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- Bornemark, Jonna
(author)
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Kunskapens gräns, gränsens vetande : En fenomenologisk undersökning av transcendens och kroppslighet
- 2009
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology.
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| 2. |
- Kasprzak, Krystof
(author)
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Vara - Framträdande - Värld : Fenomenets negativitet hos Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka och Eugen Fink.
- 2017
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The present investigation discusses the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon through an interpretation of the meaning of the negativity of the phenomenon in the philosophical works of Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka and Eugen Fink. This negativity is thematised in terms of a loss and a privation that leads to a description of the appearing of the phenomenon as a sublime event, which exposes existence to an absence of meaning. A formulation of the absence in question as a dynamic movement of existence opens a new perspective on what it means to do phenomenology: phenomenological thinking does not begin with the immediate givenness of appearance, but through the trembling of meaning in the experience of a loss of the phenomenon.
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| 3. |
- Rat, Ramona
(author)
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Un-common Sociality : Thinking Sociality with Levinas
- 2016
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The present investigation develops the notion of sociality based on Emmanuel Levinas’s thought, and proposes an understanding of sociality that resists becoming a common foundation: an un-common sociality which interrupts the reciprocal shared common, and thereby, paradoxically, makes it possible. By engaging in the larger debate on community, this work gives voice to Levinas on the question of community without a common ground, a topic and a debate where he has previously been underestimated. In this way, the aim is to reveal new directions opened up by Levinas’s philosophy in order to think an un-common sociality.
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| 4. |
- Redin, Johan
(author)
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Ars inventrix : En studie av Friedrich von Hardenbergs (Novalis') paraestetiska projekt
- 2003
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This dissertation is divided into three sections, and treats three essential ideas in the philosophical notes of Friedrich von Hardenberg (also known as Novalis): 1) the critique of the foundationalist tendency in the systematic philosophy of idealism and the development of a “logological” perspective on philosophy, language and art; 2) the formation of a romantic philosophy based on a theory of experimentation and invention; and 3) the creation of a universal encyclopaedia in order to explicate the inner unity of all sciences and arts. Taken together, these three ideas constitute a theory of creativity and inventiveness in Man that no longer serves as a theory of art or poetry proper. It broadens the concepts of philosophy, imagination and creativity and outlines a paraesthetic theory.The first part focuses on the concept of a philosophical system and Hardenberg’s disapproval of the idea that an unconditional first principle of philosophy will ground the system of the absolute held by his former teacher K.L. Reinhold and J.G. Fichte. His view that the nature of being is non-systematic led him to the conviction that no philosophy can capture the totality. Life, language and knowledge can be reflected upon only in terms of non-foundational principles and this reflection should be a “logological” approach to philosophy that ultimately forms a “transcendental poetry.”The second part investigates the product of the “logological” critique of Fichte, i.e. the romantic philosophy. This study stresses the influence of Spinoza and Plotinos in Hardenberg’s theory of the I and its creative potential. What Hardenberg identifies as “romantic” is a) the relation between the known and the unknown (as well as the relation between inside and outside, outwards and inwards) and b) an epistemological and cognitive operation preformed by the I in “series of variation.” The theory of the romantic operation leads to his theory of experimentation and invention. In Hardenberg’s view, experimentation is not only the task of scientific practice, it is the very experience and conception of reality that is experimental. This concept of experiment is considered in relation to his ideas about mathematics and combinatorics.The third and last part investigates how and why Hardenberg’s training at the mining academy in Freiberg and his acquaintance with the mineralogist A.G. Werner is important for understanding his attempt to construct a general encyclopaedia, Das Allgemeine Brouillon (The Universal Draft). Without any centre or fixed field of study, Hardenberg’s encyclopaedia is his answer to the systematic philosophers of his time, that it is possible to put “non-systematisation in a system.” The last part focuses on Hardenberg’s “revision” of his teacher Werner’s system of classification and its implications for the composition of the encyclopaedia as well as his interpretation of nature as a language and language as nature.
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