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- Haller, Philipp, et al.
(författare)
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Reactive Async : Expressive Deterministic Concurrency
- 2016
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 2016 7th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Scala. - New York, NY, USA : Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). - 9781450346481 ; , s. 11-20
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Concurrent programming is infamous for its difficulty. An important source of difficulty is non-determinism, stemming from unpredictable interleavings of concurrent activities. Futures and promises are widely-used abstractions that help designing deterministic concurrent programs, although this property cannot be guaranteed statically in mainstream programming languages. Deterministic-by-construction concurrent programming models avoid this issue, but they typically restrict expressiveness in important ways.This paper introduces a concurrent programming model, Reactive Async, which decouples concurrent computations using so-called cells, shared locations which generalize futures as well as recent deterministic abstractions such as LVars. Compared to previously proposed programming models Reactive Async provides (a) a fallback mechanism for the case where no computation ever computes the value of a given cell, and (b) explicit and optimized handling of cyclic dependencies. We present a complete implementation of the Reactive Async programming model as a library in Scala. Finally, the paper reports on a case study applying Reactive Async to static analyses of JVM bytecode based on the Opal framework.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Oak, Aditya, et al.
(författare)
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Enclave-Based Secure Programming with JE
- 2021
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Ingår i: 2021 IEEE SECURE DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE (SECDEV 2021). - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Over the past few years, major hardware vendors have started offering processors that support Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allowing confidential computations over sensitive data on untrusted hosts. Unfortunately, developing applications that use TEEs remains challenging. Current solutions require using low-level languages (e.g., C/C++) to handle the TEE management process manually a complex and error-prone task. Worse, the separation of the application into components that run inside and outside the TEE may lead to information leaks. In summary, TEEs are a powerful means to design secure applications, but there is still a long way to building secure software with TEEs alone. In this work, we present J(E), a programming model for developing TEE-enabled applications where developers only need to annotate Java programs to define application-level security policies and run them securely inside enclaves.
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| 5. |
- Salvaneschi, Guido, et al.
(författare)
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Language-integrated privacy-aware distributed queries
- 2019
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages. - : Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). - 2475-1421. ; 3:OOPSLA, s. 167:1-167:30
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Distributed query processing is an effective means for processing large amounts of data. To abstract from the technicalities of distributed systems, algorithms for operator placement automatically distribute sequential data queries over the available processing units. However, current algorithms for operator placement focus on performance and ignore privacy concerns that arise when handling sensitive data.We present a new methodology for privacy-aware operator placement that both prevents leakage of sensitive information and improves performance. Crucially, our approach is based on an information-flow type system for data queries to reason about the sensitivity of query subcomputations. Our solution unfolds in two phases. First, placement space reduction generates deployment candidates based on privacy constraints using a syntax-directed transformation driven by the information-flow type system. Second, constraint solving selects the best placement among the candidates based on a cost model that maximizes performance. We verify that our algorithm preserves the sequential behavior of queries and prevents leakage of sensitive data. We implemented the type system and placement algorithm for a new query language SecQL and demonstrate significant performance improvements in benchmarks.
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