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- Barabas, György, 1983-, et al.
(författare)
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Using Quotas as a Remedy for Structural Injustice
- 2023
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Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - : Springer. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420. ; 88, s. 3631-3649
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze a frequent but undertheorized form of structural injustice, one that arises due to the difficulty of reaching numerically equitable representation of underrepresented subgroups within a larger group. This form of structural injustice is significant because it could occur even if it were possible to completely eliminate bias and overt discrimination from hiring and recruitment practices. The conceptual toolkit we develop can be used to analyze such situations and propose remedies. Specifically, based on a simple mathematical model, we offer a new argument in favour of quotas, explore implications for policy-making, and consider the wider philosophical significance of the problem. We show that in order to reach more equitable representations, quota-based recruitment may often be practically unavoidable. Assuming that members of groups in statistical minority are more likely to quit due to their marginalization, their proportions can stabilize at a low level, preventing a shift towards more equal representation and conserving the minority status of the subgroup. We show that this argument has important implications for addressing, preventing, and remediating the structural injustice of unfair representation.
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| 4. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Exploitation and joint action
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of social philosophy. - : Wiley. - 0047-2786 .- 1467-9833. ; 50:3, s. 280-300
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There is a growing philosophical interest in the concept of exploitation as well as in putatively exploitative real-world practices. However, exploitation theory remains underdeveloped in an important way. Philosophers have mainly focused on cases where one party to a transaction or relationship, A, unduly takes advantage of another party, B, in order to secure a gain for him-/herself. At the same time, they have largely ignored cases where A takes advantage of B, but the gains A extracts from B accrue not (only) to A but (also) to a third party, C. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We distinguish between three different ways in which third parties can be involved in exploitative arrangements: (i) by non-culpably benefiting from exploitation; (ii) by culpably benefiting, without joint action; and (iii) culpably, through joint action with the exploiter. Drawing on joint action theory, we explore the relevance of this threefold distinction for the attribution of moral responsibility and blame to third parties, and defend it against potential objections. Then we argue that the distinction has important implications for the remedial duties of third-party beneficiaries of exploitation towards those who were exploited. We end by briefly highlighting the usefulness of our approach for ethical analyses of exploitative practices in the real world.
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| 5. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Exploitation and Remedial Duties
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Applied Philosophy. - : Wiley. - 0264-3758 .- 1468-5930. ; 38:1, s. 55-72
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The concept of exploitation and potentially exploitative real-world practices are the subject of increasing philosophical attention. However, while philosophers have extensively debated what exploitation is and what makes it wrong, they have said surprisingly little about what might be required to remediate it. By asking how the consequences of exploitation should be addressed, this article seeks to contribute to filling this gap. We raise two questions. First, what are the victims of exploitation owed by way of remediation? Second, who ought to remediate? Our answers to these questions are connected by the idea that exploitation cannot be fully remediated by redistributing the exploiter's gain in order to repair or compensate the victim's loss. This is because exploitation causes not only distributive but also relational harm. Therefore, redistributive measures are necessary but not sufficient for adequate remediation. Moreover, this relational focus highlights the fact that exploitative real-world practices commonly involve agents other than the exploiter who stand to benefit from the exploitation. Insofar as these third parties are implicated in the distributive and relational harms caused by exploitation, there is, we argue, good reason to assign part of the burden of remediation to them.
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| 6. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Exploitation in the gig economy
- 2023
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Ingår i: Public Ethics Blog. ; :2023-10-05
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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What do we owe the victims of exploitation?
- 2019
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Ingår i: Justice everywhere: a blog about philosophy in public affairs. ; :2019-12-19
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We tend to think that exploiting people is morally wrong. And yet, this kind of wrong is uncomfortably close to home for many of us. Likely, the clothes you wear today or the computer you use to read this piece were produced by workers who received meagre pay for dangerous and exhausting work. Since exploitation is so widespread and not something most of us can wash our hands of, we have to ask what is required to set things straight after exploitation has happened.
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| 9. |
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Morality and Agency : Themes from Bernard Williams
- 2022
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (refereegranskat)abstract
- Bernard Williams (1929–2003) was one of the great philosophical figures of the second half of the twentieth century. This collection, devoted to Williams’s ethical thought, is divided into two sections. The chapters in the first section deal with Williams’s attempts to explore theoretical options beyond the confines of what he called “the morality system.” These chapters show how, through a critical confrontation with this system, Williams found new ways to think about moral obligation, morally relevant emotions such as shame, the relevance of the history of philosophy, and also how these new ways of thinking are linked to Williams’s novel metaethical ideas concerning the possibility and limits of moral knowledge. In the book’s second section, readers will find chapters related to Williams’s discussions of freedom and responsibility, the role of luck in our moral lives, and agents’ practical reasons. Williams’s concerns about the morality system still loom large here. For example, Williams was skeptical about the prospects of putting our responsibility practices, and the conception of free will with which they are associated, on a firm footing. But as more than one author shows, Williams’s skepticism is largely confined to conceptions of free will and responsibility that are conditioned by the morality system’s uneasiness with luck. Williams has a more vindicatory story to tell about the prospects for freedom and responsibility once these concepts have been untethered from the assumptions of this system.
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