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| 2. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Doing Harm : A Reply to Klocksiem
- 2023
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Ingår i: Utilitas. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0953-8208 .- 1741-6183. ; 35:3, s. 229-237
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a recent article in this journal, Justin Klocksiem proposes a novel response to the widely discussed failure to benefit problem for the counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA). According to Klocksiem, proponents of CCA can deal with this problem by distinguishing between facts about there being harm and facts about an agent's having done harm. In this reply, we raise three sets of problems for Klocksiem's approach.
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| 3. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Plural Harm : Plural Problems
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : Springer Nature. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 180, s. 553-565
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The counterfactual comparative account of harm faces problems in cases that involve overdetermination and preemption. An influential strategy for dealing with these problems, drawing on a suggestion made by Derek Parfit, is to appeal to plural harm—several events together harming someone. We argue that the most well-known version of this strategy, due to Neil Feit, as well as Magnus Jedenheim Edling’s more recent version, is fatally flawed. We also present some general reasons for doubting that the overdetermination and preemption problems for the counterfactual comparative account can be satisfactorily solved by appealing to plural harm.
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| 4. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
- 2023
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Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly. - : Oxford University Press. - 0031-8094 .- 1467-9213. ; 74:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.
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| 5. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm
- 2023
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Ingår i: Theoria. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 89:5, s. 748-754
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Charlotte Unruh has recently put forward a hybrid account of what it is to suffer harm – one that combines comparative and non-comparative elements. We raise two problems for Unruh's account. The first concerns killing and death; the second concerns the causing of temporarily low or high welfare.
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| 6. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
- 2021
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Taylor & Francis. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 99:1, s. 164-174
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and wellbeing levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm and benefit entail an affirmative answer to this question, including the widely held Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). In this paper, however, we argue that all such accounts will be unsuccessful.
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| 7. |
- Fogal, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
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Explaining Normative Reasons
- 2023
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Ingår i: Noûs. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 57:1, s. 51-80
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.
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| 8. |
- Fogal, Daniel, et al.
(författare)
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The weight of reasons
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : Springer. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 180, s. 2573-2596
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper addresses the question of how the 'weight' or 'strength' of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively fundamental, views which analyze reasons as evidence concerning what one ought to do, views which analyze reasons in terms of good reasoning, and views which analyze reasons as explanations of ought-facts, fittingness-facts, or goodness-facts.
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| 9. |
- Franzén, Nils, 1987-, et al.
(författare)
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Grundbok i metaetik
- 2021
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Bok (refereegranskat)abstract
- Metaetiken behandlar filosofiska frågor om hur moraliska påståenden, moraliska uppfattningar, moraliska fakta och moralisk kunskap är beskaffade - liksom frågan om sådana fakta och sådan kunskap överhuvudtaget finns.I centrum för denna introduktionsbok står frågan om moralen är objektiv - hur ska denna fråga förstås och hur kan olika svar på den försvaras? I relation till denna fråga diskuteras en rad besläktade ämnen, bland annat gällande moralisk oenighet, förhållandet mellan moral och vetenskap och frågan om moraliska övertygelser kan vara mer eller mindre rationella.Grundbok i metaetik är avsedd att användas vid universitetskurser i metaetik och relaterade ämnen. Framställningen kräver dock inga särskilda filosofiska förkunskaper, och boken kan därmed läsas av alla som är intresserade av ämnet.
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| 10. |
- Johansson, Jens, et al.
(författare)
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A Simple Analysis of Harm
- 2022
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Ingår i: Ergo. - : Michigan Publishing Services. - 2330-4014. ; 9, s. 509-536
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present and defend an analysis of harm that we call the Negative Influence on Well-Being Account (NIWA). We argue that NIWA has a number of significant advantages compared to its two main rivals, the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) and the Causal Account (CA), and that it also helps explain why those views go wrong. In addition, we defend NIWA against a class of likely objections, and consider its implications for several questions about harm and its role in normative theorizing.
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