific kind of study of meaning (Bedeutung) within the cultural sciences. Chapter 3, in turn, focuses on why ideal types are necessary within this kind of cultural science by taking a closer look at how to understand Weber’s concept of given reality and the connection between meaning, concepts, reality and values in the methodological writings that constitute “Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics”.In chapter 4, the central issue of objective validity can finally be addressed. The investigation shows that what Weber says about objective validity does not cohere with what follows from his arguments concerning the relation between meaning, given reality, values and concepts. I conclude that Weber fails to provide a clear and consistent account of what objectivity could mean in the cultural sciences. This also means that Weber fails to clarify the necessity of formulating ideal types.These deficiencies notwithstanding, I argue, Weber succeeds in formulating cogent arguments concerning the relationship between given reality, values and concepts. In chapter 5, I use Wittgenstein’s later remarks on language to develop a clear and consistent conceptualization of ideal types, and propose an account of what objectivity can mean in the cultural sciences and how it can be realized.
|
|
| 2. |
|
|
| 3. |
|
|
| 4. |
|
|
| 5. |
|
|
| 6. |
|
|
| 7. |
|
|
| 8. |
- Rider, Sharon, Professor, 1963-
(författare)
-
Den tveksamme bekännaren och andra essäer
- 2021
-
Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Allt jag har gjort under närmare 30 år som akademisk lärare, forskare och essäist kan beskrivas som ett slags "kulturepistemologi" - reflektioner över det mänskliga tänkandets villkor, dess begränsningar och möjligheter. Universitetet såsom vi känner det dess forskningsprojekt och utbildningsprogram, dess interna organisation, dess mekanismer för finansiering m.m. - utgör en viss systematisering och institutionalisering av praktiker som visar vad en viss kultur värdesätter som vetenskap. Det som görs eller inte görs på universitetet avslöjar vilken kunskap vi anser är värd att upprätthålla, utveckla och sprida. I det avseendet utgör universitetet ett mikrokosmos av en kulturs mentalitet - dess tänkande, värderingar, visioner, rädslor och förhoppningar.Sharon Rider är professor i teoretisk filosofi vid Uppsala universitet, där hon var prodekanus för historisk-filosofiska fakulteten 2008-2014. Hennes arbete fokuserar på de materiella, kulturella och institutionella villkoren för vetenskap, forskning och den högre utbildningen i ljuset av grundläggande begrepp såsom autonomi, ansvar, saklighet och kunskap.
|
|
| 9. |
- Rider, Sharon, Professor, 1963-
(författare)
-
Det löser sig inte.
- 2021
-
Ingår i: Axess. - Stockholm. - 1651-0941. ; 2
-
Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
|
|
| 10. |
- Rider, Sharon, Professor, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Fake News
- 2023
-
Ingår i: Handbook of the Anthropocene. - Cham : Springer. - 9783031259098 - 9783031259104 - 9783031259128 ; , s. 1499-1505
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Fake news, in the sense of lying (the circulation of disinformation) is, of course, nothing new. While it is today typically associated with political propaganda or conspiracy theories such as climate change denial, it is as old as human communication itself, and a seemingly inevitable aspect of public discourse. Falsehoods can be used for numerous ends, from myth to satire to outright deception; the effects of fake news can range from laughter to death (Burkhart JM. Libr Technol Rep 53(8):1–36, 2017, p. 5). One might doubt the utility of a buzzword such as “fake news”, but the phenomena indicated by the term nonetheless constitute a serious challenge to modern notions of the “public sphere” as the space in which commonality is established and maintained. The very idea of the Anthropocene, and the contexts in which it appears, is perhaps one of the best illustrations of the risks involved, as well as of the problematic nature of “fake news” as a concept.In this paper, we briefly review the literature on fake news in order to locate common themes. One of these in particular stands out as central, namely, the perceived threat to liberal democratic institutions and the viability of the very idea of a public sphere on which they rely. We argue that while empirical studies and categorization of actors, motives, effects, and techniques of dissimulation and distortion are useful for understanding the nature of fake news, they tend not to pay careful attention to what is perhaps the greatest challenge, namely, the expansion and consequent reconstitution of the public sphere as a genuine plurality, with all the risks of disintegration that is entailed. We conclude with a proposal, inspired by Steve Fuller, that we acknowledge the post-truth condition as a kind of “fact” of contemporary life in which the most important function of the public sphere is, as Richard Rorty would say, to keep the conversation going. This means that the notion of “fake news” should not be taken at face value, but seen as itself a trope in that discourse. The article ends with a consideration of the fate of the Anthropocene as a scientific term to exemplify this point.
|
|
