| 1. |
- Andersson, Per A., et al.
(författare)
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Anger and disgust shape judgments of social sanctions across cultures, especially in high individual autonomy societies
- 2024
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Ingår i: Scientific Reports. - : Nature Research. - 2045-2322. ; 14:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When someone violates a social norm, others may think that some sanction would be appropriate. We examine how the experience of emotions like anger and disgust relate to the judged appropriateness of sanctions, in a pre-registered analysis of data from a large-scale study in 56 societies. Across the world, we find that individuals who experience anger and disgust over a norm violation are more likely to endorse confrontation, ostracism and, to a smaller extent, gossip. Moreover, we find that the experience of anger is consistently the strongest predictor of judgments of confrontation, compared to other emotions. Although the link between state-based emotions and judgments may seem universal, its strength varies across countries. Aligned with theoretical predictions, this link is stronger in societies, and among individuals, that place higher value on individual autonomy. Thus, autonomy values may increase the role that emotions play in guiding judgments of social sanctions.
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| 2. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Cognitive ability and ideology join forces in the culture war : A model of opinion formation
- 2023
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Ingår i: PNAS Nexus. - : National Academy of Sciences. - 2752-6542. ; 2:6
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose a model of moral policy opinion formation that integrates both ideology and cognitive ability. The link from people's ideology to their opinions is assumed to go via a semantic processing of moral arguments that relies on the individual's cognitive ability. An implication of this model is that the relative quality of arguments that justify supporting vs. opposing a moral policy-the policy's “argument advantage”-is key to how opinions will be distributed in the population and develop over time. To test this implication, we combine polling data with measures of the argument advantage for 35 moral policies. Consistent with the opinion formation model, the argument advantage of a moral policy accounts for how public opinion moves over time, and how support for the policy ideologies varies across different ideological groups and levels of cognitive ability, including a strong interaction between ideology and cognitive ability.
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| 3. |
- Vartanova, I., et al.
(författare)
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Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions
- 2021
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media S.A.. - 1664-1078. ; 12
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.
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| 4. |
- Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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The common-is-moral association is stronger among less religious people
- 2021
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Ingår i: Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. - : Springer Nature. - 2662-9992. ; 8:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Questionable behaviours that are perceived as more common also tend to be judged as more morally justified. Here we explore this phenomenon in survey data from 31 countries in the European Values Study, allowing us to examine the universality of the common-is-moral association. More than 35,000 participants rated eight questionable behaviours (e.g., cheating on taxes, having casual sex) on how frequent they are and how justified they are. We estimated common-is-moral associations both across individuals for each behaviour and across behaviours within each individual; in both cases, the association tended to be positive. We further examined the hypothesis that the common-is-moral association would be stronger among less religious people, who are less likely to adopt their moral judgements from religious authorities and therefore should be more susceptible to the heuristic of using the perceived commonness of a behaviour as a guide to how it should be morally judged. Indeed, we found the common-is-moral association to be somewhat stronger among less religious people, whether the association was estimated across individuals or within individuals. We discuss alternative explanations, implications and directions for future research.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Strimling, Pontus, et al.
(författare)
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The connection between moral positions and moral arguments drives opinion change
- 2019
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Ingår i: Nature Human Behaviour. - : NLM (Medline). - 2397-3374. ; 3:9, s. 922-930
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Liberals and conservatives often take opposing positions on moral issues. But what makes a moral position liberal or conservative? Why does public opinion tend to become more liberal over time? And why does public opinion change especially fast on certain issues, such as gay rights? We offer an explanation based on how different positions connect with different kinds of moral arguments. Based on a formal model of opinion dynamics, we predicted that positions better connected to harm and fairness arguments will be more popular among liberals and will become more popular over time among liberals and conservatives. Finally, the speed of this trend will be faster the better the position connects to harm and fairness arguments. These predictions all held with high accuracy in 44 years of polling on moral opinions. The model explains the connection between ideology and moral opinions, and generates precise predictions for future opinion change.
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