| 1. |
- Andrighetto, Giulia, et al.
(författare)
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Are Some Countries More Honest than Others? Evidence from a Tax Compliance Experiment in Sweden and Italy
- 2016
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-1078. ; 7
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness and probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level of tax evasion (as a measure of ordinary dishonesty) does not differ significantly between Swedes and Italians. However, we also uncover differences in national “styles” of dishonesty. Specifically, while Swedes are more likely to be either completely honest or completely dishonest in their fiscal declarations, Italians are more prone to fudging (i.e., cheating by a small amount). We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolution and enforcement of honesty norms.
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| 2. |
- Rothstein, Bo, 1954, et al.
(författare)
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Social democracy in crisis? What crisis?
- 2013
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Ingår i: The Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe. - Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press. - 9780748665822 ; , s. 87-106
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Has the social democratic model of society stopped working?. This chapter addresses the following question: can the weakening of the social democratic political project in Europe be explained by the fact the social democratic model of society no longer performs? In other words, can the recent electoral crisis in social democratic parties be seen as a rational response from an electorate saying goodbye to a socio-economic model? If you want to compare social democratic policies with some kind of utopian political programme, you will certainly be disappointed. As pointed out in the introductory chapter to this volume, social democracy was never a utopian political project and its earlier success can therefore not be seen as a result of fulfilling a nirvana type of society. In contrast to the utopian models historically launched by communists and anarchists, social democracy has traditionally been firmly anchored in a concrete, down-to-earth pragmatism based on a realist vision that politics must be based on what is ‘possible’. Our argument is that the most reasonable way of judging the performance of the social democratic ‘model for society’ is to compare it with other existing macro-models. The most relevant in a European perspective is the centrist Christian democratic model and the political right's neo-liberal model. The questions are these: what should count as success for such macro-models and which countries should be seen as the best representatives of the social democratic model of society? We will start with the latter question.
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| 3. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(författare)
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Preferences for honesty can support cooperation
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. - : WILEY. - 0894-3257 .- 1099-0771. ; 36:4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites (n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of two treatments that vary only in their wording: The Contribution Frame uses a standard public good game framing, while in the Honesty Frame, words aimed to trigger honesty are used. We measure subjects honesty in three ways using the (i) sender-receiver task, (ii) the die-roll task, and (iii) self-reported honesty levels and account for other-regarding preferences and social norms to disentangle key alternative motives. We find that all three measures of honesty preferences robustly predict contributions, as do other-regarding preferences and empirical expectations but not normative expectations. Additionally, honesty preferences predict contributions in the Honesty Frame but not in the Contribution Frame, although the difference between these is not consistently significant. Finally, we find no differences in average cooperation across the treatments.
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| 4. |
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