| 1. |
- Barra, Mathias, et al.
(författare)
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Do not despair about severity—yet
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Medical Ethics. - : BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. - 0306-6800 .- 1473-4257. ; 46:8, s. 557-558
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In a recent extended essay, philosopher Daniel Hausman goes a long way towards dismissing severity as a morally relevant attribute in the context of priority setting in healthcare. In this response, we argue that although Hausman certainly points to real problems with how severity is often interpreted and operationalised within the priority setting context, the conclusion that severity does not contain plausible ethical content is too hasty. Rather than abandonment, our proposal is to take severity seriously by carefully mapping the possibly multiple underlying accounts to well-established ethical theories, in a way that is both morally defensible and aligned with the term’s colloquial uses.
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| 2. |
- Jølstad, Borgar, et al.
(författare)
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When Should Popular Views be Included in a Reflective Equilibrium?
- 2024
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Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has become increasingly common to conduct research on popular views on ethical questions. In this paper, we discuss when and to what extent popular views should be included in a reflective equilibrium process, thereby influencing normative theory. We argue that popular views are suitable for inclusion in a reflective equilibrium if they approximate considered judgments and examine some factors that plausibly contribute to the consideredness of popular views. We conclude that deliberation and familiarity contribute to the consideredness of popular views, whereas prevalence does not. Furthermore, we raise the “fair trial” objection: that expert deliberation on popular views might fail to respect the consideredness of these views. Eliciting views approximating considered judgments directly from participants is therefore preferable to refining popular views or treating them as “bare” intuitions in the reflective process. These conclusions have important implications for which research methods will likely elicit popular views suitable for a reflective equilibrium process. Research focusing on the prevalence of views is unlikely to yield popular views suitable for a reflective equilibrium, whereas deliberative and in-depth work is more promising.
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| 3. |
- Solberg, Carl Tollef, et al.
(författare)
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Severity as a moral qualifier of malady
- 2023
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Ingår i: BMC Medical Ethics. - : BMC. - 1472-6939. ; 24:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The overarching aim of this article is to scrutinize how severity can work as a qualifier for the moral impetus of malady. While there is agreement that malady is of negative value, there is disagreement about precisely how this is so. Nevertheless, alleviating disease, injury, and associated suffering is almost universally considered good. Furthermore, the strength of a diseased persons moral claims for our attention and efforts will inevitably vary. This article starts by reflecting on what kind of moral impetus malady incites. We then analyze how severity may qualify this impetus. We do so by discussing the relationship between severity and need, well-being and disvalue, death, urgency, rule of rescue, and distributive justice. We then summarize our thoughts about severity as a moral qualifier. We conclude that severity is, and should continue to be seen, as a morally significant concept that deserves continued attention in the future.
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