| 1. |
- Bianchi, Federico, et al.
(författare)
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The peer review game : an agent-based model of scientists facing resource constraints and institutional pressures
- 2018
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Ingår i: Scientometrics. - : Springer. - 0138-9130 .- 1588-2861. ; 116:3, s. 1401-1420
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper looks at peer review as a cooperation dilemma through a game-theory framework. We built an agent-based model to estimate how much the quality of peer review is influenced by different resource allocation strategies followed by scientists dealing with multiple tasks, i.e., publishing and reviewing. We assumed that scientists were sensitive to acceptance or rejection of their manuscripts and the fairness of peer review to which they were exposed before reviewing. We also assumed that they could be realistic or excessively over-confident about the quality of their manuscripts when reviewing. Furthermore, we assumed they could be sensitive to competitive pressures provided by the institutional context in which they were embedded. Results showed that the bias and quality of publications greatly depend on reviewer motivations but also that context pressures can have a negative effect. However, while excessive competition can be detrimental to minimising publication bias, a certain level of competition is instrumental to ensure the high quality of publication especially when scientists accept reviewing for reciprocity motives.
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| 2. |
- Boero, Riccardo, et al.
(författare)
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Pillars of Trust : An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects
- 2009
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Ingår i: Sociological Research Online. - : SAGE Publications. - 1360-7804. ; 14:5, s. Article ID: 5-
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments on the relevance of reputation for trust and cooperation in social interaction. We have extended a repeated investment game by adding new treatments where reputation is taken more explicitly into account than before. We then compared treatments where the investor and the trustee rate each other and treatments where the investor and the trustee were rated by a third party. The results showed that: (i) third party reputation positively affects cooperation by encapsulating trust; (ii) certain differences in the reputation mechanism can generate different cooperation outcomes. These results have interesting implications for the recent sociological debate on the normative pillars of markets.
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| 3. |
- Boero, Riccardo, et al.
(författare)
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Reputational cues in repeated trust games
- 2009
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Ingår i: The Journal of Socio-Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 1053-5357 .- 1879-1239. ; 38:6, s. 871-877
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The importance of reputation in human societies is highlighted both by theoretical models and empirical studies. In this paper, we have extended the scope of previous experimental studies based on trust games by creating treatments where players can rate their opponents’ behavior and know their past ratings. Our results showed that being rated by other players and letting this rating be known are factors that increase cooperation levels even when rational reputational investment motives are ruled out. More generally, subjects tended to respond to reputational opportunities even when this was neither rational nor explainable by reciprocity.
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| 4. |
- Boero, Riccardo, et al.
(författare)
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Why Bother with What Others Tell You? : An Experimental Data-Driven Agent-Based Model
- 2010
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Ingår i: JASSS. - 1460-7425. ; 13:3, s. Article ID: 6-
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates the relevance of reputation to improve the explorative capabilities of agents in uncertain environments. We have presented a laboratory experiment where sixty-four subjects were asked to take iterated economic investment decisions. An agent-based model based on their behavioural patterns replicated the experiment exactly. Exploring this experimentally grounded model, we studied the effects of various reputational mechanisms on explorative capabilities at a systemic level. The results showed that reputation mechanisms increase the agents’ capability for coping with uncertain environments more than individualistic atomistic exploration strategies, although the former does entail a certain amount of false information inside the system.
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| 5. |
- Bravo, Giangiacomo, et al.
(författare)
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Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas : An experimental study
- 2013
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Ingår i: PLOS ONE. - : Public Library of Science (PLoS). - 1932-6203. ; 8:8
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards and punishment, as well as the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment. We found that punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if considered by itself, whereas rewards had a stronger effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of the `framing effect', i.e., as the combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and expect better behaviour from others.
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| 6. |
- Bravo, Giangiacomo, et al.
(författare)
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Hidden connections : Network effects on editorial decisions in four computer science journals
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Informetrics. - : Elsevier. - 1751-1577 .- 1875-5879. ; 12:1, s. 101-112
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper aims to examine the influence of authors’ reputation on editorial bias in scholarly journals. By looking at eight years of editorial decisions in four computer science journals, including 7179 observations on 2913 submissions, we reconstructed author/referee-submission networks. For each submission, we looked at reviewer scores and estimated the reputation of submission authors by means of their network degree. By training a Bayesian network, we estimated the potential effect of scientist reputation on editorial decisions. Results showed that more reputed authors were less likely to be rejected by editors when they submitted papers receiving negative reviews. Although these four journals were comparable for scope and areas, we found certain journal specificities in their editorial process. Our findings suggest ways to examine the editorial process in relatively similar journals without recurring to in-depth individual data, which are rarely available from scholarly journals.
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| 7. |
- Bravo, Giangiacomo, et al.
(författare)
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Intermediaries in Trust : Indirect Reciprocity, Incentives, and Norms
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Applied Mathematics. - : Hindawi Limited. - 1110-757X .- 1687-0042. ; 2015, s. 1-12
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Any trust situation involves a certain amount of risk for trustors that trustees could abuse. In some cases, intermediaries exist whoplay a crucial role in the exchange by providing reputational information. To examine under what conditions intermediary opinioncould have a positive impact on cooperation, we designed two experiments based on a modified version of the investment gamewhere intermediaries rated the behaviour of trustees under various incentive schemes and different role structures. We found thatintermediaries can increase trust if there is room for indirect reciprocity between the involved parties. We also found that the effectof monetary incentives and social norms cannot be clearly separable in these situations. If properly designed, monetary incentivesfor intermediaries can have a positive effect. On the one hand, when intermediary rewards are aligned with the trustor’s interest,investments and returns tend to increase. On the other hand, fixed monetary incentives perform less than any other incentiveschemes and endogenous social norms in ensuring trust and fairness. These findings should make us reconsider the mantra ofincentivization of social and public conventional policy.
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| 8. |
- Bravo, Giangiacomo, et al.
(författare)
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The effect of publishing peer review reports on referee behavior in five scholarly journals
- 2019
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Ingår i: Nature Communications. - : Nature Publishing Group. - 2041-1723. ; 10
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To increase transparency in science, some scholarly journals are publishing peer review reports. But it is unclear how this practice affects the peer review process. Here, we examine the effect of publishing peer review reports on referee behavior in five scholarly journals involved in a pilot study at Elsevier. By considering 9,220 submissions and 18,525 reviews from 2010 to 2017, we measured changes both before and during the pilot and found that publishing reports did not significantly compromise referees' willingness to review, recommendations, or turn-around times. Younger and non-academic scholars were more willing to accept to review and provided more positive and objective recommendations. Male referees tended to write more constructive reports during the pilot. Only 8.1% of referees agreed to reveal their identity in the published report. These findings suggest that open peer review does not compromise the process, at least when referees are able to protect their anonymity.
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| 9. |
- Bravo, Giangiacomo, et al.
(författare)
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Trust and Partner Selection in Social Networks: An Experimentally Grounded Model
- 2012
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Ingår i: Social Networks. - : Elsevier BV. - 0378-8733 .- 1879-2111. ; 34:4, s. 481-492
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article investigates the importance of the endogenous selection of partners for trust and cooperation in market exchange situations, where there is information asymmetry between investors and trustees. We created an experimental-data driven agent-based model where the endogenous link between interaction outcome and social structure formation was examined starting from heterogeneous agent behaviour. By testing various social structure configurations, we showed that dynamic networks lead to more cooperation when agents can create more links and reduce exploitation opportunities by free riders. Furthermore, we found that the endogenous network formation was more important for cooperation than the type of network. Our results cast serious doubt about the static view of network structures on cooperation and can provide new insights into market efficiency.
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| 10. |
- Casnici, Niccolò, et al.
(författare)
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Cooperazione, fiducia e differenze digenere: un’indagine cross-metodologica
- 2012
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Ingår i: Rassegna italiana di sociologia. - : Societa Editrice Il Mulino. - 0486-0349. ; 53:4, s. 573-600
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates gender differences in cooperation and trust through a cross-methodological study that combined lab experiment and trust survey. First, we performed a repeated investment game played by 108 students, where a trust-based market interaction was modeled based on asymmetries of information. Results indicated that females were more trustworthy, being more sensitive to cooperation when being trusted by others, whereas males tended to take higher risk investment when trust was relatively more rewarding. A trust survey on a population of 488 students completed the experimental results by looking at general aspects of trust perception of subjects. Also empirical results confirmed significant gender differences in trust, being females more influenced by generalized trust and interpersonal obligations.
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