| 1. |
- Andersson, Emil, 1982-
(författare)
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Reinterpreting Liberal Legitimacy
- 2019
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis is an inquiry into the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, formulated by John Rawls in his later writings. According to this principle, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. This view can be interpreted in different ways, and I argue that the presently most popular way of doing so faces serious problems. The aim is to identify and defend a more plausible version of the principle, which overcomes these problems, and yet preserves the most essential and appealing features of the approach. Among the most central issues for how to interpret the principle are how to understand the notion of justifiability to a person, and who should be included in the group of persons referred to as "all citizens". On the currently received view, only justifiability to those who count as "reasonable" matter, and justifiability to these persons is understood in non-moral terms, as being determined by what is accessible to them, given the beliefs that they happen to hold. I argue that we have good reasons to reject both of these suggestions. We should instead spell out justifiability to a person in terms of what could be reasonably accepted in a moral sense, which allows us to retain the appealing idea that legitimacy is dependent on justifiability to all citizens over whom political power is exercised. I further suggest that we can use the original position – Rawls’s version of the social contract – to determine what is justifiable to all in this sense. I defend this suggestion against the expected objection that it will not be able to take reasonable pluralism – the assumption of deep disagreement between citizens – into account, by explaining why we should sharply distinguish this principle of political legitimacy from the theory of Political Liberalism. This distinction also contributes to my response to the objection, raised against this principle, that it is self-defeating. That my suggested interpretation allows us to convincingly respond to this line of criticism is yet another reason as to why it is preferable to the standard view.
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| 2. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, et al.
(författare)
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Etiska avvägningar i pandemitider
- 2021
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Ingår i: I en tid av pandemi. - Stockholm : Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi, Finansdepartementet. - 9789152500699 ; , s. 59-72
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Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 3. |
- Brülde, Bengt, 1959, et al.
(författare)
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essentialism och naturliga sorter
- 2008
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Ingår i: Liedman S, Tännsjö T & Westerståhl D (red.). Den svårfångade relativismen: en uppslagsbok. - Stockholm : Thales.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Risberg, Olle, 1993-, et al.
(författare)
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of the American Philosophical Association. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 2053-4477 .- 2053-4485. ; 5:2, s. 189-207
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is "fundamental" moral disagreement—that is, disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonmoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the disagreement challenge is flawed as it stands. The reason is that the epistemic assumptions it requires are incompatible with the possibility of fundamental disagreement. However, we also present an alternative reconstruction of the challenge that avoids the problem. The challenge we present crucially invokes the principle that knowledge requires "adherence". While that requirement is usually not discussed in this context, we argue that it provides a promising explanation of why disagreement sometimes leads to skepticism.
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| 7. |
- Risberg, Olle, 1993-, et al.
(författare)
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Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
- 2020
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Ingår i: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. - London : Routledge. - 9780367343200
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical skeptical conclusions that others take it to generate. Since disagreement is usually classified as being a type of higher-order evidence, these worries have in turn also been taken to cast doubts on skeptical arguments that appeal to disagreement. This chapter explores the idea that disagreement can make a belief unjustified by serving as an "undercutting defeater"; i.e., as a consideration which severs the link between the grounds we have for the belief and its truth. It is shown that this idea allows advocates of skeptical arguments from disagreement to respond to the worries about the significance of higher-order evidence.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Risberg, Olle, 1993-, et al.
(författare)
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Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
- 2020
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Ingår i: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. - 2210-5697 .- 2210-5700. ; 10:3-4, s. 283-303
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focus on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe them to have, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from skepticism” against moral realism. Realists have primarily sought to respond to this argument by presenting accounts of how we could acquire knowledge of moral truths that are consistent with realist assumptions about their nature. Less time has been spent, however, on the question of why it would be a problem for moral realism if it leads to skepticism in the first place, and on the related question of which skeptical conclusions it would be problematic for a realist to simply accept. This paper considers a number of possible answers to these questions, thereby distinguishing several different versions of the argument from skepticism. It also discusses how moral disagreement and evolutionary accounts of moral beliefs may be used to support these versions, and whether such considerations suggest that not only realism but also some forms of moral anti-realism have skeptical implications.
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| 10. |
- Rosenqvist, Simon
(författare)
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Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism : Action Guidance and Moral Intuitions
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- According to hedonistic act utilitarianism, an act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available to the agent. This dissertation gives a partial defense of utilitarianism against two types of objections: action guidance objections and intuitive objections.In Chapter 1, the main themes of the dissertation are introduced. The chapter also examines questions of how to understand utilitarianism, including (a) how to best formulate the moral explanatory claim of the theory, (b) how to best interpret the phrase "pleasure minus pain," and (c) how the theory is related to act consequentialism.The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) deals with action guidance objections to utilitarianism. Chapter 2 defines two kinds of action guidance: doxastic and evidential guidance. It is argued that utilitarianism is evidentially but not doxastically guiding for us. Chapter 3 evaluates various action guidance objections to utilitarianism. These are the objections that utilitarianism, because it is not doxastically guiding, is a bad moral theory, fails to be a moral theory, is an uninteresting and unimportant moral theory, and is a false moral theory.The second part (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) deals with intuitive objections to utilitarianism. Chapter 4 presents three intuitive objections: Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. Three defenses of utilitarianism are subsequently evaluated. Chapter 5 and 6 introduces two alternative defenses of utilitarianism against intuitive objections, both of which concern the role that imagination plays in thought experimentation. In Chapter 5, it is argued that we sometimes unknowingly carry out the wrong thought experiment when we direct intuitive objections against utilitarianism. In many such cases, we elicit moral intuitions that we believe give us reason to reject utilitarianism, but that in fact do not. In Chapter 6, it is argued that using the right kind of sensory imagination when we perform thought experiments will positively affect the epistemic trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. Moreover, it is suggested that doing so renders utilitarianism more plausible.In Chapter 7, the contents of the dissertation are summarized.
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